Veal v. Citrus World, Inc.

• Decision Date: 08 January 2013
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 2:12-CV-801-IPJ
• Parties: JOHN ALBERT VEAL, JR., on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated. PLAINTIFF, v. CITRUS WORLD, INC., DEFENDANT.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama

JOHN ALBERT VEAL, JR., on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated. PLAINTIFF,

v.CITRUS WORLD, INC., DEFENDANT.

CASE NO. 2:12-CV-801-IPJ

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA SOUTHERN DIVISION

DONE and ORDERED: January 8, 2013

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pending before the court is the plaintiff's motion for leave to amend complaint (doc. 36), defendant's motion to dismiss the second amended complaint (doc. 37), the plaintiff's response to the motion to dismiss (doc. 41), the defendant's response to the plaintiff's motion to amend (doc. 42), the defendant's reply to the plaintiff's response in opposition to the motion to dismiss (doc. 44), and the plaintiff's reply in support of his motion to amend (doc. 45). Having considered the motions, responses, and the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint, as amended to date, the court finds as follows:

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The various amended complaints assert that defendant, maker of Florida's Natural Orange Juice, manipulates the flavor of its orange juice through the addition of various compounds to mask the taste that results from extensive processing. Theplaintiff complains that although defendant markets its orange juice as "100% orange juice," it is heavily processed, stored, and flavored before reaching market shelves for purchase by consumers. See e.g., second amended complaint, ¶¶ 8, 10-13, 11. Plaintiff blames some of this processing on the pasteurization process, which may create off-flavors or aromas. Id., ¶¶ 29-30, 44. He asserts that "[w]ithout the addition of flavoring and aroma, Florida's Natural would not only be unappealing to consumers, but also nearly undrinkable." Id., ¶ 40. According to plaintiff, the flavorings thus added are "unnatural, scientifically produced" and "designed in laboratories by chemists, food scientists, and flavorists." Id., ¶ 42.

The plaintiff asserts that because the label does not mention that flavoring and aroma are added, "reasonable consumers desirous of 100% pure and fresh squeezed orange juice have been deceived into purchasing Florida's Natural..." Second amended complaint, ¶ 77. The plaintiff does not aver that he personally has ever consumed Florida's Natural orange juice or that he suffered any ill health effects from consumption of the same, but rather alleges only that he purchased it, repeatedly, over the six years preceding the first complaint. Based on these allegations, the plaintiff sues on behalf of a class for breach of express warranty and breach of contract.¹

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing motions to dismiss, the court must "accept the allegations of the complaint as true and construe them 'in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.'" Simmons v. Sonyika, 394 F.3d 1335, 1338 (11th Cir.2004); citing Hill v. White, 321 F.3d 1334, 1335 (11th Cir.2003). See also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007). A court should not dismiss a suit on the pleadings alone "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim." Beck v. Deloitte & Touche, Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, Ernest & Young, L.L.P., 144 F.3d 732, 735 (11th Cir.1998)(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)).

A motion to dismiss is granted "only when the movant demonstrates 'beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'" Sonyika, 394 F.3d at 1338, citing Spain v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 363 F.3d 1183, 1187 (11th Cir.2004)(quoting Conley v.Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). See also Jackson v. Okaloosa County, Fla., 21 F.3d 1531, 1534 (11th Cir.1994)(stating that the court "must accept as true the facts stated in the complaint and all reasonable inferences therefrom").

LEGAL ANALYSIS

In essence, the plaintiff complains that bottled orange juice is not fresh-squeezed orange juice. He offers no explanation as to why he does not squeeze his own oranges if he truly seeks fresh squeezed orange juice. The court offers this observation because the essence of his claim concerns the question of how much processing is permissible in a product labeled as "fresh" "100%" or "pure."²

Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that he has "in the last six years purchased orange juice products produced, marketed and sold by the defendant as pure 100% orange juice." Amended complaint, ¶ 89. He states that had he "known the truth about the defendant's orange juice products, he would not have made his purchase choices, and would not have paid the higher value charged for the alleged quality of Florida's Natural's orange juice." Id., at ¶ 91. Based on these facts, plaintiff seeksto represent a nationwide class of individuals who similarly bought defendant's orange juice, apparently without concern as to whether such other individuals were similarly misled. Id., at ¶ 93. The plaintiff states claims on behalf of this proposed class for breach of express warranty and breach of contract. The plaintiff seeks both compensatory and injunctive relief.

