Vazquez v. Municipality of Juncos
| Decision Date | 18 November 2010 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 08–1587 (PG). |
| Citation | 756 F.Supp.2d 154 |
| Parties | Marifeli VAZQUEZ, et al., Plaintiff,v.MUNICIPALITY OF JUNCOS, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Hector L. Claudio–Rosario, Hector Claudio Law Firm, Caguas, PR, for Plaintiff.Luis E. Pabon–Roca, Faccio & Pabon Roca, Vanessa I. Marzan–Hernandez, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.
Plaintiffs Marifeli Vazquez Reyes, Francisco Bonilla Perez, and their conjugal partnership (“Plaintiffs”) filed this action on behalf of their minor daughter Ana Rocio Bonilla Vazquez (“ARB”). The action was filed under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1991 1 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (“RA” or “ Section 504”) against the Municipality of Juncos (“Defendant” or “Juncos”), alleging discrimination, retaliation, and coercion on the basis of a protected disability. (Docket No. 1). Plaintiffs further invoke supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 for claims arising under Puerto Rico law.2 Plaintiffs seek actual, compensatory, and statutory damages, as well as injunctive relief, costs, and attorney's fees. Plaintiffs have also requested a jury trial. Juncos moved for summary judgment requesting the dismissal of the claims brought forth by the Plaintiffs on the grounds that Plaintiffs are unable to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Defendant also argues that Plaintiffs are unable to produce evidence that Juncos engaged in retaliation or coercion and that since there are no material facts in dispute, judgment as a matter of law should be entered in its favor. Defendant has also requested summary judgment on Plaintiffs' compensatory damages claim and has moved to strike the jury trial demand. After a close examination of all the evidence on record and a careful review of the applicable statutory and caselaw, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Juncos' motion for summary judgment for the reasons explained below.
Plaintiffs filed the instant suit against Juncos on May 28, 2008, alleging that Defendant is liable under Title II of the ADA and Section 504. Plaintiffs further alleged that Juncos is liable under Puerto Rico's disability discrimination statute. (Docket 1).
On March 23, 2010, Juncos filed a motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 49) along with a statement of undisputed material facts. (Docket No. 50). On April 20, 2010, Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition to Juncos' statement of uncontested facts. (Docket No. 53). Plaintiffs further filed a response in opposition to the motion for summary judgment on April 4, 2010, (Docket No. 54) in conjunction with an opposing statement of additional facts. (Docket No. 55). Juncos filed a reply to Plaintiffs' response to motion for summary judgment and a response to Plaintiffs' statement of additional facts on June 14, 2010 (Docket No. 66).
As part of their discrimination claim, Plaintiffs allege that Juncos intentionally discriminated against ARB or has been deliberately indifferent to the strong likelihood that pursuit of its policies would result in violations of federally protected rights provided by the ADA and the RA. Plaintiffs further posit that Juncos, as a recipient of federal funding, is prohibited from denying persons with disabilities its municipal benefits or engaging in discrimination in accordance with federal law. Plaintiffs also argue that they qualify for relief under the ADA provisions prohibiting retaliation and coercion, as well as under state law. Juncos moved for summary judgment requesting the dismissal of the claims brought forth by the Plaintiffs on the grounds that Plaintiffs are unable to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Defendant also argues that Plaintiffs are unable to produce evidence that Juncos engaged in intentional discrimination. In its defense, Defendant proffers that its actions were not motivated by Plaintiffs' alleged condition. On the contrary, Juncos contends that it did not retaliate against Plaintiff for requesting an accommodation, but instead, claims that ARB failed to request accommodation. As a result, Juncos requests the dismissal of Plaintiffs' federal and supplemental state law claims, as well as Plaintiffs' claim for compensatory damages and demand for jury trial. Plaintiffs' opposition is also before our consideration.(Docket No. 54).
Taking into consideration all motions, replies, and statements of fact along with the relevant exhibits, this Court rejects Juncos' request for summary judgment except for Plaintiffs' ADA retaliation claim.
The following factual narrative is derived from facts that are deemed uncontested by the Court because they were included in the motions for summary judgment and statements of fact, as well as oppositions, and were agreed upon or properly supported by the evidence and not genuinely opposed.
The Court finds that the following relevant facts are undisputed:
1. Plaintiff ARB asked her mother for permission to go and do some of her homework at the Juncos municipal library on October 11, 2007. ARB had to work on some science news articles.
2. ARB's mother worked nearby the municipal library at the Fulgencio Piñero School.
3. ARB has suffered from spina bifida and hydrocephalia since birth. ARB relies on a wheelchair for mobility. She was in the eighth grade in October 2007.
4. The municipal library of Juncos, Jose M. Gallardo Library, participates in the E–Rate program.
5. Under the E-rate program, eligible schools, libraries, and consortia that include eligible schools and libraries may apply for discounts for eligible telecommunications services, Internet access, and internal connections.
