Veitch v. Illinois Cent. R. Co.

Decision Date06 April 1915
Docket Number756
Citation68 So. 575,14 Ala.App. 146
PartiesVEITCH v. ILLINOIS CENT. R. CO. et al.
CourtAlabama Court of Appeals

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County; C.B. Smith, Judge.

Action by Carlos Veitch against the Illinois Central Railroad Company and others. There was a judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded.

The complaint is against the Illinois Central, the Southern Railway, and the Louisville & Nashville Railroad, and sought judgment for damages for one car load of chops which is alleged to have been received by them as common carriers to be delivered to plaintiff at Birmingham, that they are common and connecting carriers in the state of Alabama, and that 30 days before the bringing of the suit plaintiffs gave defendants notice of the injury to the said car of chops, and made demand for payment for such injury, and that payment has not been made. The second count recites the shipment by John Wade & Son to defendant of the car of chops delivered at Memphis by the Illinois Central to be carried to Birmingham and there delivered to Earl Bros., and that the Illinois Central, a connecting carrier, carried the car to Birmingham delivered it to the Louisville & Nashville Railroad, who delivered said car to Earl Bros.' warehouse, in Birmingham, but that before the car was unloaded plaintiff purchased it from Earl Bros. and ordered the Louisville &amp Nashville Railroad Company to deliver said car of chops to Smith Bros. & Co.'s warehouse, at First avenue and Twenty-Fourth street, in the city of Birmingham, the chops still being in the same car in which the shipment originated and that the Louisville & Nashville undertook, for reward, to deliver the car, and did do so by delivering to defendant the Southern Railway, who delivered the car to the warehouse of Smith Bros. & Co., but that in delivering it they did not safely carry and deliver, but, on the contrary, conducted themselves so carelessly about the same that the chops were damaged so as to be rendered useless or valueless. Then follows the declaration as in the first count as to each defendant being a connecting and common carrier.

Charles A. Calhoun and Roy McCollough, both of Birmingham, for appellant.

Stokely, Scrivner & Dominick, of Birmingham, for appellees.

BROWN J.

The appeal in this case was sued out in term time on the 1st day of April, 1914, and was therefore returnable on the first Monday next after the expiration of 20 days from suing out the appeal, or April 27, 1914. The call of the division to which this case belonged commenced on April 20, 1914. The record was filed on Monday, November 23d, the first day of the next succeeding call, and the case was submitted the following day on the regular call of the docket. On the authority of Cudd v. Reynolds (Sup.) 65 So. 41, the motion of appellee to dismiss the appeal must be overruled.

The averments of counts 2 and 3 of the complaint show that the Illinois Central Railroad Company had fully complied with its contract with Wade & Son by a delivery of the car of chops at its final destination to Earl Bros., and that thereafter the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, under a different contract with the plaintiff and for a new consideration, undertook to transfer the car from the warehouse of Earl Bros. to that of Smith Bros. without showing any further connection of the Illinois Central with the shipment, or that it owed the plaintiff any duty with reference thereto, and was subject to the demurrer.

A carrier is not liable either as a carrier or as warehouseman for injuries to goods, no matter from what caused, after completion of its contract of carriage and complete delivery of the goods to the consignee, and an acceptance by him and subsequent assumption of full custody before the damage occurs. Barclay v. Southern Ry. Co., 6 Ala.App. 502, 60 So. 479; Southern Ry. Co. v. Barclay, 1 Ala.App. 348, 56 So. 26. The undisputed proof shows that the Illinois Central Railroad Company, after it complied with its contract with Wade & Son to transport and deliver the shipment to the consignee, Earl Bros., in Birmingham, had no further connection with the shipment, and that it owed the plaintiff no duty with reference thereto, and the affirmative charge requested by it was properly given.

This being true, unless section 5548 of the Code is applicable to the case, the affirmative charge as to the other defendants was also proper, for the reason that the plaintiff, having sued three defendants on a joint contract or obligation made by all, must recover against all or none. McAnally v. Hawkins Lumber Co., 109 Ala. 397, 19 So. 417.

The statute is remedial in its nature, and must be liberally construed so as to suppress the evil at which it is directed and advance the remedy it purposes to afford. Sprowl v. Lawrence, 33 Ala. 674; McKissick v. McClendon, 133 Ala. 558, 32 South. 486; Steele v. Tutwiler, 68 Ala. 110; Morrow v. Woods, 56 Ala. 6; Ex parte Plowman, 53 Ala. 445; 36 Cyc. 1173(2).

The goods in this case, consisting of a car load of sacked "corn chops," were shipped from Memphis, Tenn., by Wade & Sons, to be delivered to Earl Bros., Birmingham, Ala and were carried over the lines of the Illinois Central Railroad, the initial carrier, from Memphis to Birmingham, and were there delivered to the Louisville & Nashville Railroad, to be transferred or switched over its lines to the warehouse of Earl Bros.; and under a subsequent arrangement with plaintiff the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company undertook to transfer the car from the side tracks at Earl Bros.' warehouse to the warehouse of Smith Bros., on the side tracks of the Southern Railway Company, and in the performance of this undertaking the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company took charge of the car and delivered it to the Southern Railway Company, and the Southern Railway Company placed it on the side tracks at Smith's warehouse. In the performance of these functions, under the joint traffic arrangements shown by the evidence in this case, the defendants were common carriers, and their roads are "connecting lines," within the purview of the statute. Agee v. L. & N.R.R. Co., 142 Ala. 344, 37 So. 680; Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Wichita Wholesale Grocery Co., 55 Kan. 525, 40 P. 899; United States v. Northern Pacific Terminal Co. (C.C.) 181 F. 879; ...

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