Vendrella v. Astriab Family Ltd.

• Decision Date: 01 April 2014
• Docket Number: No. 18949.,18949.
• Parties: Anthony VENDRELLA et al. v. ASTRIAB FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP et al.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

311 Conn. 301

87 A.3d 546

Anthony VENDRELLA et al.

v.ASTRIAB FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP et al.

No. 18949.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Sept. 24, 2014.

Decided April 1, 2014.

Steven L. Seligman, with whom, on the brief, were Lester Katz, Hartford, and Christian Sterling, for the appellants (defendants).

Hugh D. Hughes, New Haven, with whom were Joseph D. Foti, Jr., Cheshire, and, on the brief, William F. Gallagher, New Haven, and Garrett Moore, Cheshire, for the appellees (plaintiffs).

Doug Dubitsky and Lisa Solomon, Westport, filed a brief for the Connecticut Farm Bureau Association et al. as amici curiae.

ROGERS, C.J., and ZARELLA, EVELEIGH, McDONALD, ESPINOSA and VERTEFEUILLE, Js.

ROGERS, C.J.

The primary issue that we must resolve in this case is whether the keeper of a horse has a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent the horse from causing injuries to others when the particular horse has not previously exhibited mischievous propensities, but the trier of facts reasonably could find that horses as a species have a natural propensity to bite. The plaintiffs, Anthony Vendrella (father) and his son, Anthony John Vendrella (minor plaintiff),¹ brought this action for personal injuries incurred when a horse known as Scuppy, which was kept at a facility owned by the defendants, Astriab Family Limited Partnership and Timothy D. Astriab, ² bit the minor plaintiff. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment contending that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants had actual or constructive notice that Scuppy had mischievous propensities. The trial court granted the motion and rendered judgment for the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed to the Appellate Court, which reversed the judgment of the trial court. Vendrella v. Astriab Family Ltd. Partnership, 133 Conn.App. 630, 660, 36 A.3d 707 (2012). We then granted the defendants' petition for certification to appeal.³Vendrella v. Astriab Family Ltd. Partnership, 304 Conn. 919, 41 A.3d 306 (2012). The issues that we must resolve on appeal are: (1) Did the Appellate Court properly conclude as a matter of law that a defendant has a duty of care to prevent injuries caused by a domestic animal that did not have known mischievous propensities if the injuries were foreseeable because the animal belongs to a class of animals that is naturally mischievous, i.e., naturally inclined to do an act that might endanger the safety of persons or property; ⁴ and (2) if so, is there a genuine issue of material fact as to whether, under the specific facts and circumstances of the present case, the minor plaintiff's injury was foreseeable? ⁵ With respect to the first question, we conclude that, as a matter of law, the owner or keeper of a domestic animal has a duty to take reasonable steps to prevent injuries that are foreseeable because the animal belongs to a class of animals that is naturally inclined to cause such injuries, regardless of whether the animal had previously caused an injury or was roaming at large and, accordingly, the owner may be held liable for negligence if he or she fails to take such reasonable steps and an injuryresults.⁶ With respect to the second question, we conclude that the evidence submitted by the plaintiffs in the present case in opposition to the defendants' motion for summary judgment created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the minor plaintiff's injury was foreseeable because horses have a natural propensity to bite. Accordingly, we conclude that the Appellate Court properly reversed the trial court's summary judgment rendered in favor of the defendants and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Before addressing the merits of the defendants' claims, it is important to clarify what this case is about. As we have indicated, the first question that we must decide is whether, as a matter of law, the keeper of a domestic animal that did not have known mischievous propensities, but that belongs to a class of animals with naturally mischievous propensities, may be held liable for foreseeable injuries caused by the animal when the keeper was negligent in controlling the animal or, instead, as claimed by the defendants, the keeper of such an animal is immune from liability for such injuries, even if he was negligent in controlling the animal, unless the animal was roaming at large. In other words, we must decide, as a matter of law, whether the owner or keeper of a domestic animal that has not previously displayed mischievous propensities has a duty to take reasonable steps to prevent injuries that are foreseeable because of the animal's naturally mischievous propensities. Because we conclude that the answer to the first question is “yes,” the second question that this court must decide is whether there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether, under all of the relevant facts and circumstances of this case, the injury caused by Scuppy was reasonably foreseeable.

