Vazza Properties, Inc. v. City Council of Woburn

• Decision Date: 17 May 1973
• Citation: 1 Mass.App.Ct. 308,296 N.E.2d 220
• Parties: VAZZA PROPERTIES, INC. v. CITY COUNCIL OF WOBURN.
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

Page 220

296 N.E.2d 220

1 Mass.App.Ct. 308

VAZZA PROPERTIES, INC. v. CITY COUNCIL OF WOBURN.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

Argued March 22, 1973.

Decided May 17, 1973.

Bruce G. McNeill, Boston (John E. Bradley, Boston, with him), for plaintiff.

William H. Shaughnessy, Boston (James F. Lawton, Jr., Boston, with him), for defendant.

Before ROSE, KEVILLE and ARMSTRONG, JJ.

ARMSTRONG, Justice.

This bill in equity was brought by the owner of 4.5 acres of vacant land on Alfred Street near its intersection with Main Street in Woburn, against the Woburn city council, appealing the council's denial of a special permit to erect on that land 144 one-bedroom apartment units in nine buildings, with parking facilities for 156 automobiles. The plaintiff's application to the city council was filed pursuant to a city ordinance requiring a special permit issued by the council for the construction of apartment buildings in a residential zone. ¹ The ordinance sets forth standards to govern the council's exercise of its discretion in granting or denying special permits. ² After hearing, the council voted on the application, which failed to receive the two-thirds vote required for approval. Three reasons were cited for denial of the special permit in the lengthy and detailed findings and decision adopted by the members who so voted: (1) the proposed apartment complex with adjacent parking areas would aggravate a periodic flooding problem in nearby residential areas by eliminating a natural, soft-peat holding area for the Middlesex canal waterway and the surrounding area, and the members were not persuaded that the plaintiff's proposed drainage system would provide an adequate substitute; (2) the Woburn water supply system is insufficient to meet the existing residential and industrial demands as well as to maintain sufficient pressure for fire protection, and 'future construction of this magnitude would create a public safety hazard for the North Woburn area'; and (3) due to the narrow, S-curve construction of Alfred Street at its junction with Main Street, neither those streets nor the intersection would be equipped to handle an increased traffic load without creating a 'serious (traffic) safety problem.'

On appeal under G.L. c. 40A, § 21, the trial judge made independent findings of facts which are set out in the margin. ³ On the basis of these findings, the judge concluded that the council did not act arbitrarily in denying the special permit, that it had to deal with serious problems of traffic congestion, water drainage, and high population density, and that its action in denying the permit was therefore within the scope of its authority. From a final decree to that effect, the plaintiff appealed.

The plaintiff's principal contention is that the judge's findings of fact are not sufficiently detailed to comply with the standard of review required by G.L. c. 40A, § 21, as construed (with reference to a predecessor statute) in Pendergast v. Board of Appeals of Barnstable, 331 Mass. 555, 120 N.E.2d 916, and a line of cases following it. The plaintiff relies principally on JOSEPHS V. BOARD OF APPEALS OF BROOKLINE, MASS., 285 N.E.2D 436^A.

The Josephs case, however, was an appeal from a decision granting, not denying, a variance and several special permits. In such a case not only must a board of appeals make an affirmative finding as to the existence of each condition of the statute or by-law required for the granting of the variance or special permit (Planning Bd. of Springfield v. Board of Appeals of Springfield, 355 Mass. 460, 462, 245 N.E.2d 454), but the judge in order to affirm the board's decision on appeal must find independently that each of those conditions is met. Blackman v. Board of Appeals of Barnstable, 334 Mass. 446, 449, 136 N.E.2d 198. In the Josephs case the judge's findings were not detailed enough to support a decree sustaining the grant of certain of the special permits. 'The pertinent by-law provisions require the specific application of mathematical formulae. The judge's findings did not comply with these requirements.' Mass., ^b 285 N.E.2d 436 at 441.

The present case, however, is an appeal from the council's denial of a special permit. Such a denial is within the discretion of a board of appeals. Pendergast v. Board of Appeals of Barnstable, 331 Mass. 555, 559--560, 120 N.E.2d 916; Gulf Oil Corp. v. Board of Appeals of Framingham, 355 Mass. 275, 277--278, 244 N.E.2d 311; MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 356 Mass. 635, 638, 255 N.E.2d 347. The discretion must not be exercised arbitrarily, however. 'The board must act fairly and reasonably on the evidence presented to it' (MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 356 Mass. 635, 638--639, 255 N.E.2d 347, 350), and must set 'forth clearly the reason or reasons for its decisions.' G.L. c. 40A, § 18. On appeal under § 21 the nature of the findings of fact the judge is required to make must be governed by the nature of the reasons a board gives for its decision. The council here did not purport to base its decision on lack of authority to grant the permit because a legally essential prerequisite was absent. Rather, the council denied the permit as an act of discretion, and set forth its reasons for exercising its discretion in the manner it did. The judge's function on appeal was to ascertain whether the reasons given by the council had a substantial basis in fact, or were, on the contrary, mere pretexts for arbitrary action or veils for reasons not related to the purposes of the zoning...