Velez-Sotomayor v. Progreso Cash and Carry, Inc.

• Citation: 279 F.Supp.2d 65
• Decision Date: 07 May 2003
• Docket Number: No. CIV. 01-1678(JAG/ADC).,CIV. 01-1678(JAG/ADC).
• Parties: Maricely VELEZ-SOTOMAYOR, Ruben Rodriguez Guadalupe, and their conjugal society Plaintiffs v. PROGRESO CASH AND CARRY, INC., and Juan Marroig Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

279 F.Supp.2d 65

Maricely VELEZ-SOTOMAYOR, Ruben Rodriguez Guadalupe, and their conjugal society Plaintiffs v. PROGRESO CASH AND CARRY, INC., and Juan Marroig Defendants.

No. CIV. 01-1678(JAG/ADC).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

May 7, 2003.

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Osvaldo Pérez-Marrero, San Juan, for plaintiff.

Marie L. Cortés-Cortés, Andrés J. Colberg-Trigo, Lespier & Muñoz-Noya, San Juan, for defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

DELGADO-COLON, United States Magistrate Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) the parties have consented to final entry of judgment by a United States Magistrate Judge. See also Local Rule 505(3). An Order of Reference was entered on May 24, 2002 (Docket No. 21). Now before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs' opposition thereto and Defendants' reply (Docket Nos. 47, 48, 52). For the reasons explained below, upon consideration of the pleadings of the parties, and the attached exhibits, the motion before the Court is hereby GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. Background

Plaintiffs filed their complaint on May 22, 2001, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). Plaintiffs also raise supplemental claims pursuant to 29 L.P.R.A. § 146 et seq., 29 L.P.R.A. § 185a, and 31 L.P.R.A. §§ 5141, 5142. Plaintiff Maricely Vélez-Sotomayor (hereafter "Vélez") alleges that while employed by Defendant Progreso Cash and Carry, Inc. (hereafter "Progreso") as a cashier, she was subject to religious discrimination and discrimination on the basis of her pregnancy. More particularly, she alleges that once she became pregnant, Progreso knowing that Vélez was a Jehovah's Witness, required all cashiers to celebrate Christmas by wearing Christmas hats during the holiday season. She informed her superior that she would not wear the Christmas hat due to her religious beliefs. Thereafter, during a meeting between Vélez and Juan Marroig (hereafter "Marroig"), the owner of Progreso, Vélez was informed that she was suspended from work, without pay, until the holiday season ended. Vélez was informed that the reason for her suspension was her refusal to wear a Christmas hat. At the time Vélez was six months pregnant. She alleges that the reason given for the suspension was a pretext. When the holiday season ended, Vélez returned to work to find that "she was no longer wanted" and that all maternity benefits had been suspended.

Defendants subsequently moved to dismiss the complaint, said motion being denied on May 24, 2002 (Docket No. 22). Defendants now move for summary judgment on the basis that plaintiffs lack competent evidence to sustain the claims of discrimination based upon religion and pregnancy (Docket No. 47). More particularly, defendants assert that Vélez cannot claim disparate treatment for having been pregnant on November 30,1999, because there were other employees who were pregnant at the time; the requirement of wearing a Santa Clause cap did not affect Vélez's religious beliefs; and defendants did not have any discriminatory animus against Vélez. Defendants also move the court for dismissal of the Title VII claims against defendant Juan Marroig on the basis that there is no individual liability under Title VII. Finally, defendants move for dismissal of plaintiffs' Law 80 and Law 100 claims on the basis that the burden shifting framework is unconstitutional.

II. Uncontested Facts

Progreso is a corporation engaged in the business of retail and sale of foods and other goods to other business and restaurants in Ponce, Puerto Rico. Vélez was employed as a part-time employee with Progreso from August 15, 1996, until November 30, 1999. Her duties included the position of cashier. All the cashiers, including Vélez, were required to wear a vest, an identification card or tag as part of the dress code established by Progreso. In 1999, all the cashiers were required to wear a Santa Claus cap during the Christmas season.

