Vega-Mena v. U.S.

• Decision Date: 02 November 1992
• Docket Number: VEGA-MEN,No. 92-1659,P,92-1659
• Citation: 990 F.2d 684
• Parties: Davidlaintiff, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant, Appellee. . Heard
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 684

990 F.2d 684

David VEGA-MENA, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant, Appellee.

No. 92-1659.

United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.

Heard Nov. 2, 1992.

Decided April 13, 1993.

Eli B. Arroyo with whom Andres Garcia Arache and Alcides Oquendo Maldonado were on brief, for plaintiff, appellant.

Silvia Carreno Coll, Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom Daniel F. Lopez-Romo, U.S. Atty., was on brief, for U.S.

Before TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge, CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judge, and SKINNER, ^* Senior District Judge.

LEVIN H. CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judge.

Appellant, a security guard injured on the job at a United States naval station in Puerto Rico, brought this negligence action against the United States and others after he collected benefits under Puerto Rico's workers' compensation system. The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico granted summary judgment for the United States, finding that the United States was appellant's "statutory employer" and thus immune from suit under the Puerto Rico Workmen's Compensation Act. Appellant argues on appeal that the court misapplied Puerto Rico law, and, in the alternative, that federal law preempts the statutory employer immunity rule of Puerto Rico law. We affirm the grant of summary judgment.

I.

In 1988, appellant David Vega-Mena was employed by Vigilantes, Inc. ("Vigilantes"), a Puerto Rican corporation, as a security guard. Pursuant to a contract with the United States of America, Vigilantes provided security guard services at the United States Naval Station, Roosevelt Roads in Ceiba, Puerto Rico. On the evening of October 13, 1988, Vega-Mena was performing his duties as a security guard at the Roosevelt Roads naval station when he fell into a tank of waste diesel fuel and sustained serious injuries.

Vigilantes was an insured employer pursuant to the Puerto Rico Workmen's Compensation Act ("PRWCA"), 11 L.P.R.A. § 1 et seq., and Vega-Mena applied for, and collected, all the benefits available to him as an employee of Vigilantes under the PRWCA. Thereafter, in October 1990, Vega-Mena and other plaintiffs brought this civil action in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico against the United States, Vigilantes, and certain other defendants. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants' negligence had caused Vega-Mena's injuries. For reasons not relevant to this appeal, the complaint was amended in April 1991 to name Vega-Mena as the sole plaintiff and Vigilantes and the United States as the only defendants.

Both the original and amended complaints alleged that the district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1346, the jurisdictional provision of the Federal Tort Claims Act. The complaints also referred to 28 U.S.C. § 2671, which defines terms used in the Federal Tort Claims Act. The only cause of action alleged was for "negligence."

The district court dismissed the claims against Vigilantes on jurisdictional grounds. Vega-Mena does not appeal from that ruling. In July 1991, the United States moved for summary judgment on the claims against it. The government argued that the Puerto Rico Workmen's Compensation Act entitled it to "statutory employer" immunity against appellant's action. Vega-Mena replied that the United States did not meet the requirements of Puerto Rico for statutory employer status. In the alternative, he contended, the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq.--which applied to his case, appellant argued, by force of the Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1651 et seq.--preempted Puerto Rico's statutory employer rule, disentitling the United States to statutory employer immunity.

The district court granted summary judgment to the United States, finding no genuine issue of material fact and holding that the PRWCA provided the United States with statutory employer immunity. The court noted that plaintiff's original and amended complaints made no reference to the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act or the Defense Base Act, but stated that "the outcome would have been the same" even if he had "brought the claim" under those acts. Appellant Vega-Mena appeals from the district court's final order to the extent it granted summary judgment for appellee, the United States.

II.

A. Puerto Rico Statutory Employer Doctrine

Vega-Mena contends that the district court misconstrued Puerto Rican law in determining that the United States was immune as a "statutory employer" from tort liability for appellant's injuries.