6. On October 11, 2007 Minor plaintiff ARB and her classmate were instructed to do homework together. The homework consisted of collecting science news in order to classify and prepare a summary of the news selected. The children went to the library to look for science news in the computers in order to complete the homework.
7. Luis Omar Caballero (“LOC”) was going to assist ARB with her homework and get the information for her.
8. ARB and LOC requested a key to utilize the elevator and took the elevator to the second floor. ARB and LOC did not get out of the elevator.
9. Minor plaintiff ARB did not have the opportunity to register at the computer room located in the second floor.
10. The elevator was repaired approximately two days before October 11, 2007.
11. There was no sign indicating that the elevator was out of order. There was no other elevator available at the library and it is unclear if there was a sign indicating the elevator was used exclusively for freight purposes.
12. The library director, Hilda Hernandez (“Hernandez”), has the practice of not allowing the public to use the library's elevator. The second floor of the library can only be accessed by stairs. The library elevator is used exclusively for freight purposes.
13. On at least one previous occasion Hernandez reacted angrily to a request for reasonable accommodation for ARB and stated that the only people she had to give reasonable accommodation to were her employees.
14. Hernandez was told by one of her office employees that the elevator was in use. Hernandez proceeded to tell ARB and LOC to exit the elevator.
15. ARB worked at the library during the summer of 2007 under a summer job contract with the Municipality. ARB worked in the library's reception area during her summer job. Her tasks included making copies and answering the phone.
16. ARB utilized the elevator to get to the second floor as part of her employment during the month of June 2007.
17. During her summer employment at the municipal library, ARB requested the noon shift so that she could attend therapy in the mornings. ARB did not request further accommodations.
18. ARB does not know whether the elevator had been repaired after June 2007 and prior to October 2007.
19. ARB does not know if the elevator had been out of order during the period between June 2007 and October 2007.
20. ARB has not been to the municipal library after October 11, 2007. ARB does not know anyone that has been to the library after October 11, 2007.
21. ARB does not know if the elevator is currently working at the municipal library.
22. The library still has the same elevator and it is used exclusively for freight purposes.
23. ARB was only familiar with the reception area and the book area of the library.
24. A person seeking to use the computers in the library could sign in on either the first or second floor.
25. A week after October 11, 2007, LOC went back to the municipal library and the computer that had been out of order was working properly.
Beyond these factual stipulations, the parties, in their respective statements of uncontested material facts, disagree as to whether Hernandez had established a policy that the elevator could only be used as a freight elevator and when exactly the elevator was repaired. Moreover, the parties strongly disagree as to whether or not Hernandez told ARB that she had to leave the library and the tenor with which she asked ARB to exit the elevator. A related point of contention is whether or not there were any employees available to provide assistance on the day of the incident and if ARB was in fact offered assistance after being asked to leave the elevator. Additionally, the parties are in disagreement regarding the availability of other computers that ARB could have used on the ground floor after being asked to leave the elevator. Lastly, the parties disagree as to whether or not a municipal employee regularly retrieves the desired information from the computer or if the public can utilize the computers without the assistance of an employee.
A motion for summary judgment is governed by Rule 56(c) of the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Echevarria v. AstraZeneca, LP
...of undesirable flaws in employee's performance).20 Contrary to the ADA, Law 44 lacks a retaliation component. Vázquez v. Municipality of Juncos,756 F.Supp.2d 154, 166 (D.P.R.2010) ; Franco,2009 WL 702221, *31, n. 17. Puerto Rico has a separate retaliation statute that applies to its anti-di......
-
Torres v. Junto De Gobierno De Servicio De Emergencia
...situations where economic harm is not present if there exists a sign of actual animus towards the disabled.” Vazquez v. Municipality of Juncos, 756 F.Supp.2d 154, 167 (D.P.R.2010) (citing Schultz v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n of U.S., 139 F.3d 286, 290–91 (1st Cir.1998) ). At this stage in......
-
Huertas Leon v. Colon-Rondon
..."the First Circuit has recognized that in some cases their ‘points of departure have no bearing.’ " Vazquez v. Municipality of Juncos, 756 F.Supp.2d 154, 163 (D.P.R. 2010) (quoting Partelow v. Massachusetts, 442 F.Supp.2d 41, 47 (D. Mass. 2006) ). Consequently, "the courts in our circuit ha......
-
DeCotiis v. Whittemore
...Rehabilitation Act.”) (citing Oliveras–Sifre v. Puerto Rico Dep't of Health, 214 F.3d 23, 25 (1st Cir.2000)); Vazquez v. Municipality of Juncos, 756 F.Supp.2d 154 (D.P.R.2010). Accordingly, the Court does not find it necessary to repeat its reasoning with regard to Plaintiff's retaliation c......