Venice Justice Comm. v. City of L. A.

Decision Date09 September 2016
Docket NumberCase No. CV 16-01115 DDP (SSx)
Citation205 F.Supp.3d 1116
Parties VENICE JUSTICE COMMITTEE, an unincorporated association; Peggy Kennedy, an individual, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Central District of California

Colleen Marika Mullen, John P. Given, Justine Marie Schneeweis, Carol A. Sobel, Law Office of Carol A. Sobel, Santa Monica, CA, for Plaintiff.

Sara Ugaz, Los Angeles City Attorney's Office, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendants.

ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS

DEAN D. PREGERSON, United States District Judge

Before the court is Defendant City of Los Angeles's (the "City") Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Venice Justice Committee and Peggy Kennedy's Complaint. (Dkt. 13.) After hearing oral argument and considering the parties' submissions, the court adopts the following Order.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Los Angeles Municipal Code section 42.15

The Venice Beach Boardwalk (the "Boardwalk") is a major tourist attraction in the City of Los Angeles that has long served as a traditional public forum for free speech activities. (See Los Angeles Municipal Code section 42.15 ("LAMC § 42.15"), attached as Exhibit 1 to Defendant's Request for Judicial Notice.) In 2004, the City of Los Angeles passed LAMC § 42.15, which imposed certain time, place, and manner restrictions on activities on the Boardwalk. LAMC § 42.15(B)(3). The goal of the Ordinance was to preserve the unique historic character of the Boardwalk as a forum for free speech, maintain its status as a tourist attraction, protect commercial life on the Boardwalk, and ensure safety. Id.

Over the years, the City has amended the provision on numerous occasions, including in response to First Amendment challenges. See, e.g. , Dowd v. City of Los Angeles , No. CV 09–06731 DDP SSX, 2013 WL 4039043, at *1 (C.D.Cal. Aug. 7, 2013). At issue in this case is the most recent iteration of LAMC § 42.15, which was amended in 2014. LAMC § 42.15 delineates the Boardwalk into Designated Spaces, Pagoda, and Recreation Areas. LAMC §§ 42.15(D)-(F). The remainder of the space is considered "undesignated Space." Id. This case concerns only the restrictions pertaining to the Designated Spaces and undesignated Spaces.

In Designated Spaces, "[p]ersons can engage in traditional expressive speech and petitioning activities, and can Vend the following expressive items: newspapers, leaflets, pamphlets, bumper stickers, patches, and/or buttons" and engage in other expressive activities not relevant here. Id. § 42.15(D)(1). The Ordinance defines "vending" as "[t]o sell, offer for sale, expose or display for sale, solicit offers to purchase, or to barter Food, Goods or Merchandise, or services in any area from a stand, table ... or to require someone to pay a fee or to set, negotiate, or establish a fee before providing Food, Goods or Merchandise, or services, even if characterized by the Vendor as a Donation." Id. § 42.15(A)(20). The Ordinance also includes a "Sunset Provision," which prohibits "set[ting] up or set[ting] down items in, tak[ing] down items from or block[ing], or attempt[ing] to reserve a Designated Space between Sunset and 9:00 a.m." Id. § 42.15(E)(9).

As for undesignated spaces, the Ordinance distinguishes between those on the west side of the Boardwalk and those on the east side. In the undesignated area on the west side, also called the ocean-side, a person may engage in all the same activities as in Designated Spaces, except vending, and may "set up a display table, easel, stand, equipment or other furniture ... subject to reasonable size and height restrictions ... provided the equipment or activity associated with the equipment does not materially impede or obstruct pedestrian or vehicular traffic or areas designed for emergency ingress or egress." Id. § 42.15(F)(1)(b). By contrast, in the undesignated area on the east side, a person may engage in all the same activities as in Designated Spaces (including vending) but may not "set up a display table, easel, stand, equipment or other furniture, use a Pushcart or other vehicle" at any time. Id. § 42.15(F)(1)(a).

