Veal v. Memorial Hosp. of Washington County

• Decision Date: 31 July 1995
• Docket Number: No. 5:93-cv-13-4(WDO).,5:93-cv-13-4(WDO).
• Citation: 894 F. Supp. 448
• Parties: Betty N. VEAL, Plaintiff, v. MEMORIAL HOSPITAL OF WASHINGTON COUNTY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia

894 F. Supp. 448

Betty N. VEAL, Plaintiff, v.MEMORIAL HOSPITAL OF WASHINGTON COUNTY, Defendant.

No. 5:93-cv-13-4(WDO).

United States District Court, M.D. Georgia, Macon Division.

July 31, 1995.

S. Phillip Brown, Macon, GA, for plaintiff.

Forrest Walker Hunter, Clare H. Draper, IV, Atlanta, GA, for defendant.

ORDER

OWENS, District Judge.

Before the court are defendant's summary judgment motion and plaintiff's motion to amend her complaint for a second time.After careful consideration of the arguments of counsel, the relevant caselaw, and the record as a whole, the court issues the following order.

I.FACTS

A.General Background

In May 1991, plaintiff had corrective eye surgery on her left eye per the advice of her physicians.The surgery was hoped to correct Fuch's Syndrome, a condition that causes the cornea to swell.Plaintiff then went to work for defendant Memorial Hospital of Washington County in July 1991 as a Ward Secretary on the night shift, from 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. the following morning.Plaintiff was the first person to fill the position of Ward Secretary on the night shift.

Plaintiff's supervisor claims to have begun receiving unfavorable reports on plaintiff, specifically, that she would incompletely or incorrectly perform tasks assigned to her.More important, however, were the accusations that plaintiff was sleeping while on the job.The supervisor counseled plaintiff regarding these complaints, and even went so far as to transfer her for training to the morning shift.Defendant claimed none of these tactics solved the problems allegedly experienced with plaintiff.

Plaintiff was then discharged on the basis of her supervisor's recommendation to defendant.Plaintiff claims the discharge to have been based upon her disability — problems she experienced due to Fuch's Syndrome and the corrective surgery caused her eyes to be light sensitive, and this gave the appearance that she was sleeping when she claims to have simply been squinting her eyes.Many eyewitnesses controvert plaintiff's claim, and state that she was sleeping, pure and simple.All individuals involved in the process of the adverse employment decision deny considering plaintiff's eye condition when recommending, or ordering, her termination.

B.Procedural History

Plaintiff's complaint, as initially filed on January 11, 1993, solely alleged a violation of specific provisions of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973(the "Act"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797b(1985& Supp.1995), and nothing more.SeePlaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint and Add Count, ¶ 1("Plaintiff filed this action based entirely upon the Rehabilitation Act of 1973").Specifically, the complaint sounds entirely in discrimination in employment.SeeComplaint, ¶¶ 9, 11(failure to make reasonable accommodations "to allow plaintiff to perform her job properly," and terminated in "large part" due to her disability).Plaintiff alleged that she was terminated on March 10, 1992, and defendant admitted this fact in its answer.

Defendant then sought dismissal upon the basis of the statute of limitations.Plaintiff was terminated on March 10, 1992.Since the Rehabilitation Act does not prescribe for itself a statute of limitations, precedent mandated that this court"adopt a local time limitation as federal law if it was not inconsistent with federal law or policy to do so."SeeWilson v. Garcia,471 U.S. 261, 266-67, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1942, 85 L.Ed.2d 254(1985).The statutory scheme in this forum most closely analogous to the Rehabilitation Act is the Georgia Equal Employment for Persons with Disabilities Code, O.C.G.A. § 34-6A-1 to -6 (1992& Supp.1995).SeeHenrickson v. Pain Control and Rehabilitation Institute,205 Ga.App. 843, 424 S.E.2d 27(1992).The limitations period for this local statute is one-hundred and eighty (180) days, measured from the time of the challenged conduct.O.C.G.A. 34-6A-6(a)(1992& Supp.1995).One-hundred and eighty (180) days from the challenged conduct in the casesub judice would have fallen on or around September 10, 1992.Plaintiff conceded that its action would be timely "if there is a two (2) year statute of limitation."SeePlaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint and to Add a Count, at ¶ 4.Because plaintiff's complaint was not filed until January 1993, well after the applicable limitations period of 180 days, the court granted defendant's motion and dismissed the Rehabilitation Act claim.