On the morning of November 30, 1999, Vélez appeared for work and refused to wear the Santa Claus cap. She was told by Rosa Nieves, Cashiers Supervisor, that Marroig had stated that if she [Vélez] decided not to wear the cap, to punch out and go upstairs to meet with Marroig. On that date, Vélez told Marroig that being a Jehovah Witness she did not celebrate Christmas and wearing the hat, as required, was contrary to her religious beliefs. Vélez was raised in the Jehovah's Witness religion, was baptized in 1989 and carries a blood card identifying herself as a Jehovah's Witness. During her deposition Vélez testified that the cap was part of the Christmas celebration and wearing it was against her religious beliefs. Rosa Nieves explained to plaintiff Vélez that the cap was related to Santa Claus and that it was not related with the birth of Christ.

As of November 30, 1999, Vélez was six months pregnant and Marroig was aware of this fact. During that time there were other pregnant employees at Progreso.

Vélez requested unemployment benefits on December 6, 1999. She filed a charge before the Anti-Discrimination Unit against Progreso on December 9, 1999, alleging discrimination based upon religion. Vélez was declared eligible for unemployment benefits on December 22, 1999.

Vélez returned to Progreso after Three Kings Day (January 6, 2000) and requested work hours. She was informed that she was no longer needed as they were in a slow season. In late February or early March, Vélez went to Progreso to have her maternity benefits form filled out. Vélez was informed that awarding of benefits remained the responsibility of the Department of Labor & Unemployment as Vélez was no longer working and/or receiving unemployment benefits.¹

Vélez gave birth on March 19, 2000, to a son. Vélez filed a second complaint with the Anti-Discrimination Unit for religious and pregnancy discrimination on April 12, 2000. Her son, who had become ill following his birth, was hospitalized in Puerto Rico and Florida, respectively, before succumbing to his illness in Florida when he was 13 months old. There is no evidence or claim pointing to any relationship between employment conditions and the illness of plaintiff's son.

III. Analysis

A. Legal Standard

A motion for summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Wolf v. Gruntal & Co., 45 F.3d 524, 527 (1st Cir.1995); National Amusements, Inc., v. Dedham, 43 F.3d 731, 735 (1st Cir.1995). The First Circuit delineated the manner in which Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, functions:

Once a properly documented motion has engaged the gears of Rule 56, the party to whom the motion is directed can shut down the machinery only by showing that a trialworthy issue exists. As to issues on which the summary judgment target bears the ultimate burden of proof, she cannot rely on an absence of competent evidence, but must affirmatively point to specific facts that demonstrate the existence of an authentic dispute. Not every factual dispute is sufficient to thwart summary judgment; the contested fact must be "material" and the dispute over it must be "genuine." In this regard, "material" means that a contested fact has the potential to change the outcome of the suit under the governing law if the dispute over it is resolved favorably to the nonmovant. By like token, "genuine" means that the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor of the nonmoving party.

McCarthy v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 56 F.3d 313, 315 (1st Cir.1995) (citations and some internal punctuation marks omitted).

The Court "must view the entire record in the light most hospitable to the party opposing summary judgment, indulging all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir.1990). While carrying out that task, the Court can safely ignore "conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation." Suárez v. Pueblo Intern., Inc., 229 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir.2000) (quoting Medina-Muñoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.1990)).

Once a movant has made a preliminary showing that there exists no genuine issue of material fact, and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the nonmovant bears the burden to show the existence of a genuine material issue. J. Geils Band Employee Benefit Plan v. Smith Barney Shearson, Inc., 76 F.3d 1245, 1251 (1st Cir.1996). The non-movant cannot meet this burden by mere allegation or denial of the pleadings. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(e). Nor can the nonmoving party avoid summary judgment by relying on conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, unsupported speculation, or "[b]rash conjecture coupled with the earnest hope that something concrete will materialize." J. Geils Band Employee Benefit Plan, 76 F.3d at 1251 (quoting Dow v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 1 F.3d 56, 58 (1st Cir.1993)). "If no genuine issue of material fact emerges from this perscrutation, then the case may be ripe for summary adjudication." Suárez, 229 F.3d at 53.

B. Individual Liability Under Title VII

Defendants ask the Court to dismiss the Title VII claims against defendant Juan Marroig on the basis that Title VII does not provide for individual liability, as a matter of law. The First Circuit has yet to resolve the issue of individual liability in Title VII cases.² However, other circuits have determined there is no personal liability under Title VII³ and, in several cases in this District, it has been held that no personal liability exists under Title VII. Like the majority of the circuit courts, this District has generally held that individual defe...