La Veck v. Parke, Davis & Co., No. 77.

• Court: Supreme Court of Michigan
• Writing for the Court: MOORE
• Citation: 157 N.W. 72,190 Mich. 604
• Parties: LA VECK v. PARKE, DAVIS & CO.
• Decision Date: 30 March 1916
• Docket Number: No. 77.

190 Mich. 604
157 N.W. 72

LA VECK
v.
PARKE, DAVIS & CO.

No. 77.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

March 30, 1916.

Certiorari to Industrial Accident Board.

Proceeding before the Industrial Accident Board by Michael La Veck to obtain compensation for personal injuries, opposed by Parke, Davis & Co., employer. Compensation was awarded by the board, and the employer brings certiorari. Order affirmed.

Argued before STONE, C. J., and BROOKE, KUHN, MOORE, BIRD, STEERE, and PERSON, JJ.

[157 N.W. 72]

H. R. Martin, of Detroit, for claimant.

Charles M. Woodruff, of Detroit, for defendant.

MOORE, J.

This is certiorari by the respondent to the Industrial Accident Board to review a finding of the board awarding compensation to the claimant. The brief of appellant begins as follows:

‘Appellant does not question the Industrial Accident Board's finding of facts, and only refers to the testimony of record to amplify the same.’

It will be helpful to quote from the opinion of the Industrial Accident Board:

‘In this case the committee of arbitration denied applicant's claim for compensation, and applicant thereupon appealed the case to the full board for review. Since the arbitration a considerable amount of additional testimony was taken, particularly medical testimony tending to show that the probable cause of the paralysis from which the applicant suffers was a cerebral hemmorrhage caused by heat and coverxertion, together with a diseased condition of his arteries, known as arterial sclerosis of some two years' standing.

‘The evidence fairly tends to show that the paralysis resulted from the rupture of a small blood vessel in the brain. We say ‘small’ because the paralysis was gradual, being first noticed by the dropping of a flask from the hand, later on by inability to use his arm, and still later by the paralysis of one side of the body. The work which applicant was doing was making bouillon from beef by boiling and certain other processes in a room and with retorts and appliances maintained for that purpose by respondent. The weather was hot, and an extra amount of bouillon was made that week, so as to have enough to meet the demands of the plant while the apparatus was being transferred to a new room which was to be equipped for such work. A high degree of heat was required in the process, and, although the retorts were so constructed as to protect the operator as far as possible from the heat and steam, a considerable quantity of both escaped into the workroom at the times of making the various changes connected with the process. No visible accident occurred and no event causing external violence to applicant's body. It was apparently conceded on the hearing that the cause of the paralysis was in the brain, the applicant contending that it was the rupture of a cerebral blood vessel, while the respondent contended that the paralysis resulted from the clogging of such vessel. The testimony on behalf of the applicant tended to show that on account of the condition of his arteries a cerebral hemorrhage was likely to result from the increased pressure caused by unusual heat and overexertion, and that in the opinion of his experts such hemorrhage did occur, resulting finally in the total paralysis of one side of the body. Was it an accident within the meaning of the law, and did it arise out of and in the course of applicant's employment?

‘Under the doctrine laid down in the ‘Spanner Case,’ so-called, and also in other and later English cases, this would be an accident. In Fenton v. J. Thorley & Co., 5 W. C. C. P. 4, the question of what constitutes an accident is exhaustedly discussed, Lord McNaughten's opinion being in subsequent cases regarded as authority, and this being regarded as a leading case. Lord McNaughten's opinion is an able discussion of the principle involved and a review of the authorities. In the opinion of Lord Robertson on page 9, it is said: ‘In the present instance a man by an act of overexertion broke the wall of his abdomen. Suppose the wheel had yielded and been broken by exactly the same act; surely the breakage would be rightly described as accidental.’

‘In McInnes v. Dunsmuir-Jackson, Ltd., 1

[157 N.W. 73]

B. W. C. C. 226, it is held that, where overexertion brings on a cerebral hemorrhage and paralysis, it is...