The court granted defendant's motion to dismiss the Rehabilitation Act claim, however, only after it had first permitted plaintiff to amend her complaint to include a count under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 — that state actors had deprived her of rights statutorily secured to her by the Rehabilitation Act.No constitutional deprivations were alleged in this amendment.

Plaintiff, in the wake of defendant's summary judgment motion, filed yet another motion to amend her complaint, in which she adds that defendant similarly deprived her of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process.Plaintiff's second motion to amend comes after the conclusion of discovery on September 16, 1994.See Minute Entry of Aug. 16, 1994.

II.DISCUSSION

A.Plaintiff's Second Motion to Amend

So as to be precise, plaintiff's present motion to amend her complaint states:

the plaintiff was deprived of federally guaranteed due process by the defendant's failure to allow plaintiff to attend the hearing at which her termination was discussed, and in which hearing evidence taken from various employees concerning plaintiff's job performance all for the purpose of deciding plaintiff's fate as an employee.

Motion to Amend Complaint(5/24/95), ¶ 2.According to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("FED.R.CIV.P.")15(a), a party at this stage in the litigation may amend its "pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires."Defendant's response to this motion clearly indicates that its consent is not forthcoming.The question is thus whether justice so requires that leave to amend be given.

The Supreme Court has elaborated on the meaning of the phrase "when justice so requires."The general rule regarding amendments has thus been summarized as follows:

In the absence of any apparent or declared reason — such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc. — the leave sought should, as the rules require, be "freely given."

Rosen v. TRW, Inc.,979 F.2d 191, 194(11th Cir.1992)(quotingFoman v. Davis,371 U.S. 178, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222(1962)).Whether leave to amend should be granted is a decision left to the sound discretion of the district court; however, the court should state a justifying reason for a denial.Moore v. Baker,989 F.2d 1129, 1131(11th Cir.1993).

Several courts of appeals have recognized the injustice inherent in allowing the plaintiff to add a new and distinct cause of action when discovery is complete (or nearly so), defendant has already filed and briefed its summary judgment motion, and plaintiff has had previous opportunities to add the particular claim he belatedly brings to the court.In Grant v. News Group Boston, Inc.,55 F.3d 1, 5-6(1st Cir.1995), the First Circuit referred to the following facts in finding that the district court had not abused its discretion by refusing to permit an amendment that raised new and distinct theories.When plaintiff filed his amendment, discovery was complete, and would need to be reopened were the amendment allowed; defendant had completed its summary judgment motion and was undoubtedly well into its trial preparation; and plaintiff had not given a sufficient reason for not having amended the complaint earlier.The end result was that defendant would have been prejudiced by allowing the amendment.The court also noted that the facts upon which this putative theory was based had not been hidden prior to discovery.

The Seventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Cleveland v. Porca Co.,38 F.3d 289, 297-98(7th Cir.1994), in which plaintiff sought to add an entirely new claim "after discovery was completed and after the motions for summary judgment were fully briefed."Moreover, "defendants had already filed witness and exhibit lists with the court," and the deadline for amendments to the complaint (set by courtorder) had passed.In light of this, the court of appeals upheld the district court's action disallowing the amendment.

In the casesub judice,the court allowed plaintiff an opportunity to amend her complaint after defendant had already answered and filed a motion to dismiss.¹In the court's considered judgment, allowing plaintiff to amend her complaint a second time would unduly prejudice defendant.Tiernan v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co.,719 F.2d 1, 4-5(1st Cir.1983)(prejudice to defendant even where discovery need not be reopened; sufficient that allowance of amendment would affect defendant's trial strategy and tactics).See alsoKleinhans v. Lisle Sav. Profit Sharing Trust,810 F.2d 618, 625(7th Cir.1987).Plaintiff's motion is accordingly DENIED.

B.Defendant's Summary Judgment Motion

The court now turns to defendant's summary judgment motion, which is premised on the notion that the Title VII template of McDonnell-Douglas governs our proof mode.Notwithstanding this court's prior dismissal of the Rehabilitation Act claim, defendant claims that plaintiff"must prove a violation of the Rehabilitation Act in order to prevail at all in this case."Defendant's Brief, at 14.It is in light of this belief that defendant has tailored its arguments.Seesupra note 5.Defendant apparently assumes that the amendment adding the § 1983 cause of action functionally revived the Rehabilitation Act claim.

As a result of...