Veach v. Barber
| Decision Date | 23 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2021AP1030 |
| Parties | Jeff Veach and Ramona Veach, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Charles Barber, Margo Barber, Clint Ziegler, Jill Ziegler, Corey J. Roudebush, Martha J. Roudebush, Noel Mattei and Laura Mattei, Defendants-Respondents. |
| Court | Wisconsin Court of Appeals |
This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.
APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Columbia County Cir Ct. No. 2020CV70: TROY D. CROSS, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Fitzpatrick, Graham, and Nashold, JJ.
Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in Wis.Stat. Rule 809.23(3).
¶1 Charles and Margo Barber own a parcel of land (the "Barber parcel"), and the deed for that parcel conveys an easement for ingress and egress ("the easement") that passes across other parcels. One of the parcels across which the easement passes is owned by Jeff and Ramona Veach (the "Veach parcel"). The deed for the Veach parcel references a certified survey map that depicts the portion of the easement that passes across the Veach parcel, but that deed does not state that the Veaches have been granted an easement.
¶2 The Veaches filed a complaint in the Columbia County Circuit Court against the Barbers and the owners of the other parcels across which the easement passes. The Veaches requested that the court enter a declaratory judgment stating that the language of the easement benefits all of the parcels across which it passes, including the Veach parcel. The Veaches also requested that the court enter an order correcting their deed pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 847.07 (2019-20)[1] and reforming the deed pursuant to the court's equitable authority so as to grant an easement to the Veaches. Finally, the Veaches asked for an order granting an easement to their property through the doctrines of implication, necessity, estoppel, and prescription. The Barbers and the Veaches both moved for summary judgment. The court granted the Barbers' motion and denied the Veaches' motion.
¶3 On appeal, the Veaches argue that the circuit court erroneously granted summary judgment for the Barbers because the deed for the Veach parcel, the certified survey map referenced in the Veaches' deed, and the language of the easement establish that the Veaches were conveyed an easement for access to their property.[2] In the alternative, the Veaches argue that the circuit court erred in failing to reform the deed for the Veach parcel based on mutual mistake. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the court's order granting summary judgment for the Barbers and denying the Veaches' summary judgment motion.
¶4 The Barbers request an award of costs and attorney fees incurred in this appeal because, in their view, the Veaches' entire appeal is frivolous. We deny the Barbers' motion.
¶5 There is no dispute as to the following material facts.
¶6 In 1993, Earl Hillestad executed a warranty deed conveying to the Barbers a parcel of land-i.e., the Barber parcel-in the Town of Lodi, Wisconsin. This parcel is landlocked and does not border a public road. The deed for the Barber parcel included an easement for access to the Barber parcel from Cactus Acres Road across five parcels that were owned by Hillestad at that time, including what is now the Veach parcel. For convenience, we refer to those other four parcels as the "Roudebush parcel," the "Ziegler parcel," the "Mattei parcel," and the "Right-of-Way parcel."[3]
¶7 The Barber, Veach, Roudebush, Ziegler, Mattei, and Right-of-Way parcels are depicted on the following map[4]:
(Image Omitted) ¶8 The easement approximately follows the dotted line from the bottom left of the Barber parcel, along the top of the map and down the right side of the map. The easement is located on a 66-foot strip of land that: begins at the southern border of the Barber parcel; passes along the southern edge of the Barber parcel; passes along the northern edge of the Veach, Roudebush, Ziegler, and Mattei parcels; passes along the length of the Right-of-Way parcel; and ends at the point at which the Right-of-Way parcel borders Cactus Acres Road. The full text of the instrument that conveyed the easement is reproduced later in this opinion.