While not squarely at issue in this case, the Ordinance further provides that "[n]o Person shall use or obstruct access to any City-owned or maintained property or equipment, including, but not limited to, street furniture, benches, planters, trash receptacles, Pagodas or other structures or equipment installed on public property, for Vending, Performing, or display of anything whatsoever." Id. § 42.15(G). As a result of these combined limitations, Plaintiffs allege that the majority of the remaining undesignated spaces available for expressive activity are "only 30 inches or 60 inches wide and 60 inches." (Plaintiffs' Opposition to Motion to Dismiss 7.)

B. Factual Background

Plaintiff Peggy Kennedy is a co-founder of the Venice Justice Committee (VJC). (Compl. ¶ 13.) The VJC advocates against civil and human rights violations in the Venice area with a focus on the interactions of the police and the homeless community. (Id. ¶ 12.) This case arises out of two incidents that occurred on the Boardwalk when Plaintiff Kennedy was involved in advocacy efforts related to the VJC. (Id. ¶¶ 24-27.)

The first incident occurred on February 2, 2015. (Id. ¶ 24.) On that day, shortly after sunset, Plaintiffs allege that Ms. Kennedy set up a small folding table in a Designated Space to display signs, hold petitions, collect donations, and provide informational pamphlets. (Id. ¶¶ 24-25.) Soon thereafter, Plaintiffs claim that two LAPD officers approached Ms. Kennedy and informed her that she could not "vend" in a Designated Space after sunset. (Id. ¶ 25.) Ms. Kennedy responded that she was not vending anything but was instead collecting donations from individuals who wanted to support the work of the VJC. (Id. ) The officers then allegedly explained to Ms. Kennedy that soliciting donations constituted vending. (Id. ¶ 26.) They also told her that she would be issued a citation if she did not immediately stop seeking donations. (Id. ) Ms. Kennedy acquiesced and left the space. (Id. )

According to Plaintiffs, Ms. Kennedy did not attempt to set up another table on the Boardwalk for several months. (Id. ¶ 27.) The second incident occurred on September 25, 2015 when Ms. Kennedy again set up a table in a Designated Space after sunset. (Id. ¶ 27.) On this occasion, Ms. Kennedy had placed a sign on the table that read, "Stop Killing of Homeless." (Id. ) She also set out informational pamphlets, petitions, a flyer about an upcoming march, and a cardboard box to collect donations. (Id. ¶¶ 27, 29.) Approximately fifteen minutes after sunset, two LAPD officers approached Ms. Kennedy and informed her that she could not set up in a vending space after sunset. (Id. ¶ 30.) The officers explained that, while she could continue to engage in expressive activity, including collection petition signatures and passing out flyers, she would need to keep moving up and down the Boardwalk. (Id. ) The officers allegedly threatened her with a citation if she remained. (Id. ) Ms. Kennedy again left the Boardwalk. (Id. ) Plaintiffs also allege that it was not feasible to engage the public, carry VJC's literature, and solicit donations if she had to keep moving at all times. (Id. )

In response to these incidents, Plaintiffs brought this suit seeking declaratory relief that Plaintiffs' constitutional rights were violated as a result of the LAPD officer's actions, declaratory relief that requesting donations to support political does not constitute vending, and an injunction against the City from enforcing the Sunset Provision of LAMC § 42.15 so as to prohibit all core political speech on the Boardwalk after sunset.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint will survive a motion to dismiss when it contains "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must "accept as true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Resnick v. Hayes , 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir.2000). Although a complaint need not include "detailed factual allegations," it must offer "more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Conclusory allegations or allegations that are no more than a statement of a legal conclusion "are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. In other words, a pleading that merely offers "labels and conclusions," a "formulaic recitation of the elements," or "naked assertions" will not be sufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

"When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief." Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Plaintiffs must allege "plausible grounds to infer" that their claims rise "above the speculative level." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief" is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

III. DISCUSSION
A. Activities Prohibited by LAMC § 42.15

Before determining whether LAMC § 42.15 survives Plaintiffs' constitutional challenge, the court must first determine what activities are specifically prohibited by the Ordinance. In their Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that LAMC § 42.15 prohibits "all core political speech on the Boardwalk after sunset." (Compl., "Prayer for Relief" at ¶ 3.) Plaintiffs also allege that the City improperly conflates " ‘solic...

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