Veach, In re

• Decision Date: 12 March 1956
• Docket Number: No. 44453,44453
• Citation: 287 S.W.2d 753,365 Mo. 776
• Parties: In re Ogle E. VEACH, an Attorney.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 753

287 S.W.2d 753

365 Mo. 776

In re Ogle E. VEACH, an Attorney.

No. 44453.

Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.

March 12, 1956.

Lyle M. Allen, George C. Willson, III, St. Louis, for informants.

Stephen F. Pinter, St. Louis, for respondent.

EAGER, Judge.

This is a disciplinary proceeding against Ogle E. Veach, a member of the Bar of Missouri; he will hereinafter be referred to as the respondent. The information was filed direct in this court on June 3, 1954, under Rule 5.03, by the members of the Bar Committee for the Eighth Judicial Circuit. That committee had conducted an informal investigation, and thereafter had held formal hearings after due notice to respondent, who appeared there in person and by attorney. After such hearings, the committee found that there was probable cause to believe that respondent was guilty of professional misconduct in both particulars set out in the notice; these conform, generally, to Counts I and II of the information filed here.

Count I of the information charges professional misconduct in that respondent, with the aid of one Ross, solicited the personal injury claim of William C. Hugueley in St. Louis, Missouri, on February 23, 1952, and thereafter; Count II alleges the suspension of respondent from the practice of law by a judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois, by reason of ten separate acts of improper solicitation or attempted solicitation of personal injury claims; that suspension was for a period of five years from September 24, 1953; attached to the information are authenticated copies of the judgment and opinion of that court. The prayer is that respondent be permanently disbarred. Summons in usual form was issued and served, and the court also entered its order requiring respondent to show cause why he should not be disciplined by reason of the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois.

Respondent filed his answer denying the charges of Count I and specifically denying that Ross solicited on his behalf or with his authority; the answer admitted the suspension in Illinois, as alleged in Count II, but denied the sufficiency of the evidence there, and denied the 'legality' of that judgment because respondent was not then engaged in practice in Illinois and had no office or home there. Respondent likewise filed a return to the order to show cause alleging: (1) that no rule had been adopted by this court permitting any summary order based on the Illinois proceedings; (2) that respondent was and is a resident of Missouri, had no office in Illinois for some years prior to the proceedings there, and that he was originally licensed here; (3) that the opinion of the Supreme Court of Illinois 'discloses no basis for the severe condemnation' adjudged; (4) that the criticism there levied against him for not producing certain corroborating witnesses was unjustified. Informants have filed their motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Count II of the information, on the ground that respondent has failed to allege any facts sufficient to show why the Illinois judgment should not subject him to discipline here. That motion is now pending.

This court then appointed the Honorable John W. Calhoun, former Judge of the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, as Special Commissioner to take testimony, make findings, and report to this court his findings and conclusions on Count I of the information. The Special Commissioner duly qualified and proceeded to hold hearings at various times. Respondent appeared there in person and by counsel and participated in the hearings. It developed at these hearings that William C. Hugueley and Mildred P. Jamerson, both of whom had testified before the committee at the informal and formal hearings (see Rule 5.03), had moved to Chicago, Illinois, and were then married; these witnesses had not answered a request that they appear before the Commissioner; consequently, the informants offered, and the Commissioner received, over objection, the record of their testimony at both such prior hearings. Although it may be that all such evidence was properly received under Rule 5.03, since these witnesses were fully cross-examined at the formal hearing and after due notice to respondent, we need not cross that bridge here; we shall consider only the testimony of these witnesses at the formal hearing before the committee, which consisted almost entirely of cross-examination by respondent's counsel. There can certainly be no lack of due process in so doing. Thus, we proceed first to a review of the evidence on Count I of the information. Since it is our duty to make our own decision, after giving due regard to the findings and recommendations of the Commissioner, we review the evidence independently.

It appears that respondent lived in Illinois until he enrolled in the Benton College of Law in St. Louis, from which he graduated in 1928; at approximately that time he was admitted to the Bar of Missouri. He continued to practice here until about 1939 or 1940, when he was admitted to practice in Illinois. From that time until about 1951 he maintained an office in East St. Louis, Illinois, after which time he apparently moved back to Missouri. At the time of the occurrences charged in Count I he had an office address in St. Louis, Missouri.

