Veith v. Joint School Dist. No. 6 of City of Fort Atkinson, 3

• Decision Date: 02 May 1972
• Docket Number: No. 3,3
• Parties: , 80 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2176, 68 Lab.Cas. P 52,792 David VEITH, Appellant, v. JOINT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 6 OF the CITY OF FORT ATKINSON and Towns of Koshkonong, et al., Respondents.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Page 714

196 N.W.2d 714

54 Wis.2d 501, 80 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2176,

68 Lab.Cas. P 52,792

David VEITH, Appellant, v. JOINT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 6 OF the CITY OF FORT ATKINSON and Towns of Koshkonong, et al., Respondents.

No. 3.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

May 2, 1972.

David Veith, a teacher, commenced this suit against Joint School District No. 6 of the City of Fort Atkinson and Towns of Koshkonong, Sumner, Jefferson, Oakland, Hebron, Palmyra, Cold Spring and Lima, the board of education of the school district and its members, for wrongful discharge and seeks damages for loss of wages and of professional reputation. The defendants answered and moved for summary judgment which was granted on the grounds Veith was not wrongfully discharged and he had failed to allege a properly filed claim against the defendants and its rejection. From the judgment dismissing his complaint, Veith appeals.

Lawton & Cates, Madison, for appellant.

Melli, Shiels, Walker & Pease, Madison, for respondents.

HALLOWS, Chief Justice.

This case arises out of a labor dispute. Veith had been employed as a teacher by the defendant school district since the 1961--1962 school year. He was a member of the bargaining union represented by the Fort Atkinson Education Association, Inc. (FEA). Negotiations for the 1969--1970 collective-bargaining contract between FEA and the board of education of the school district began on November 27, 1968, but were not concluded until July, 1969. The existing contract, which was due to expire on August 25, 1969, provided in Article I(E) (6), 'If negotiations are not completed by March 15, the Board of Education will apply the continuing contract law (118.22(2), (3) ¹ by not issuing a notice of renewal of contract.' The school district did not issue a notice of renewal to any of the teachers nor did it prior to March 15th notify the teachers their contracts would not be renewed. On April 8th, FEA affirmed its members' intention to accept 1969--1970 contracts which included terms negotiated by FEA on their behalf. The board replied to FEA that each teacher had a duty under sec. 118.22, Stats., to accept his own contract not later than April 15th. On April 11, 1969, Veith and about 150 other teachers each sent a 'letter of intent' to the school board wherein each stated he intended to accept a contract which would be subject to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement being negotiated by FEA and the board. ² The school board replied to the teachers that it did not consider the letters of intent to constitute compliance with their contract or with the state law and included a form of acceptance which provided merely that the undersigned accept the renewal of the present contract of the teacher. These forms were not used by the teachers. Thus the issue was created whether the teachers were bound by their contract and the law to accept a contract on April 15th which did not automatically provide for the benefits of the then pending labor negotiations. If the school board were correct in its view, the teachers would be placed in an unequal bargaining position with the school board.

Thus on May 28, 1969, Veith was notified that because he had not accepted his contract his position was vacant. Veith replied and reaffirmed his intention to sign 'a contract upon satisfactory agreement of a negotiated settlement.' On June 19, 1969, the school board filled Veith's position by hiring another teacher. During July the school board reached an agreement with FEA and in August the contracts were offered to the teachers with the exception of Veith and two teachers who had been replaced and had found jobs outside the defendant district's schools.

The trial court found the 'letter of intent' was insufficient to meet the unambiguous requirement of sec. 118.22(2), Stats., there was no ambiguity in the language of the statute or of Article I(E)(6) of the contract, and thus any resort to pastbargaining history of the contract was unnecessary. The court also ruled the requirement of sec. 118.22(2) that a teacher, who did not receive a notice of renewal of or a refusal to renew his contract on or before March 15th, must accept in writing the current contract for the following school year not later than April 15th was not in conflict with sec. 111.70, Stats., and did not prevent municipal employees from continuing to bargain.

However, we do not reach these interesting issues because we are of the opinion the plaintiff was not entitled to raise them or to maintain this suit because he had not filed a claim with the school district as is required by sec. 118.26, Stats. ³ This section for the purpose of this issue is identical with sec. 62.25(1), Stats., concerning notice of claims against cities. In Schwartz v. City of Milwaukee (1969), 43 Wis.2d 119, 168 N.W.2d 107, this court held that compliance with sec....