Velocity Express Mid-Atlantic v. Hugen, Record No. 022877.
Decision Date | 12 September 2003 |
Docket Number | Record No. 022877. |
Citation | 585 S.E.2d 557,266 Va. 188 |
Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
Parties | VELOCITY EXPRESS MID-ATLANTIC, INC. v. Brian F. HUGEN. |
John Charles Thomas; E. Duncan Getchell, Jr. (M. Christine Klein; Brian J. Schneider; Robert L. Hodges; Amy M. Pocklington; Hunton & Williams; McGuireWoods, on briefs), Richmond, for appellant.
Jeffrey A. Breit (John W. Drescher; John L. Watts; Boyd Scarborough; Breit, Drescher & Imprevento; Griffin, Pappas & Scarborough, on brief), Norfolk, for appellee.
Amicus Curiae: American Tort Reform Association (Sherman Joyce; Victor E. Schwartz; Mark A. Behrens; Cary Silverman; Shook, Hardy & Bacon, on brief), in support of appellant.
Present: All the Justices.
OPINION BY Chief Justice LEROY R. HASSELL, SR.
In this appeal, the primary issue that we consider is whether the plaintiffs closing argument to the jury deprived the defendant of its right to a fair and impartial trial.
Plaintiff, Brian F. Hugen, was seriously injured in an automobile accident on August 28, 2000. The accident occurred around 7:00 a.m. on State Route 32 in the City of Suffolk. Route 32 is a two lane highway that extends in northern and southern directions. The speed limit is 55 miles per hour.
Michael T. Ross was driving a car in the northern lane of travel. Plaintiff was driving his car in the same direction behind Ross' vehicle. Ross observed a white van approaching from the opposite direction. Defendant, Velocity Express Mid-Atlantic, owned the white van which was operated by its employee, Alvin J. Winston. The van "drift[ed] over" into Ross' lane of travel. Trying to avoid a collision, Ross steered his car "all the way to the shoulder of the road," and defendant's van "sideswipe[d]" Ross' car. Defendant's van then collided with plaintiff's car in plaintiffs lane of travel.
After the accident occurred, Winston told defendant's safety director: Winston told a police officer at the scene of the accident that Winston "never saw the first vehicle that he collided with."
As a result of the accident, plaintiff sustained catastrophic injuries, and he suffered permanent physical and mental disabilities. Plaintiff was in a coma for 62 days following the accident. He suffered a compression fracture of the thoracic vertebrae, a broken femur, a fractured hip, multiple fractures to his right ankle, collapsed lungs, and severe brain injuries. He experienced multi-system organ dysfunction, acute renal failure, multiple incidents of deep venous thromboses, and pneumonia. He has developed a rare condition known as heterotopic ossification, which causes abnormal new bone formations and ultimately will cause his joints to fuse together, thereby preventing him from moving his body. The severe stiffness in the joints caused by the heterotopic ossification has almost completely restricted plaintiffs use of his arms, hips, legs, and knees. Eventually, plaintiff will have a total ankylosis or "frozen jaw" that will prohibit him from opening his mouth, and his jaw will become "permanently locked." Plaintiff will lose all his teeth, and he will have to be fed through the insertion of a surgically-implanted tube into his stomach.
Plaintiff's brain injuries have impaired his memory, attention span, and abilities to concentrate, understand, and follow instructions. He ranks in the bottom five percent of the population in terms of his mental functions. As a result of his brain injuries, plaintiff eats excessive quantities of food because he is unable to discern when he is full. Consequently, plaintiff, who weighed approximately 175 pounds before the accident, now weighs 282 pounds. His weight impairs his ability to breathe, adversely affects his heart, and increases the risk of further blood clots.
During a jury trial, plaintiff and defendant relied upon expert witness testimony to establish life care plans that plaintiff will require because of his dire medical condition. Plaintiff's expert witnesses testified that plaintiff will need the services of a licensed practical nurse 24 hours each day for the remainder of his life. Robert D. Voogt, one of plaintiff's expert witnesses, testified that plaintiff needs the assistance of a licensed practical nurse because this type of nurse can provide the appropriate nursing care that plaintiff currently requires and will require in the future. Defendant's expert witness, Robert H. Taylor, testified that a certified nursing aide, who has less training and is less expensive than a licensed practical nurse, can provide the 24-hour daily care that plaintiff needs. Taylor testified that a certified nursing aide would cost approximately $96,360 per year, which, when added to the other costs, resulted in a life care plan that will cost $4,123,193.50. Plaintiff presented evidence, however, that a licensed practical nurse would cost $425,955 per year, which, when added to other costs, resulted in a life care plan that cost $17,091,000.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $60,000,000. The circuit court entered a judgment confirming the verdict and defendant appeals.
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the defense of sudden emergency. Defendant claims that the van operated by its employee, Winston, was forced into plaintiffs lane of travel when Ross' car collided with defendant's van. We disagree with defendant.
The sudden emergency doctrine relieves a person of liability if, without prior negligence on his part, that person is confronted with a sudden emergency and acts as an ordinarily prudent person would act under the circumstances. See, e.g., Jones v. Ford Motor Co., 263 Va. 237, 262, 559 S.E.2d 592, 605 (2002); Bentley v. Felts, 248 Va. 117, 120, 445 S.E.2d 131, 133 (1994); Carolina Coach Co. v. Starchia, 219 Va. 135, 141, 244 S.E.2d 788, 792 (1978); Pickett v. Cooper, 202 Va. 60, 63, 116 S.E.2d 48, 51 (1960); Southern Passenger Motor Lines, Inc. v. Burks, 187 Va. 53, 60, 46 S.E.2d 26, 30 (1948).
Additionally, we have stated:
Cowles v. Zahn, 206 Va. 743, 746-47, 146 S.E.2d 200, 203 (1966); accord Ford Motor Co., 263 Va. at 262, 559 S.E.2d at 605; Starchia, 219 Va. at 141, 244 S.E.2d at 792.
In the present case, the circuit court correctly concluded that defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction on the sudden emergency doctrine. The accident was caused by the negligence of defendant's own employee. For example, Ross, the driver of the car that collided with defendant's van before that van collided with plaintiff's car, testified as follows:
And, contrary to defendant's assertions, the evidence of record clearly demonstrates that the accident occurred in the lane of travel occupied by Ross and plaintiff. Simply stated, a sudden emergency did not exist.
Plaintiff's counsel made the following remarks during his closing argument to the jury:
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...(N.C.2002) ("Arguments that ask the jurors to place themselves in the victim's shoes are improper."); Velocity Express Mid-Atlantic, Inc. v. Hugen, 266 Va. 188, 585 S.E.2d 557, 565 (2003) (ruling "plaintiff's repeated requests to the jury that it apply the `Golden Rule' were prejudicial and......
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