Velez v. Microgenics Corp.
Decision Date | 16 July 2020 |
Docket Number | 20-CV-387 (JLS) (JJM) |
Parties | CARLOS VELEZ, Plaintiff, v. MICROGENICS CORPORATION and THERMO FISHER SCIENTIFIC, INC., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of New York |
Pro se plaintiff Carlos Velez is in Department of Corrections and Community Supervision ("DOCCS") custody at Five Points Correctional Facility. He filed a complaint, seeking relief under this Court's diversity jurisdiction, for violation of his rights when DOCCS disciplined him for drug use while he was confined at Attica Correctional Facility ("Attica"). Dkt. 1. Specifically, Velez seeks relief because the testing equipment Defendants provided to DOCCS produced a false positive result. See id. Velez also requested permission to proceed in forma pauperis. Dkt. 2.
Defendant Microgenics Corporation appeared and moved to dismiss. Dkt. 4. For the reasons discussed below, Velez's claims will be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)—and Microgenics's motion to dismiss denied as moot—unless Velez files an amended complaint as directed.
Because Velez satisfied the statutory requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and filed the required authorization (Dkt. 2), he is granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis. Therefore, under Section 1915(e)(2)(B), this Court must screen Velez's complaint.
Section 1915 "provide[s] an efficient means by which a court can screen for and dismiss legally insufficient claims." Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Shakur v. Selsky, 391 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2004)). The Court shall dismiss a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity, or an officer or employee of a governmental entity, if the Court determines that the action: (1) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1)-(2). And the Court shall dismiss the complaint of a civil litigant proceeding pro se if, among other reasons, the complaint "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted." See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Generally, the Court will afford a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend or to be heard before dismissal "unless the court can rule out any possibility, however unlikely it might be, that an amended complaint would succeed in stating a claim." Abbas, 480 F.3d at 639 (internal quotations omitted). But leave to amend may be denied when any amendment would be futile. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000).
The Court must accept all factual allegations as true and must draw all inferences in Velez's favor when evaluating the complaint. See Larkin v. Savage, 318 F.3d 138, 139 (2d Cir. 2003) (per curiam); King v. Simpson, 189 F.3d 284, 287 (2d Cir. 1999). "Specific facts are not necessary," and a plaintiff "need only 'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations and citation omitted)); see also Boykin v. Keycorp, 521 F.3d 202, 216 (2d Cir. 2008) (). A court "is obliged to construe [pro se] pleadings liberally, particularly when they allege civil rights violations," McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2004), but even pro se pleadings must meet the notice requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Wynder v. McMahon, 360 F.3d 73, 79 n.11 (2d Cir. 2004).
Under these standards, Velez alleges that, while confined at Attica in June 2019, he submitted a urine sample that was tested with the "Indiko Plus urinalysis analyzer." See Dkt. 1, at 4 ¶ 20. The urine sample Velez submitted returned a "false positive" for prohibited drug use. See id. As a result, Velez was subjected to thirty days in keeplock, lost attendant privileges, and lost opportunities like preferential transfer to a prison closer to home as disciplinary sanctions. See id. at 1 ¶ 4; id. at 2 ¶¶ 5-6. On January 6, 2020, "DOCCS confirmed that . . . Velez's testresults were a faulty false positive." Id. at 5 ¶ 24. Velez alleges that Defendants1 were negligent in providing the equipment to DOCCS, in training DOCCS officers on the equipment, in operating and maintaining the equipment, and in failing to ensure that equipment at DOCCS facilities functioned properly. See Dkt. 1, at 5 ¶ 26.
As explained above, the Court must dismiss the complaint if it determines that the complaint fails to state a claim for relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Neither defendant has been formally served. Nevertheless, Defendant Microgenics moved to dismiss the complaint. See Dkt. 4. Defendant Thermo Fisher Scientific, Inc. has not responded to the complaint, so the complaint is subject to initial Section 1915 review.
Because the Court dismisses the complaint with leave to amend, as set forth below, it denies Microgenics's motion to dismiss as moot. See Graham v. Bank of Am., 432 F. App'x 41 (2d Cir. 2011) ( ).
Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). Velez's claims fail under this standard because he does not allege that Defendants owed him a duty.
Under New York law, "a contractor generally does not owe an independent tort duty of care to a non-contracting third party." Dung Nguyen v. Morrison Healthcare, 412 F. Supp. 3d 196, 202 (E.D.N.Y. 2018). But three exceptions to this general rule exist, in which a contractual obligation may create a duty of care to a non-contracting third party:
Only the first exception bears a connection to Velez's claims. The exception does not apply here, however—where DOCCS performed the testing and Velez alleges that Defendants failed in some unspecified manner to assist DOCCS officials in performing the tests. Cf. Landon v. Kroll Lab. Specialists, Inc., 22 N.Y.3d 1, 6-7 (2013) ( ).
Even if Defendants owed a duty to Velez, Velez's conclusory and speculative allegations of negligence would not support his claims. In particular, Velez deduces from the false positive result that Defendants must have breached a duty to him. See Dkt. 1, at 6 ¶¶ 30-32. The complaint fails to plausibly allege a breach of duty that would constitute negligence. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (), A false positive result by a screening test—without more—does not support a negligence claim; rather, it supports only an inference that the false positive resulted from the inherent limitations of a screening test. Velez does not offer more here but alleges only a list of the steps at which Defendants could have made errors, plus conclusory claims of a breach of duty. See generally Dkt. 1, at 5-6.
Velez frames his complaint as negligence claims against screening test manufacturers. To the extent that Velez also seeks relief against DOCCS for the sanctions he received as a result of the positive test result,2 his complaint does not state a claim for violation of his due process rights. See Peranzo v. Coughlin, 675 F. Supp. 102, 103-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (, )aff'd, 850 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1988).
Because Velez's complaint does not state claims against Defendants, the Court dismisses the complaint for failure to state a claim but grants Velez leave to amend to set forth the necessary allegations, if possible. See Davidson v. Flynn, 32 F.3d 27, 31 (2d Cir. 1994) (...
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