Thus, contrary to the defendants' repeated suggestion in their briefs to this court and at oral argument, the Appellate Court did not adopt, and the plaintiffs are not asking this court to adopt, a rule under which the keeper of a horse can be held strictly liable for injuries caused by the animal. ⁷ Moreover, contrary to the defendants' suggestion, the Appellate Court did not hold, and the plaintiffs make no claim, that injuries from horse bites are foreseeable as a matter of law because all horses have a natural propensity to bite under all circumstances. In other words, neither the Appellate Court nor this court concludes that horses may be presumed to be dangerous. Rather, that issue must be decided on a case-by-case basis. Thus, because we conclude in the present case that the plaintiffs' evidence has created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether horses have a natural inclination to bite humans, the case must be submitted to the trier of facts so that it may decide as a matter of fact whether the plaintiffs have met their burden of proof on that issue and, if so, whether the defendants were negligent in controlling Scuppy. In other words, the trier of facts must determine whether the minor plaintiff's injuries were foreseeable and, if so, what the appropriate standard of care was, whether the defendants breached that standard of care and, if they did, whether the breach was a proximate cause of the minor plaintiff's injuries. Those questions are not for this court to decide. ⁸

The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the following relevant facts and procedural history. “At all relevant times Astriab operated a business located at 203 Herbert Street in Milford (property) known as Glendale Farms. That business was open to the public and was twofold in nature. Glendale Farms sold annual flowers, vegetable plants, ground covers and seasonal ornamentals, and it also provided horse boarding services. The property contained, inter alia, greenhouses, stables and paddocks. As manager and supervisor, Astriab oversaw operations at Glendale Farms.

“Astriab testified in his deposition that customers of Glendale Farms enjoyed seeing the horses on the property and acknowledged that although he could have erected a barrier between the customers and the horses, he chose not to do so. Crystal Cobb, an employee at Glendale Farms and [the] girlfriend of Astriab, similarly testified in her deposition that customers regularly asked to look at the horses after purchasing goods from the greenhouse. She explained that it was something that customers expected because ‘when they have little kids, they see the horse, they want to take a look.’

“The plaintiffs patronized Glendale Farms on the morning of May 18, 2006. At that time, the [minor] plaintiff ... was two years old. After purchasing plants from the greenhouse, the ... father placed the plants in their vehicle, which was located in a parking lot adjacent to a paddock containing three horses. The plaintiffs then walked over to the paddock and stood approximately one foot outside its fence to admire a brown horse known as Scuppy. The ... father petted Scuppy as the [minor] plaintiff ... watched. The ... father stopped petting Scuppy when the [minor] plaintiff ... noticed another horse in the paddock. Suddenly, and without warning, Scuppy lowered his head and bit the [minor] plaintiff ... on his right cheek, removing a large portion of flesh. The injury ultimately required surgery and resulted in a permanent scar on the [minor plaintiff's] right cheek.

“The plaintiffs commenced the present action against the defendants on May 14, 2008.⁹ Their complaint consisted of six counts. In counts one and three, the [minor] plaintiff ... alleged negligence and recklessness on the part of Astriab. In count two, the ... father alleged a claim of bystander emotional distress against Astriab. Counts four, five and six were directed at the Astriab Family Limited Partnership and repeated the respective allegations of the first three counts.

“On October 2, 2009, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. That one sentence motion alleged that ‘there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the [d]efendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the basis that they neither had actual notice nor constructive notice of any [mischievous] disposition or propensities on the part of the ... horse which allegedly bit the minor [p]laintiff.’ The defendants submitted the sworn affidavit of Astriab in support of that motion. In that affidavit, Astriab averred, inter alia, that ‘during the twenty-eight years that Glendale Farm[s] has kept horses, we have never had an episode where any of the horses we kept has bitten or otherwise injured any person.’ He further maintained that ‘[b]ecause I do not know the identity of [the horse] which bit the [minor plaintiff], I have no way of knowing, and do not know, anything about the disposition or propensities of [the...