Veiga v. World Meteorological Organization

• Decision Date: 15 July 2008
• Docket Number: No. 07 Civ. 3182(VM).,07 Civ. 3182(VM).
• Citation: 568 F.Supp.2d 367
• Parties: Maria Do Rosário VEIGA, Plaintiff, v. WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORGANIZATION et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

568 F.Supp.2d 367

Maria Do Rosário VEIGA, Plaintiff, v. WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORGANIZATION et al., Defendants.

No. 07 Civ. 3182(VM).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

July 15, 2008.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Monica Ona Bileris, Law Office of Timothy J. McInnis, New York, NY, for Plaintiff.

DECISION AND ORDER

VICTOR MARRERO, District Judge.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Maria Do Rosário Veiga ("Veiga"), a citizen of Portugal and Italy, brought this action naming as defendants her former employer, the World Meteorological Organization ("WMO"), an international organization headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, as well as Michel Jarraud ("Jarraud"), a French national who is a Secretary General of the WMO and a resident of Switzerland; Joachim Muller ("Muller"), a German national who is a Director of the WMO and a resident of Switzerland; Jorge Cortès ("Cortès"), an American national who is a Director of the WMO and a resident of Switzerland; and Iwona Rummel-Bulska ("Rummel-Bulska"), a Polish national who is a former legal advisor of the WMO and now a resident of Nairobi, Kenya (collectively "Defendants").

Because on its face the complaint indicates that all material events and operative facts that gave rise to the action occurred at the WMO in Geneva, that the parties, witnesses, and documents associated with the case are situated primarily in Switzerland, and that Veiga's substantive claims for relief are grounded on various instruments of international law, as well as local and federal law of Switzerland and the United States, the Court, by Decision and Order dated May 7, 2007, dismissed the case under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. However, as conditions of dismissal, the Court allowed Veiga to apply for the imposition of requirements that, in the event Veiga were to commence litigation of her claims in Switzerland, Defendants would accept service of process and personal jurisdiction, not raise defenses based on the statute of limitations and pay any final judgment rendered against them.¹ Veiga responded by letter urging the Court to grant reconsideration. By Memo-endorsed Order dated April 3, 2008, the Court authorized Veiga to serve a copy of the summons, complaint and motion for reconsideration on the WMO by personal and mail delivery to the WMO representative in New York, insofar as such service would not be inconsistent with any provision of international treaty or national law.

Invoking applicable privileges and immunities under treaties and international and United States law, the WMO, in a submission to the Court dated April 30, 2008 (the "WMO's Resp."), declined to accept service. The Court then granted Veiga's request that the WMO's response be treated as a motion to dismiss this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. By letter to the Court dated June 9, 2008 ("Veiga's Resp."), Veiga opposed the motion. Having considered the correspondence and related documents described above, as well other documents filed in connection with this litigation, and having reviewed relevant legal authorities, the Court grants the WMO's motion.

II. DISCUSSION

The facts pertaining to this case are described in the Court's earlier ruling dismissing the action on forum non convenience grounds, familiarity with which is assumed. See Veiga, 486 F.Supp.2d at 300-03.

In support of its claim of immunity from process in this action, WMO relies, among other authorities and precedents, on: (1) the privileges and immunities provision contained in Article 27 of the Convention of the World Meteorological Organization, adopted in 1947 and ratified by the United States on May 4, 1949, 1 U.S.T. 281; (2) the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, adopted in 1947, which provides for immunity from legal process for the specialized agencies of the United Nations, an institutional status the WMO acquired in 1951, see G.A. Res. 179(II), U.N. Doc. A/RES/179(II) (Nov. 21, 1947); (3) the International Organizations Immunities Act ("IOIA"), 22 U.S.C. § 288 et seq.; (4) Executive Order No. 10676 of September 1, 1956, by which the President of the United States designated the WMO as an international organization entitled to the privileges and immunities conferred by the IOIA, see 21 Fed.Reg. 6625 (1956); and (5) the Headquarters Agreement between Switzerland and the WMO, which specifies the legal status granted to the WMO by Switzerland as Host State of the WMO, see Agreement, Plan of Execution, and Protocol Concluded Between the Swiss Federal Council and the World Meteorological Organization, March 10, 1955, at 189, http://www.wmo.int/pages/gov ernance/policy/documents/WMO_15_07_en.pdf (last visited July 14, 2008). The WMO also points out that Article 21(b) of its Convention designated the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organization as the sole forum for the resolution of disputes between the WMO and its employees, and that Veiga had availed herself of this mechanism in filing numerous complaints asserting essentially the same allegations and claims contained in her action before this Court.

