Vazquez v. BOUGAL

• Decision Date: 02 September 1981
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 81-126 (PG).
• Citation: 525 F. Supp. 976
• Parties: Leonel VAZQUEZ, on behalf of his son Lester Vazquez Cruz, Plaintiff, v. Honorable Delia Lugo BOUGAL, Ponce Juvenile Court Judge, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

525 F. Supp. 976

Leonel VAZQUEZ, on behalf of his son Lester Vazquez Cruz, Plaintiff, v. Honorable Delia Lugo BOUGAL, Ponce Juvenile Court Judge, et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 81-126 (PG).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

September 2, 1981.

María Laura Colón, P. R. Legal Services, Río Piedras, P. R., for plaintiff.

Secretary of Justice of P. R., Dept. of Justice of P. R., San Juan, for defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

PEREZ-GIMENEZ, District Judge.

Presently before this Court is defendants' Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment, filed on February 18, 1981, based on the grounds of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel by judgment. On March 16, 1981, plaintiff filed his opposition thereto. Defendants, on April 7, 1981, filed a reply to plaintiff's opposition to defendants' motion to dismiss and request for summary judgment.

As per Order of May 5, 1981, the parties were ordered to submit further briefs in relation to the claims made by the plaintiff on the Equal Protection and Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. In compliance with said order plaintiff filed his brief on June 5, 1981, and defendants on June 22, 1981.

Plaintiff filed the instant action alleging violations to the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution, on January 27, 1981. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1343(3) and 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiff also requests declaratory and injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. 1651, 2201 and 2202.

Plaintiff contends that he, as a juvenile under the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, has been denied the application of the statute of limitations prescribed for criminal actions instituted pursuant to the Penal Code of Puerto Rico, 33 Laws of Puerto Rico Annotated 3412,¹ which is only applicable to adults; and that the failure to apply this statute to juveniles constitutes a violation to their due process and equal protection rights.

Plaintiff is a juvenile presently within the jurisdiction of the Ponce Juvenile Court. On October 16, 1978, complaints were filed against juvenile plaintiff at the Juvenile Division of said court. The allegations of the said complaints state that on June 2, 1977, he was driving an automobile in violation of the traffic laws because although he had a learner's permit, he was not accompanied by a duly authorized driver, and, also, because he caused an accident wherein the driver of the other vehicle was injured. He was charged with violating Articles 3-105(d) and 5-201 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, 9 L.P.R.A. 655(d) and 871, respectively.²

On or around December 19, 1978, plaintiff filed a motion before the Ponce Juvenile Court requesting that the protection of the statute of limitations governing criminal actions be applied to the case of herein plaintiff,³ and, thus, that insofar as the charges against plaintiff were filed more than a year after the date of the alleged offenses, the charges be dismissed as having prescribed. On March 7, 1979, the Ponce Juvenile Court (Judge Delia Lugo Bougal) issued an order denying plaintiff's petition that the criminal statute of limitations be applied to the juvenile's pending charges. Plaintiff then filed on April 6, 1979, a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico requesting review of the determination by the Ponce Juvenile Court. The Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico rendered an Opinion in the case on June 25, 1980, holding that the statute of limitations for criminal actions is not applicable to juvenile proceedings.⁴ Plaintiff's trial was already held at the Ponce Juvenile Court. Presently, plaintiff is awaiting ruling whether or not he is a juvenile delinquent based on the evidence presented at said trial.

The complaint in the present action was filed on January 27, 1981, praying for the determination by this Court that the Penal Statute of Limitations is applicable to juvenile proceedings. On February 3, 1981, plaintiff requested this Court to issue an order for defendants to show cause why an order temporarily restraining state juvenile proceedings should not be issued. This Court, by Opinion and Order filed on February 6, 1981, denied the abovementioned request grounded on the policy of federal non-interference in state pending proceedings, as established by the U. S. Supreme Court in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971); Trainor v. Hernández, 431 U.S. 434, 97 S.Ct. 1911, 52 L.Ed.2d 486 (1977), and that plaintiff had not shown the necessary extraordinary circumstances which authorize the federal court to enjoin a state proceeding.