The defendant asserts that the plaintiff lacks standing because he alleges no actual or concrete injury; that the complaint is preempted by the FDA regulations, and that the plaintiff does not state claims for breach of contract or breach of express warranty. The plaintiff responds that his injury is the purchase of orange juice believing it to be something that it was not. However, the plaintiff does not allege any claim under the Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act.³ The court considers each of the defendant's bases for its motion to dismiss in turn.

"Standing is a threshold jurisdictional question which must be addressed prior to and independent of the merits of a party's claims." Swann v. Sec'y, 668 F.3d 1285, 1288 (11th Cir.2012) (quoting Bochese v. Town of Ponce Inlet, 405 F.3d 964, 974 (11th Cir.2005) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted)). Standing isjurisdictional, cannot be waived, and is properly addressed under Rule 12(b)(1). See United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742, 115 S.Ct. 2431, 132 L.Ed.2d 635 (1995).

The defendant asserts that plaintiff has not alleged an injury in fact, beyond his purchase of Florida's Natural orange juice. For standing, the plaintiff must establish "three elements: an actual or imminent injury, causation, and redressability." Swann v. Secretary, Georgia, 668 F.3d 1285, 1288 (11th Cir.2012) (quoting Hollywood Mobile Estates Ltd. v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 641 F.3d 1259, 1265 (11th Cir.2011)). Because this case is styled as a class action, the named plaintiff must have standing before the court can certify a class. See Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 1265 (11th Cir.2009). See also Mills v. Foremost Ins. Co., 511 F.3d 1300, 1307 (11th Cir.2008) ("To have standing to represent a class, a party must not only satisfy the individual standing prerequisites, but must also be part of the class and possess the same interest and suffer the same injury as the class members.").

The analytical framework for resolving standing issues requires consideration of both "constitutional" and "prudential" requirements for standing. Young Apartments, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter, FL, 529 F.3d 1027, 1038 (11th Cir.2008) (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975); Harris v. Evans, 20 F.3d 1118, 1121 (11th Cir.1994) (en banc)). "The constitutional requirements derive from Article III's limitation of federal jurisdiction to situationswhere a justiciable 'case or controversy' exists between the litigants." To have standing, a plaintiff must establish (1) that he has suffered an actual or threatened injury, (2) that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable ruling. See e,g., Young Apartments, 529 F.3d at 1038. "If a plaintiff cannot satisfy these constitutional standing requirements, the case lies outside the authority given to the federal courts by Article III and must be dismissed." Id.

In addition to the constitutional requirements of Article III, the Supreme Court has also instructed courts to consider three prudential principles when weighing whether judicial restraint requires the dismissal of a party's claims. Warth, 422 U.S. at 499-500, 95 S.Ct. 2197; Bischoff v. Osceola County, 222 F.3d 874, 883 (11th Cir.2000). The Eleventh Circuit has summarized these prudential considerations as:

1) whether the plaintiff's complaint falls within the zone of interests protected by the statute or constitutional provision at issue;

2) whether the complaint raises abstract questions amounting to generalized grievances which are more appropriately resolved by the legislative branches; and

3) whether the plaintiff is asserting his or her own legal rights and interests rather than the legal rights and interests of third parties.

Harris, 20 F.3d at 1121 (quoting Saladin, 812 F.2d at 690).

Young Apartments, Inc., 529 F.3d at 1039.

Here, the plaintiff alleges that his injury was the actual purchase of orange juice. However, he does not explain how buying packaged orange juice, when he wanted packaged orange juice, injured him.⁴ The plaintiff states both that he either (1) "purchased products [he] would not have purchased" or (2) "paid more than [he] otherwise would have been wiling to pay" if the product was not mislabeled. Second amended complaint, ¶ 13. However, he does not state a claim for any deceptive trade practice in the labeling. Rather, he sues for breach of contract and breach of express warranty.⁵ He asserts that in taking compounds from orange juice and manipulating them to create a better tasting orange juice post-pasteurization process, the defendant should not label the contents of its orange juice as "orange juice." Plaintiff's response (doc. 41) at 6. Somewhat contradictory to his claims, the plaintiff recognizes...