Vennum v. Harwood
| Decision Date | 31 December 1844 |
| Parties | THOMAS VENNUMv.JOHN HARWOOD. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
CASE for slander, in the Iroquois circuit court, brought by the appellee against the appellant, and heard before the Hon. RICHARD M. YOUNG and a jury, at the October term, 1844. Verdict for the plaintiff below for $900. A motion for a new trial was made by the defendant below, but the motion was overruled, and judgment rendered on the verdict of the jury.
The substance of the several affidavits, on which the motion for a new trial was based, in set forth in the opinion of the court.
J. J. BROWN, for the appellant: A new trial ought to have been granted. Sellers v. The People, 3 Scam. 412, and cases there cited; Graham on New Trials 129, and cases there cited.
D. L. GREGG, for the appellee: The affidavits to impeach Finley's competency as a juror, do not show such a positive expression of opinion, as would amount to a disqualification. An opinion founded on rumor, or report, does not necessarily disqualify. The juror's opinions were based upon rumors. Smith v. Eames, 3 Scam. 78; Gardner v. The People, Ib. 88; Sellers v. The People, Ib. 414; Durell v. Mosher, 8 Johns. 445.
The court was under no obligation to treat affidavits in support of a motion for a new trial as true. Bruce v. Truett, 4 Scam. 454.
The affidavit of the juror Finley contradicts the affidavits of Wilson, Crawford and Wagner, in every particular, and gives a statement of all he had said, having reference to the case. This does not disclose a ground of challenge.
Jurors will not be allowed to impeach their verdict, but their statements may be received to support it. Dana v. Tucker, 4 Johns. 487; Barlow v. The State, 2 Blackf. 115.
It is the right of the party to ask the juror, on his voire dire, whether he has formed or expressed an opinion as to the merits of the controversy. Maize v. Sewell, 4 Blackf. 449. If he waives the right and takes the juror, he ought not to be allowed to set the verdict aside, by showing a previous expression of opinion. He stands guilty of laches, and should not avail himself of his own wrong act. In this case, it does not appear that the jurors were examined on the voire dire, although previously to being sworn, they were interrogated by Vennum's counsel.
If a party does not exercise his right at the proper time, he ought not, especially in civil causes, to be allowed the benefit of it after verdict. He might permit a person having expressed an opinion to go upon the jury for the express purpose of obtaining a new trial, in the event of being unsuccessful.
It was the duty of Vennum to have had the incompetent juror set aside, as soon as his incompetency was discovered. It may have come to his knowledge during the trial. The records do not show that this was not the case, and it is by no means unreasonable to suppose that he may have relied upon the juror's incompetency to obtain a new trial, if unsuccessful. He ought to have shown that he was ignorant of the juror's expression of opinion, not only when the jury was impaneled, but during the whole trial. In the case of Stone v. The People, 2 Scam. 337, it was decided that an incompetent juror may be discharged after trial has commenced, and a new one selected to fill his place.
Courts will reluctantly interfere to set aside verdicts. Wickersham v. The People, 1 Scam. 130; Wheeler v. Shields, 2 do. 351; Coe v. Givan, 1 Blackf. 367.
It is proper to adopt a rigid rule in order to restrain motions for new trials, where no cause exists. The frequency of such motions is a great annoyance to our courts, and ought to be checked.
If these views are correct, a new trial was properly refused by the court below.
This was an action on the case for slander brought by Harwood against Vennum.
The declaration alleged that the defendant had charged the plaintiff with the commission of the crime of larceny. The defendant pleaded not guilty. The cause was tried by a jury, who found a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, for nine hundred dollars. The defendant entered a motion for a new trial. One of the grounds urged for a new trial was the disqualification of J. S. Finley one of the jurors who tried the case. To sustain this ground several affidavits were read. The defendant stated, that at the time of impanelling the jury, all the jurors were asked if they had formed or expressed any opinion as to the rights of the parties, or the merits of the case; that they severally answered in the negative; that at the time, he had no knowledge or suspicion, that Finley had formed or expressed any opinion about the case, otherwise he should most certainly have challenged him; that he had since learned with surprise, that Finley had, previous to the trial, repeatedly expressed an opinion about the case, and with much warmth, against the defendant, and adverse to his rights.
J. J. Brown, Esq. the counsel for the defendant, stated that the jurors, in answer to the questions asked them, severally declared that they had neither formed nor expressed an opinion relative to the rights of the parties, or the merits of the case; that at the time the jurors were sworn to try the case, he had no knowledge or suspicion that Finley had ever formed or expressed an opinion about the case.
Jacob Wagner stated, that some two or three weeks before the trial, he heard Finley say that Vennum had talked too much...
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People v. Caravens
......This court also held in the early case of Vennum v. Harwood, 1 Gilman 659, that where a juror has expressed a decided opinion on the merits of the case adverse to the defendant and that fact was not ......