It has been established that a state court decision on constitutional issues so presented and decided cannot be raised in a federal court under the Civil Rights Act. Lovely v. Laliberte, 498 F.2d 1261 (1 Cir., 1974). A party who has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate constitutional issues before the highest state court cannot use 42 U.S.C. 1983 civil rights action as a means of collateral attack or appeal of the final judgment of the state court. P. I. Enterprises, Inc., v. Cataldo, 457 F.2d 1012 (1 Cir., 1972); Vorbeck v. Whaley, 478 F.Supp. 1117 (E.D. Mo., 1979).

Thus, the issue before us is to determine whether the federal constitutional issues were raised, litigated and decided at the Juvenile Court and Supreme Court of Puerto Rico.

Plaintiff in the instant case argues that there is no Commonwealth of Puerto Rico decision on the federal issues raised in this suit and that this Court must proceed to adjudicate them. Therefore, this Court must determine if plaintiff raised the constitutional issues under the federal constitution at the Commonwealth courts, or on the contrary, made a specific reservation of his federal constitutional rights at the state court. England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 84 S.Ct. 461, 11 L.Ed.2d 440 (1969).

A reading of the Petition for Certiorari filed by plaintiff in the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and included with the complaint in the present case as Appendix I, reveals that plaintiff did raise the constitutional issue under the federal constitution on various occasions in said document. At the outset, in the jurisdictional pleading, at Page 1, plaintiff invokes the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico on both the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Article II, Sections 1, 7, 11 and 12, and on the Constitution of the United States, Amendments V and XIV.

Then, at pages 9 and 10, plaintiff specifically states:

"Due process of law and Equal Protection under the laws are constitutional guarantees imposed by the Constitution of the United States and of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico that may be asserted in cases where offenses are charged, offenses which had they been committed by adults, would constitute public crimes." (Emphasis added)

Plaintiff then goes on to cite several federal cases⁵ which have extended to juvenile proceedings certain constitutional guarantees that are applicable in adult criminal proceedings.

Additionally, at the Juvenile Court, Ponce Part, plaintiff raised the constitutional issues in a motion to dismiss where the issue of the applicability of the criminal statute of limitations to juvenile proceedings was first raised. Plaintiff grounded this argument on the federal constitution.⁶ Therefore, plaintiff unreservedly briefed, argued and submitted for decision at the state court his contention that the denial of the application of the statute of limitations prescribed for criminal actions in the penal code to juveniles constitutes a violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the U. S. Constitution.

Plaintiff alleges that there is no Commonwealth of Puerto Rico court decision on the federal issue raised in this suit, and cites Fernández v. Trías, 586 F.2d 848 (1 Cir., 1978) as controlling as to all the issues regarding res judicata and collateral estoppel pending before this Court. It was held in that case that only collateral estoppel of issues actually litigated and adjudicated would be applied to a federal plaintiff who had had a prior juvenile state court proceeding.

The Fernández case is distinguishable from the case at bar. On that case, complaints were filed in the juvenile court against a minor who was subsequently placed in detention without an adversary probable cause hearing. A petition was filed at the juvenile court requesting a judicial hearing to determine probable cause. Said request was denied orally and a petition for certiorari before the Puerto Rico Supreme Court followed. The Supreme Court simply denied certiorari without any statement of reasons. The denial of the certiorari without reasons does not express any view as to the merits of the cases. Borinquen Furniture v. District Court, 78 P.R.R. 858, 861 (1956); Suárez v. Administrador del Deporte Hípico de P. R., 354 F.Supp. 320 (D.P.R., 1972). Therefore, the issue in that case is not whether that claim was actually raised, but whether that claim was actually decided by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico.

In the present case, the situation is totally different. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico granted the petition for certiorari filed by the juvenile and an opinion was rendered as to the issues presented before it. As to the issue of statute of limitations in juvenile proceedings presented to this Court, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico stated: "A comparison between the principles underlying the statute of limitations in criminal law and those behind our Act Concerning Minors reveals that the former are not applicable to the proceedings established by said Act.". Slip Opinion, supra, at 9. After examining the Supreme Court decision the opinion rendered was based both on the local and federal constitutions, as...