Under the workers' compensation scheme in Puerto Rico, when an employee suffers an injury, illness, disability or death as a result of "any act or function inherent in [his] work," and his employer is insured according to law, the employee's right to compensation from the employer is limited to the statutory compensation offered through the State Insurance Fund. 11 L.P.R.A. §§ 2, 21; Santiago Hodge v. Parke Davis & Co., 126 D.P.R. 1 (1990) (hereinafter Santiago Hodge P.R.) (reprinted in Santiago Hodge v. Parke Davis & Co., 909 F.2d 628, 635 (1st Cir.1990) (hereinafter Santiago Hodge II )). The injured worker lacks a cause of action against his employer for damages regardless of the employer's degree of negligence. Santiago Hodge P.R., reprinted in 909 F.2d at 636-37. The PRWCA does not, however, prevent the injured worker from suing a third party in tort for the worker's insured injuries, such a defendant being a stranger to the employer-employee relationship. Id. at 637; see 11 L.P.R.A. § 32. ¹

The concept of "statutory employer" was fashioned by the Puerto Rico courts to extend an employer's immunity to certain persons who were not technically employers but were thought to deserve immunity from tort liability because of their close involvement in the employer-employee relationship. See Santiago-Hodge v. Parke Davis & Co., 859 F.2d 1026, 1029 (1st Cir.1988) (hereinafter Santiago-Hodge I ). The courts took note of the fact that a contractor is not only compelled to provide workmen's compensation insurance for his own employees, see 11 L.P.R.A. § 19, but is also "subsidiarily liable for the premium payments ('taxes') of the workers of a person who 'contracted' with him [the contractor] or the workers of 'a contractor or independent subcontractor' hired by him when the latter were not insured[.]" Santiago Hodge P.R., reprinted in 909 F.2d at 637 (emphasis in original); see 11 L.P.R.A. § 20. ² The term "statutory employer" is thus used by the Puerto Rico courts to refer to "the principal contractor and to distinguish him from the subcontractor, the real or contractual employer of an employee who seeks compensation for a work-related accident, when the principal contractor may be protected by the employer immunity." Santiago Hodge P.R., reprinted in 909 F.2d at 638. One purpose for making contractors responsible for the premiums incurred by subcontractors is to encourage principal contractors, when choosing subcontractors, to insist that they carry the appropriate workers' compensation insurance. Id. at 637.

Puerto Rico case law "has only recognized the 'statutory employer' within the context of a contract or subcontract for work or services, and only for project owners, principal contractors or subcontractors who had, with regard to the injured worker, the mutual legal obligation to insure him with the State Insurance Fund." Id. at 638. "The determinant factor of immunity is the existence of that direct or indirect link between the workman who suffers the accident and the employer in the course of whose employment and as consequence of which the injury takes place." Ruiz Diaz v. Vargas Reyes, 109 D.P.R. 761, 9 P.R.Sup.Ct.Off'l Translations 1019, 1024 (1980).

Unless there exists a legal nexus linking the worker's direct employer to the wrongdoer in the mutual legal obligation to insure the employee with the Fund, the alleged wrongdoer is a mere "third party" lacking statutory protection against claims by injured workers, and not an immune "statutory employer." Santiago Hodge P.R., reprinted in 909 F.2d at 638. The crucial factor in determining whether the requisite legal nexus exists is the nature and terms of the contractual relationship between the contractor and subcontractor. Id. at 639. In Lugo Sanchez v. Puerto Rico Water Resources Auth., 105 D.P.R. 861, 5 P.R.Sup.Ct.Off'l Translations 1198 (1977), the Puerto Rico Supreme Court held that a principal contractor who requires his independent subcontractors to take out workmen's compensation insurance has "insured" the workmen of the independent subcontractor and is therefore immune from suit under the exclusive remedy provision, 11 L.P.R.A. § 21. See Garcia v. Friesecke, 597 F.2d 284, 288-89 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 940, 100 S.Ct. 292, 62 L.Ed.2d 306 (1979); Santiago Hodge P.R., reprinted in 909 F.2d at 638.

In the present case, the district court ruled that the United States qualified as a statutory employer because it shared the legal obligation to insure Vigilantes' employees under the Puerto Rico workers' compensation program. The United States and Vigilantes clearly had a principal contractor-subcontractor relationship. Under their written agreement, Vigilantes was obligated to provide guard services to the United States at specified locations for the term of the contract. Vigilantes' employees, including appellant, worked as guards at United States naval facilities, and appellant sustained his injuries while working as a Vigilantes guard on patrol at such a facility. Even more to the point, the United States contractually required Vigilantes to obtain state workers' compensation insurance for the security guards as required by Puerto Rico law. ³ It was under this insurance that appellant, following injury, brought his claim for compensation and recovered. Given the terms of the contract between the parties, it is clear that under Puerto Rico law the requisite...