Confronted with the compelling weight and barriers created by these authorities, Veiga, in a striking display of professional candor, acknowledges the forceful legal impediment she cannot readily overcome. In particular, she states that she "can only lament the fact that the current state of U.S. law, as applied by most American courts faced with an action against an international organization such as the WMO purporting to enjoy immunity from suit or process, supports the assertion of [the WMO]." (Veiga's Resp. 3.) Indeed, § 288b of the IOIA explicitly provides that specified international organizations "shall enjoy the same immunity from suit and every form of judicial process as is enjoyed by foreign governments," except to the extent expressly waived. 22 U.S.C. § 288b. Section 288d extends that immunity to acts performed by officers and employees of international organizations in their official capacity and falling within their jurisdictions. See id. at § 288d(b). As the WMO's response to this action confirms, there has been no express waiver of immunity by the WMO on its behalf or that of the WMO officers or employees named as individual defendants.

Case law applying the IOIA uniformly holds that international organizations covered by the statute, while engaged in noncommercial activities, are immune from process in suits brought by their employees alleging breach of contract, wrongful termination, fraudulent conduct and other claims similar to those asserted by Veiga in the instant action. See Mendaro v. World Bank, 717 F.2d 610, 615 (D.C.Cir.1983) (noting that "one of the most important protections granted to international organizations is immunity from suits by employees of the organization in actions arising out of the employment relationship"); Tuck v. Pan Am. Health Org., 668 F.2d 547, 549-50 (D.C.Cir.1981); Broadbent v. Organization of Am. States, 628 F.2d 27, 35 (D.C.Cir.1980); Brzak v. United Nations, 551 F.Supp.2d 313, 317-18 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); De Luca v. United Nations Org., 841 F.Supp. 531, 534-35 (S.D.N.Y.1994). This country's recognition of this doctrine and the practical and diplomatic grounds supporting it were articulated by the District of Columbia Circuit in Broadbent:

The United States has accepted without qualification the principles that international organizations must be free to perform their functions and that no member state may take action to hinder the organization. The unique nature of international civil service is relevant. International officials should be as free as possible, within the mandate granted by the member states, to perform their duties free from the peculiarities of national politics.

628 F.2d at 35.

Veiga nonetheless seeks to avoid the inevitable conclusion of her concession by the novel approach of challenging the constitutionality of the IOIA. She contends that accepting the WMO's claimed immunity from process pursuant to the IOIA in this case would deprive her of all rights of action, remedies and access to an American court without any substitute legal recourse, thus denying her justice in violation of fundamental rights she asserts under the United States Constitution. Specifically, Veiga claims that dismissal of her suit by reason of Defendants' immunity would (1) deny her right of due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by barring access to the Court for a hearing on the merits of her complaint; (2) abridge her First Amendment right of free speech to petition the government for redress of grievances; and (3) deprive her of a right to trial by jury in violation of the Seventh Amendment. Veiga further contends that application of the IOIA in this case would violate the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 UNTS 171, 6ILM 368 (1966), by failing to provide her with a remedy for the human rights claims she asserts.

Veiga's challenge rests upon a predicate for which she fails to offer any legal explanation or warrant other than conclusory arguments: that she has constitutional rights to invoke in this case or standing to challenge the validity of the IOIA. As a starting point for an analysis of this premise, the Court notes that, absent very limited exceptions, the United States Constitution does not apply to events that occur in other sovereign nations not involving American citizens or effects in the United States. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318, 57 S.Ct. 216, 81 L.Ed. 255 (1936) ("Neither the Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have any force in foreign territory unless in respect of our own citizens."); Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 402 cmt. d (1987) (discussing the "effects" principle). In this connection, the Court notes that Veiga states that she is a resident of...