¶9 After purchasing the Barber parcel, the Barbers built a driveway ("the driveway") to Cactus Acres Road along the length of the easement. Following the sale of the Barber parcel, Hillestad sold the Veach, Roudebush, Ziegler, Mattei, and Right-of-Way parcels. The deeds for the Veach, Roudebush, and Ziegler parcels do not include the description of the easement that appears in the deed for the Barber parcel.[5]
¶10 The Barbers and the Matteis both use the portion of the driveway that passes across the Right-of-Way parcel. Additionally, consistent with the conveyance of the easement, the Barbers use the portion of the driveway that passes across the northern edge of the Mattei, Veach, Roudebush, and Ziegler parcels. The Veaches, Roudebushes, and Zieglers do not utilize any portion of the driveway and have not contributed to the cost of building, maintaining, or plowing the driveway.
¶11 The Veaches filed a complaint against the Barbers, the Roudebushes, the Zieglers, and the Matteis.[6] The complaint sought relief that can be summarized as follows: (1) an order declaring that the easement is a non exclusive easement that entitles the Veaches to an easement for ingress and egress; (2) an order pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 847.07(1)(a)[7] correcting the legal description of the deed for the Veach parcel to include a grant of an easement; (3) an order pursuant to the court's equitable powers under WIS. STAT. § 706.04(1)[8] to correct the "mutual mistake" of Hillestad and the Veaches in not including a grant of an easement in the Veaches' deed; and (4) an order granting an easement to the Veaches through the doctrines of implication, necessity, estoppel, and prescription.
¶12 The Barbers moved for summary judgment on each claim in the Veaches' complaint.[9] The Veaches responded by filing both their own motion for summary judgment and a response opposing summary judgment for the Barbers. In these pleadings the Veaches argued that they are entitled to summary judgment because the easement is "non-exclusive" and because the language of the easement demonstrates the intent to provide a right of access to the Veach, Roudebush, Ziegler, and Mattei parcels for the owners of those parcels. The Veaches' motions also requested that the court correct the deed for the Veach parcel based on "mutual mistake."[10]
¶13 The circuit court granted the Barbers' motion for summary judgment and denied the Veaches' motion for summary judgment. The court determined that neither the deed for the Veach parcel nor the deed for the Barber parcel entitled the Veaches to an easement for access to the Veach parcel. The court also dismissed all claims against the Zieglers, Roudebushes, and Matteis as moot. The Veaches filed a motion for reconsideration, and the court denied that motion. The Veaches appeal the court's order granting summary judgment for the Barbers and denying the Veach summary judgment motion.[11] ¶14 Additional facts are discussed later in this opinion.
¶15 The Veaches argue that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to the Barbers, and denying their summary judgment motion, because the pertinent instruments and extrinsic evidence establish that the Veaches were granted an easement to access their property. The Barbers respond that the court properly granted summary judgment in their favor because the Veaches fail to establish that there was an intent to convey an easement to the Veaches. We begin by setting forth our standard of review and governing principles regarding summary judgment and deed interpretation.
¶16 We review a circuit court's decision to grant or deny summary judgment de novo, applying the same methodology as the circuit court. Konneker v. Romano, 2010 WI 65, ¶22, 326 Wis.2d 268, 785 N.W.2d 432. On summary judgment, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." WIS. STAT. § 802.08(2); see Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Klomsten, 2018 WI.App. 25, ¶31, 381 Wis.2d 218, 911 N.W.2d 364. "An issue of fact is genuine if a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party." Central Corp. v. Research Prods. Corp., 2004 WI 76, ¶19, 272 Wis.2d 561, 681 N.W.2d 178. "A material fact is such fact that would influence the outcome of the controversy." Id. ¶17 This appeal requires that we interpret the language of the deeds for the Barber and the Veach parcels as well as the certified survey map referenced in the Veaches' deed. A "certified survey map" is a map or plan of record of a land division that complies with the requirements of WIS. STAT. § 236.34. A map that is referenced in a deed is considered to be one of the terms of the deed. See Pavela v. Fliesz, 26 Wis.2d 710, 715, 133 N.W.2d 244 (1965); Slauson v. Goodrich Transp. Co., 99 Wis. 20, 25, 74 N.W. 574 (1898) ().
¶18 When interpreting deeds, our goal is to determine the...
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