William C. Hugueley, an employee of Fisher Body Division of General Motors in St. Louis, sustained injuries in an automobile accident on February 22, 1952, and was taken to the St. Louis City Hospital and there placed in a ward with various other patients. Two friends, a Miss (or Mrs.) Mildred P. Jamerson and Charles F. Oberhaus visited him there from time to time, and parts of the evidence stated here consist of their testimony. Combining the evidence of these three persons, it appears therefrom generally that about 1:00 P.M. on Saturday, the day after the accident, a man appeared at Hugueley's bedside, entirely unrequested and unknown to him, and introduced himself as Mr. Ross. This man said that he had been informed that Hugueley was hurt, that he was working for an attorney, that 'we are well equipped to do the job * * * we take pictures of the place,' that he figured Hugueley needed a good lawyer, and that 'they should get started on it right immediately before it gets too old * * *.' Hugueley told him that he would not be interested until he talked with his friends, but that he could come back if he wanted to; the man returned the next afternoon (Sunday) and talked both with Hugueley and Miss Jamerson, to the latter of whom he also introduced himself as 'Ross.' On either Saturday or Sunday he mentioned Mr. Veach, the respondent, whom he said was then in Alton, Illinois, working on a case; he further said that Mr. Veach 'usually worked with him.' On Sunday Ross left after a few minutes when Hugueley's wife came in; in the meantime, however, he had said that he wanted them to meet Mr. Veach, talked about 'cases' he had been interested in, and asked if Miss Jamerson would be there on Monday. On two occasions Ross was asked for his card, but he said that he 'had changed his shirt' and had none. Neither Hugueley nor Miss Jamerson told Ross not to bring Mr. Veach there, nor did they invite him to do so. Miss Jamerson testified that she told Ross that if Hugueley wanted him he would get in touch with him, and that he talked about cases and left. On Monday evening Ross came back with respondent Veach, who did most of the talking after he was introduced by Ross. Charles Oberhaus and Miss Jamerson were also there and much of the conversation was between them and Veach because Hugueley was 'more or less' letting them handle the matter and he was apparently not in a physical condition to conduct negotiations; Mr. Veach then mentioned other specific cases in which he had been associated and the matter of large settlements obtained; Miss Jamerson and Oberhaus asked Veach for his card and she testified that 'he eventually' gave them one and wrote his telephone number on it; the card was produced at the hearing. Miss Jamerson also asked him what his 'terms' were and he replied that 'we get a third.' Oberhaus testified that Veach did not in so many words say 'Give me the case,' but when asked by respondent's own counsel: 'Did he solicit the case or not, in your presence?' he answered 'I believe he did; yes.' Miss Jamerson further testified that on the day Hugueley went home from the hospital and while some insurance people were there, the doorbell rang, the landlord answered, and when she looked out a little later she saw respondent get into a car across the street and drive away; also, that Ross was with him. She further testified that someone telephoned the house the next morning and said 'This is Ross and Veach,' and that she told the person speaking that Hugueley already had a lawyer (he having apparently employed a Mr. Mashak on the previous evening.)

The respondent testified before the Commissioner in substance as follows (we shall note in parentheses certain comparisons with his testimony before the Bar Committee): that since 1952 he had been associated with the law firm of Cox, Cox & Cox in St. Louis; that he had known a Roy Garrett who had previously referred his brother's case to respondent, and had also referred to him the case of a 'lady * * * that got hurt one time'; that Garrett was not a lawyer, but ran a trailer camp and had been in the insurance business; that on February 23, 1952, he found a telephone message on his desk instructing him to meet Roy Garrett at the City Hospital to see a friend of his there, but 'they had it Ross instead of Roy'; that he went to the City Hospital that evening, met Garrett in the reception room and was taken into the ward and introduced to Hugueley. (In his testimony before the Committee respondent said that Garrett had, at the time, been visiting his injured brother; that Garrett was 'there with Mr. Hugueley' when he, Veach, got to the hospital; also, that...