Veney v. Wyche

• Decision Date: 18 June 2002
• Docket Number: No. 01-6603.,01-6603.
• Citation: Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726 (4th Cir. 2002)
• Parties: Daniel L. VENEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. T.V. WYCHE; Darnley R. Hodge, Superintendent, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

293 F.3d 726

Daniel L. VENEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. T.V. WYCHE; Darnley R. Hodge, Superintendent, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 01-6603.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued April 5, 2002.

Decided June 18, 2002.

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ARGUED:

John M. Wright, Student, University of Virginia School of Law Appellate Litigation Clinic, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. William Fisher Etherington, Beale, Balfour, Davison & Etherington, P.C., Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.

ON BRIEF:

Neal L. Walters, University of Virginia School of Law Appellate Litigation Clinic, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. William K. Lewis, Beale, Balfour, Davison & Etherington, P.C., Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.

Before WIDENER and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and STAPLETON, Senior Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge WILLIAMS wrote the opinion, in which Judge WIDENER and Senior Judge STAPLETON joined.

OPINION

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge.

Daniel L. Veney, an inmate incarcerated at Riverside Regional Jail in Hopewell, Virginia, filed the present action under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 1994), alleging that defendants Lieutenant T.V. Wyche and Superintendent Darnley R. Hodge violated his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution by treating him differently from other inmates because of his gender and sexual preference. Specifically, Veney claims that defendants denied his requests to move from his single-occupancy cell into a double-occupancy cell because he is a homosexual male. The district court, after screening Veney's complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915A (West Supp. 2001), dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Because we agree with the district court that even if all of Veney's allegations were true, he would not be entitled to relief, we affirm.

I.

Veney has been incarcerated at Riverside since January 23, 2000. With the exception of two days, he has been held in a single-occupancy cell. On December 17, 2000, after several requests to switch into a double-occupancy cell were denied, Veney filed a grievance with Riverside alleging that prison officials, by not allowing him to switch cells with other inmates, were discriminating against him because he is a homosexual male. On December 22, 2000, Captain L. White ruled that Veney was not being discriminated against. Veney unsuccessfully appealed White's decision under the Riverside grievance procedure. On March 7, 2001, Veney filed a pro se complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, alleging that prison officials had violated his constitutional right to equal protection of the law.

In his complaint, Veney claims that he is being treated differently from similarly situated heterosexual males and homosexual females, both of whom, asserts Veney, are housed in double-occupancy cells at Riverside. The district court, as required under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (PLRA), reviewed Veney's complaint to identify any cognizable claims. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915A (West Supp.2001). After careful consideration of Veney's pleadings, the district court determined that his complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and dismissed the action. On appeal, Veney challenges the district court's dismissal of his equal protection claim, asserting that his complaint alleges specific facts showing that correctional officials treated him differently from similarly situated inmates without a legitimate penological reason for doing so.

II.

Under § 1915A, the provision at issue in this case, the district court is required to review any "complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity ... [and] identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint ... fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted...." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915A(a), (b)(1). We review dismissals for failure to state a claim de novo. See Sanders v. Sheahan, 198 F.3d 626, 626 (7th Cir.1999) (concluding that dismissals under § 1951A for failure to state a claim require the same standard of review as dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6)); Davis v. District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342, 1348 (D.C.Cir.1998) (same).

A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted unless "after accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the plaintiff's complaint as true and drawing all reasonable factual inferences from those facts in the plaintiff's favor, it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim entitling him to relief." Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir.1999). Moreover, when such a dismissal involves a civil rights complaint, "we must be especially solicitous of the wrongs alleged" and "must not dismiss the complaint unless it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any legal theory which might plausibly be suggested by the facts alleged." Harrison v. United States Postal Serv., 840 F.2d 1149, 1152 (4th Cir.1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). We are not required, however, "to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences." See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir.2001). Nor must we "accept as true allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or by exhibit." Id. These principles guide our de novo review of the district court's dismissal of Veney's complaint.

III.

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The equal protection requirement "does not take from the States all power of classification," Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979), but "keeps governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike." Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10, 112 S.Ct. 2326, 120 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992). To succeed on an equal protection claim, Veney "must first demonstrate that he has been treated differently from others with whom he is similarly situated and that the unequal treatment was the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination." Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir.2001). If he makes this showing, "the court proceeds to determine whether the disparity in treatment can be justified under the requisite level of scrutiny." Id. To state an equal protection claim, Veney must plead sufficient facts to satisfy each requirement, which we discuss in turn.

A.

Veney claims that he is not allowed to occupy a double-occupancy cell because he is a homosexual male. He asserts that both heterosexual males and homosexual females at Riverside are housed in double-occupancy cells, while his requests to move from his single-occupancy cell have been consistently denied. Veney further alleges that requests to move into a double-occupancy cell made by "seemingly heterosexual" males were granted. (J.A. at 6.) For purposes of this appeal, we must accept Veney's allegations as true and draw all inferences in his favor. We therefore assume that Veney is not allowed to move into a double-occupancy cell because he is a homosexual male.¹ We also assume, without deciding, that in all relevant respects, Veney is similarly situated to the other inmates at Riverside.² Veney's complaint therefore sufficiently alleges that Riverside is intentionally discriminating against him by treating him differently from similarly situated heterosexual males and homosexual females.³

B.

Having determined that Veney's complaint alleges disparate treatment based upon intentional discrimination, we turn to our second inquiry of whether Veney has alleged facts that, if found to be true, would demonstrate that the disparate treatment lacks justification under the requisite level of scrutiny. Ordinarily, when a state regulation or policy is challenged under the Equal Protection Clause, unless it involves a fundamental right or a suspect class, it is presumed to be valid and will be sustained "if there is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose." Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-320, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993). Veney's case does not involve a fundamental right, and he does not allege that he is a member of a suspect class.⁴ Rather, he claims that he has been discriminated against on the basis of sexual preference and gender. Outside the prison context, the former is subject to rational basis review, see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631-32, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996) (applying the rational relation test to an amendment to Colorado's constitution that prohibited any measures to protect homosexuals as a class), whereas the latter is subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny, see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976) ("To withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives."). When equal protection challenges arise in a prison context, however, courts must adjust the level of scrutiny to ensure that prison officials are afforded the necessary discretion to operate their facilities in a safe and secure manner. See Morrison, 239 F.3d at 654-55. In a prison context, therefore, we must determine whether the disparate treatment is "reasonably related to [a...