De Vegvar v. Gillilland, 12791.

• Citation: 228 F.2d 640
• Decision Date: 22 December 1955
• Docket Number: No. 12791.,12791.
• Parties: Edith Neuman DE VEGVAR, Appellant, v. Whitney GILLILLAND, Pearl Carter Pace, and Henry J. Clay, Constituting the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States, and George M. Humphrey as Secretary of the Treasury of the United States of America, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

228 F.2d 640 (1955)

Edith Neuman DE VEGVAR, Appellant, v. Whitney GILLILLAND, Pearl Carter Pace, and Henry J. Clay, Constituting the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States, and George M. Humphrey as Secretary of the Treasury of the United States of America, Appellees.

No. 12791.

United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.

Submitted November 19, 1955.

Decided December 22, 1955.

Writ of Certiorari Denied March 26, 1956.

Mr. Ernest Angell, New York City, of the bar of the Court of Appeals of New York, pro hac vice, by special leave of Court, with whom Mr. Percy A. Shay, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellant.

Mr. Samuel D. Slade, Atty., Dept. of Justice, with whom Mr. Leo A. Rover, U. S. Atty., was on the brief, for appellee. Messrs. Edward H. Hickey and William P. Arnold, Attys., Dept. of Justice, and Lewis Carroll and Rufus E. Stetson, Jr., Assts. U. S. Attys., also entered appearances for appellee.

Messrs. Philip Levy, Joseph W. Wyatt, Robert T. Reynolds, Washington, D. C., and Samuel A. McCain, New York City, filed a brief on behalf of Victor K. Anninger; Steven Ausnit; Walter Petschek; Socony Mobil Oil Company, Inc.; Karel Charles Stiassni; and Francis Price, Jr. and Dennis G. Karzag, Executors of the Estate of William Zimdin, as amici curiae, urging affirmance.

Before EDGERTON, Chief Judge, and WILBUR K. MILLER and WASHINGTON, Circuit Judges.

Writ of Certiorari Denied March 26, 1956. See 76 S.Ct. 543.

WASHINGTON, Circuit Judge.

Mrs. de Vegvar brought suit in the District Court against the members of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, seeking to compel reconsideration of a decision of the Commission denying her claim to a share in the fund administered by that body known as the Yugoslav Claims Fund. The Secretary of the Treasury was also made a party defendant, and plaintiff asked that he be restrained from paying the amounts awarded to other claimants by the Commission, as this would so reduce the fund that her claim could not be paid.

The Yugoslav Claims Fund consists of moneys paid by Yugoslavia to the United States pursuant to an executive agreement,¹ this payment to be in full settlement and discharge of certain claims of our government against Yugoslavia and of all claims "of nationals of the United States against the Government of Yugoslavia on account of the nationalization and other taking by Yugoslavia of property" between September 1, 1939, and the date of the agreement. The agreement provided that only persons who were nationals of the United States "at the time of nationalization or other taking" by Yugoslavia were to be eligible to share in the Fund. It also provided that claims against the Fund were to be adjudicated by an agency to be established or designated by the United States Government, and that distribution was to be made "in accordance with such methods of distribution as may be adopted by the Government of the United States."

Congress passed the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949² to implement the executive agreement just described and any similar agreements which might later be negotiated. The Act set up the International Claims Commission³ and gave it jurisdiction to make "final decisions with respect to claims" against the Fund. 22 U.S.C.A. § 1623(a). Such decisions were to "constitute a full and final disposition" of each claim considered. 22 U.S.C.A. § 1623(b). The Act then went on to say in Section 4(h) that the "action of the Commission in allowing or denying any claim under this subchapter shall be final and conclusive on all questions of law and fact and not subject to review by the Secretary of State or any other official, department, agency, or establishment of the United States or by any court by mandamus or otherwise." 22 U.S.C.A. § 1623(h).

Mrs. de Vegvar, as one of those who filed a claim against the Fund, was given a hearing by the Commission. Most of the evidence she presented was admitted, but the Commission excluded certain proffered evidence relating to the laws of Yugoslavia. The Commission later rendered its Final Decision, holding that plaintiff's property had been taken by Yugoslavia on January 19, 1946, a date prior to the time when plaintiff became a naturalized citizen of the United States. One Commissioner dissented, on the ground that the Government of Yugoslavia had not obtained title to the property, under the laws of Yugoslavia, until November, 1947, by which time plaintiff had become an American citizen. Mrs. de Vegvar then brought this action in the District Court. A motion to dismiss was made by the defendants-appellees, and was granted by the Court. This appeal followed.

Appellant's main reliance is on Section 4(a) of the Act, which directs the Commission to "apply the following in the following order: (1) The provisions of the applicable claims agreement as provided in this subsection; and (2) the applicable principles of international law, justice, and equity." 22 U.S.C.A. § 1623(a). Appellant says that the Commission failed to examine and give effect to the Yugoslav statute relating to confiscation of property, and that this was a failure by the Commission to exercise the jurisdiction conferred on it by the Act. She further says that the refusal by the Commission to receive the evidence offered by her, to the effect that the decree of the Yugoslav court which purported to confiscate her property was null and void under ...