Vennekolt v. Lutey

• Decision Date: 15 January 1934
• Docket Number: 7212.
• Parties: VENNEKOLT v. LUTEY, County Treasurer, et al.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

28 P.2d 452

96 Mont. 72

VENNEKOLT v. LUTEY, County Treasurer, et al.

No. 7212.

Supreme Court of Montana

January 15, 1934

Rehearing Denied Jan. 18, 1934.

Original proceeding by Wallace Vennekolt against Emanuel Fischl, as County Treasurer of Lewis and Clark County, and others for an injunction. On death of Fischl, one Lutey was substituted.

Writ granted.

Toomey & McFarland and H. K. Anderson, all of Helena, for plaintiff.

Raymond T. Nagle, Atty. Gen., and Jeremiah J. Lynch, Asst. Atty Gen., for defendants.

STEWART Justice.

This is an original proceeding to test the constitutionality of certain provisions of chapter 158 of the Session Laws of 1933, known as the Motor Registration Act.

Section 1 of the Act provides: "Registration must be renewed annually and license fees and taxes paid annually. All registrations expire on December 31 of the year in which they are issued and application for registration, or re-registration, must be filed with the County Treasurer as aforesaid not later than February 1 of each year." Subdivision 2.

Section 1 is a re-enactment, in amended form, of section 1759 of the Revised Codes of 1921, and, after enumerating the things that must be contained in the application for registration contains the following provision: "Before filing such application with the County Treasurer, the applicant shall submit the same to the County Assessor of said county and said County Assessor shall indicate on said application in a space to be provided for that purpose, the assessed valuation of said automobile for the year for which said application of registration is made. The applicant shall, upon the filing of said application, pay to the County Treasurer the registration fee prescribed by Section 1760 of the Revised Codes of Montana of 1921 and any amendments thereto, and all owners of motor vehicles subject to taxation in Montana on the first day of January and those acquiring ownership of motor vehicles prior to the first Monday in March shall also pay the taxes assessed against said motor vehicle for the current year of registration, unless said taxes are a lien upon real property of said taxpayer.

Upon satisfactory proof that any vehicle registered subsequent to the first Monday in March was not taxable in the state on said first Monday in March or that the taxes thereon had been paid, or that said taxes are a lien upon real property of the taxpayer, such fact shall be noted on receipt issued by the County Treasurer as hereinafter provided."

Section 3 is a re-enactment in amended form of section 2002, Revised Codes of 1921, and reads as follows: "The Assessor must between the first Monday of March and the second Monday of July in each year, assess the names of all taxable inhabitants, and all property in his county subject to taxation, except such as is required to be assessed by the State Board of Equalization, and except motor vehicles theretofore assessed as provided herein and Section 1759 as amended by this Act, and must assess such property, to the persons by whom it was owned or claimed, or in whose possession or control it was at twelve o'clock M. on the first Monday of March next preceding; but no mistake in the name of the owner or supposed owner of real property renders the assessment thereof invalid. Credits must be assessed as provided in Section 1996, Subdivision 6. The Assessor must, also, pursuant to the provisions of Section 1759 as amended by this Act, assess all motor vehicles in his county subject to taxation on January 1st of each year and all motor vehicles becoming taxable thereafter up to twelve o'clock noon of the first Monday in March of each year, at the time that such motor vehicles shall so become taxable in his said county."

Plaintiff alleges that he is a taxpayer upon personal property only; that he owns a car, and that he intends to trade his car in on another car between February 1 and March 1; that, if the above act is enforced as written and as the county officers propose to enforce it, he will be forced to pay a tax on his presently owned car based upon the 1933 levy, whereas the owners of other cars of equal value, who also own real estate, will be allowed to pay on another and a different rate, to wit, the rate or levy to be fixed by the county board on the second Monday of August for the year 1934; that he will also be forced to pay taxes on the other car which he intends to obtain in trade upon the basis of the 1933 rate or levy; and that as a result there will be an unjust discrimination and a lack of uniformity.

Plaintiff invokes sections 1 and 11 of article 12, and section 27 of article 3, of the Montana Constitution. Section 1 provides as follows: "The necessary revenue for the support and maintenance of the state shall be provided by the legislative assembly, which shall levy a uniform rate of assessment and taxation, and shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valuation for taxation of all property, except that specially provided for in this article. The legislative assembly may also impose a license tax, both upon persons and upon corporations doing business in the state." Section 11 provides as follows: "Taxes shall be levied and collected by general laws and for public purposes only. They shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax."

Section 27, article 3, provides: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."

It must be admitted that a statute or a provision of law must be plain and definite enough to express with reasonable certainty the object sought to be achieved. We feel impelled to make an examination of the last provision of section 3 of the above chapter--the amendment of the old section 2002--in order to ascertain if this provision is reasonably understandable and possible of fair enforcement. The section does plainly provide that all property in a county, except the property to be assessed by the state board of equalization, and motor vehicles theretofore assessed under the amended section 1759, shall be assessed by the assessor between the first Monday of March and the second Monday of July. It is also reasonably plain that all motor vehicles in the county must be assessed on January 1st of each year. The trouble comes with the final provision of the section. That provision follows the requirement last mentioned, but it follows it without punctuation or break. The wording is "and all motor vehicles becoming taxable thereafter up to twelve o'clock noon of the first Monday in March of each year, at the time that such motor vehicles shall so become taxable in his said county." The members of this court have given careful consideration to the language employed and have been, and are now, unable to determine as to what the section does provide as to the assessment and taxation...