Vazquez-Filippetti v. Banco Popular De Puerto Rico

• Decision Date: 09 January 2006
• Docket Number: No. CIV. 03-2071(HL).,CIV. 03-2071(HL).
• Parties: Yomar VAZQUEZ-FILIPPETTI, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BANCO POPULAR DE PUERTO RICO, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

409 F.Supp.2d 94

Yomar VAZQUEZ-FILIPPETTI, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BANCO POPULAR DE PUERTO RICO, et al., Defendants.

No. CIV. 03-2071(HL).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

January 9, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

David W. Roman, Jose Luis Ubarri-Garcia, Brown & Ubarri, San Juan, PR, Luis R. Mena-Ramos, Luis R. Mena Ramos Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Yomar Vazquez-Filippetti, Luz E. Filippetti-Perez, Marlyn Vazquez-Filippetti, Yohannie Vazquez-Filippetti, Plaintiffs.

Ivan M. Fernandez, Ivan M. Fernandez Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, defendant.

Francisco J. Colon-Pagan, Luis G. Martinez-Llorens, Colon, Colon & Martinez, San Juan, PR, Ivan M. Fernandez, Ivan M. Fernandez Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Federal Ins. Co., defendant.

Hector R. Cuprill, Hector R. Cuprill Law Office, Ponce, PR, Ivelisse Toro-Zambrana, Felix A. Toro Jr. Law Office, Ponce, PR, Vicente Santori-Margarida, Pinto-Lugo, Oliveras & Ortiz, PSC, San Juan, PR, for Jose Toro-Rodriguez, Felix Toro-Rodriguez, defendants. Vicente Santori-Margarida, Pinto-Lugo, Oliveras & Ortiz, PSC, San Juan, PR, for Cooperativa de Seguros Multiples, defendant.

Hector R. Cuprill, Hector R. Cuprill Law Office, Ponce, PR, for Cecilia Petition-Garcia, defendant.

Hector R. Cuprill, Hector R. Cuprill Law Office, Ponce, PR, Ivelisse Toro-Zambrana, Felix A. Toro Jr. Law Office, Ponce, PR, for C/P Toro-Petiton Conjugal Partnership Toro-Petiton, defendant.

ORDER

LAFFITTE, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on remand from the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit for the limited purpose of clarifying this Court's apparent grant of prejudgment interest to plaintiffs and entering any appropriate amended judgment.¹ Regretfully, due to a clerical error on the part of this Court, the Court of Appeals has inadvertently been mislead into understanding that plaintiffs' motion for prejudgment interest and attorneys' fees (Dkt. No. 176) has been adjudicated. As set forth in more detail below, this Court has not ruled upon said motion. Pursuant to the Court of Appeals' remand to clarify the issue of prejudgment interest and Rule 60(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court enters an amended order denying plaintiffs' motion for prejudgment interest and attorneys' fees.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Yomar Vazquez-Filippetti along with her mother and siblings, filed a personal injury action in this Court against Banco Popular de Puerto Rico (hereinafter "BPPR"), BPPR's insurer Federal Insurance Company, José Toro Rodríguez, Felix Toro Rodríguez, Cecilia Petition Garcia, the conjugal partnership comprised between Felix Toro Rodríguez and Cecilia Petition Garcia, (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the Toro defendants"), and their insurer Cooperativa de Seguros Multiples. The matter was tried before a jury, and on March 18, 2005, the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiffs. On March 22, 2005, the Court entered judgment.² That same day, plaintiffs requested that the Court amend the judgment to reflect that defendants are jointly and severally liable to plaintiffs for the full amount of the judgment.³ On April 6, 2005, plaintiffs filed a second motion to amend judgment, requesting the imposition of prejudgment interest and attorneys' fees.⁴

On August 16, 2005, the Court entered a docket order stating in its entirety "ORDER granting 172 Motion to Amend/Correct, granting 176 Motion to Amend/Correct. An amended judgment shall be entered accordingly."⁵ On the same date, the Court entered an amended judgment which was identical to the original judgment but included the following sentence, "Defendants are jointly and severally liable to plaintiffs for the full amount of the judgment."⁶ Three days later, on August 19, 2005, Co-defendants BPPR and Federal Insurance Company appealed this Court's March 22, 2005 original judgment, August 16, 2005 amended judgment, and July 22, 2005 order denying defendants' renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law.⁷ On December 19, 2005, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, holding the appeal in abeyance and retaining appellate jurisdiction, issued an order remanding the case for the limited purpose of having the Court "clarify its grant of prejudgment interest and enter any further appropriately amended judgment."⁸

It has come to the Court's attention that its docket order entered on August 16, 2005, (Dkt. No. 193) contains a clerical error. In said order, the Court intended to rule only on plaintiffs' March 22, 2005 motion to amend judgment to address the issue of joint and several liability (Dkt.172), and not plaintiffs' April 6, 2005 motion to amend judgment to include the imposition of prejudgment interest and attorneys' fees (Dkt. No. 176). However, due to an inadvertence, plaintiffs' April 6 2005 motion to amend judgment was mistakenly selected in the electronic document filing system. The Court has not previously adjudicated plaintiffs' motion for prejudgment interest and attorneys' fees, and is making its ruling now. Accordingly, pursuant to the First Circuit Court of Appeals' December 19, 2005 remand order and Rule 60(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court enters an amended order denying plaintiffs' motion for prejudgment interest and attorneys' fees.

II. MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES AND PREJUDGMENT INTEREST

Before the Court are plaintiffs' motion to amend judgment to include the imposition of prejudgment interest and attorneys' fees⁹ and defendants' individual oppositions to said motion.¹⁰ Since jurisdiction of this case is based on diversity of citizenship, the Court must apply the substantive law of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico to the issue of attorneys' fees and prejudgment interest. Correa v. Cruisers, a Div. of KCS Int'l, Inc., 298 F.3d 13, 30 (1st Cir.2002)(citing Grajales-Romero v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 194 F.3d 288, 301 (1st Cir.1999)); Fajardo Shopping Ctr., S.E., v. Sun Alliance Ins. Co. of Puerto Rico, 167 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir.1999). It is well established that Puerto Rico's Civil Procedure Rule 44.1(d) and Rule 44.3(b) are substantive for Erie doctrine purposes. Fajardo Shopping Ctr., S.E., 167 F.3d at 14; Servicios Comerciales Andinos, S.A. v. Gen. Elec. Del Caribe, Inc., 145 F.3d 463, 478 (1st Cir.1998). Rule 44.1(d) provides that "[i]n the event any party or its lawyers has acted obstinately or frivolously, the court shall, in its judgment, impose on such person the payment of a sum for attorney's fees which the court decides corresponds to such conduct." 32 L.P.R.A.App. III, R. 44.1(d); Top Entertainment, Inc. v. Torrejon, 351 F.3d 531, 533 (1st Cir.2003). Rule 44.3(b) provides that prejudgment interest is mandated "on the party that has acted rashly." 32 L.P.R.A.App. III, R. 44.3(b). "[W]hile Rule 44.3(b) speaks in terms of parties who act `rashly,' `the case law makes it transpicuously clear that the legally operative conduct under Rule 44.3(b) is that of obstinacy.'" Id. (quoting Dopp v. Pritzker, 38 F.3d 1239, 1252 (1st Cir.1994))(citing De Leon Lopez v. Corporacion Insular de Seguros, 931 F.2d 116, 126-27 (1st Cir. 1991); Ramos v. Davis & Geck, Inc., 167 F.3d 727, 734 (1st Cir.1999)).

"A finding of obstinacy requires that the court determine a litigant to have been unreasonably adamant or stubbornly litigious, beyond the acceptable demands of the litigation, thereby wasting time and causing the court and the other litigants unnecessary expense and delay." Correa, 298 F.3d at 30 (quoting De León López, 931 F.2d at 126); Puerto Rico Telephone Co., Inc. v. U.S. Phone Mfg. Corp., 427 F.3d 21, 33 (1st Cir.2005). Specifically, "[a] party shall be found obstinate if it `engages in actions which (a) make necessary litigation which could have been avoided, (b) prolongs the litigation unnecessarily, or (c) requires the other party to incur expenses in the pursuit of avoidable tasks.'" Top Entertainment Corp., 349 F.Supp.2d at 251 (quoting Newell Puerto Rico, Ltd. v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 20 F.3d 15, 24 (1st Cir.1994)). "Examples of obstinate conduct include: denying all liability in answering a complaint, where the defendant later admits liability; raising inapplicable defenses; denying all liability when only the amount of damages sought is contested; and denying a fact, knowing it is true." Correa, 298 F.3d at 31 (citing Fernández Mariño, 18 P.R. Offic. Trans at 830-31). If the court concludes that a party has been obstinate, the assessment of attorneys' fees and legal interest is mandatory. Id.; Fajardo Shopping Ctr., S.E., 167 F.3d at 14 (citing Dopp, 38 F.3d at 1252).

In the present case, plaintiffs seek the imposition of attorneys' fees and prejudgment interest, pursuant to Rule 44.1(d) and Rule 44.3(b) respectively, on the grounds that defendants were obstinate because they contested negligence and facts which in good faith could not have been denied, and filed frivolous motions. In support of their argument that defendants were obstinate in contesting negligence and facts, plaintiffs rely on co-defendants BPPR and Federal Insurance Company's answers to nine (9) paragraphs of the second amended complaint; and co-defendants José Toro Rodríguez, Felix Toro Rodríguez, and Cooperativa de Seguros Multiples answers to five (5) paragraphs of the second amended complaint. Defendants' answers, with one exception, fall into two categories: (1) answers that deny responsibility for plaintiffs' injuries and other allegations of negligence, and (2) answers that deny allegations on the grounds that defendants' lacked sufficient information or deny allegations as drafted. As discussed below, the Court finds that in the instant case defendants' answers to the second amended complaint do not amount to obstinate conduct.

The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has summarily rejected the argument that a defendant engages in obstinacy within the meaning of Rule 44.1(d) when it merely answers a complaint and denies negligence or...