Velez-Santiago v. State Univ. of N.Y. At Stony Brook

• Decision Date: 27 March 2019
• Docket Number: Index No. 2518/17,2017–10297
• Citation: Velez-Santiago v. State Univ. of N.Y. At Stony Brook, 170 A.D.3d 1182, 98 N.Y.S.3d 77 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019)
• Parties: In the Matter of Terence VELEZ–SANTIAGO, Petitioner, v. STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT STONY BROOK, Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

170 A.D.3d 1182

98 N.Y.S.3d 77

In the Matter of Terence VELEZ–SANTIAGO, Petitioner,

v.STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT STONY BROOK, Respondent.

2017–10297

Index No. 2518/17

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Submitted—November 27, 2018

March 27, 2019

Jose William Cotto, Ossining, N.Y., for petitioner.

Letitia James, Attorney General, New York, N.Y. (Steven C. Wu and David Lawrence III of counsel), for respondent.

RUTH C. BALKIN, J.P., CHERYL E. CHAMBERS, SHERI S. ROMAN, SYLVIA O. HINDS–RADIX, JJ.

DECISION & JUDGMENT

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the Appeals Board of Stony Brook University dated January 12, 2017. The determination affirmed a decision of the Office of University Community Standards of Stony Brook University dated October 28, 2016, made after a hearing, finding the petitioner violated certain sections of the University Student Conduct Code and suspending him from Stony Brook University through May 31, 2017.

ADJUDGED that the petition is granted, on the law, with costs, the determination is annulled, and the penalty imposed is vacated.

On April 18, 2016, the petitioner, a student at Stony Brook University (hereinafter Stony Brook), was charged with violating certain sections of the University Student Conduct Code (hereinafter Conduct Code), including sections VII.C.5.a (sexual harassment), VII.C.5.b (nonconsensual sexual contact), and VII.C.5.c (nonconsensual sexual intercourse and/or penetration), among others, and was suspended immediately from Stony Brook pending a hearing on the charges. Thereafter, Stony Brook conducted an investigation, an investigative report was prepared, and a hearing was held on August 19, 2016. Following the hearing, the Office of University Community Standards issued a decision dated October 28, 2016, finding the petitioner had not committed the violations alleged with respect to several of the charges but had violated sections VII.C.5.a, VII.C.5.b, and VII.C.5.c of the Conduct Code. The hearing panel concluded, among other things, that the complainant had affirmatively consented to engaging in sexual intercourse and oral sex with the petitioner, but that she had not consented to a separate sexual act. The panel imposed the sanction of suspension from Stony Brook through May 31, 2017.

In a determination dated January 12, 2017, the Stony Brook Appeals Board affirmed the decision dated October 28, 2016.

The petitioner then commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review the determination dated January 12, 2017, alleging, among other things, that the determination was not supported by substantial evidence. In an order dated September 21, 2017, the Supreme Court transferred the proceeding to this Court pursuant to CPLR 7804(g).

Review of Stony Brook's disciplinary determination made after a hearing is limited to whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence (see CPLR 7803[4] ; Matter of Haug v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Potsdam, 32 N.Y.3d 1044, 87 N.Y.S.3d 146, 112 N.E.3d 323 ; Matter of Bursch v. Purchase Coll. of the State Univ. of N.Y., 164 A.D.3d 1324, 1328, 85 N.Y.S.3d 157 ; Matter of Lambraia v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Binghamton, 135 A.D.3d 1144, 1146, 23 N.Y.S.3d 679 ). Substantial evidence "means such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact" ( 300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 45 N.Y.2d 176, 180, 408 N.Y.S.2d 54, 379 N.E.2d 1183 ; see Matter of Haug v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Potsdam, 32 N.Y.3d at 1046, 87 N.Y.S.3d 146, 112 N.E.3d 323 ).

Here, the determination that the petitioner violated sections VII.C.5.a (sexual harassment), VII.C.5.b (nonconsensual sexual contact), and VII.C.5.c (nonconsensual sexual intercourse and/or penetration) of the Conduct Code was not supported by substantial evidence. The...