Venstein v. Ravenstein
| Decision Date | 17 July 2014 |
| Docket Number | NO. 2012-CA-01085-SCT,2012-CA-01085-SCT |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
| Parties | JOHN W. RA VENSTEIN v. ELISHA RAVENSTEIN (HAWKINS) |
EN BANC.
¶1. John Ravenstein appeals the 2012 judgment of the Madison County Chancery Court appointing his ex-wife Elisha Ravenstein Hawkins as conservator for the couple's adult son Ryan. John also appeals the chancery court's denial of his motions for relief from judgment and modification of child support, through which he attempted to terminate his duty to support Ryan financially. We find that the chancellor correctly denied John's motion for relief from the divorce judgment and motion for modification of child support. But we find that the chancery court applied an incorrect legal standard for appointing a conservator forRyan. Accordingly, we reverse the chancery court's appointment of Elisha as Ryan's conservator and remand for further proceedings.
¶2. The Madison County Chancery Court granted Elisha Ravenstein Hawkins a divorce from her husband John Ravenstein on March 27, 1998. Elisha was awarded physical and legal custody of the couple's son Ryan, with liberal visitation awarded to John. At the date of the divorce, Ryan was seven years old. Ryan suffers from serious medical conditions that have rendered him severely mentally and physically disabled. In the divorce decree, after discussing John's substantial income and Ryan's unique needs, Chancellor Lutz found that John was capable of paying $1,500 a month in child support. The chancellor then held:
This Court is unable to justify allowing Ryan to become a ward of the state upon reaching his twenty-first birthday when he has parent's [sic] capable of caring for him. With guidance from Taylor1 and the other jurisdictions which are noted above, this Court will require John to continue support for Ryan's life. According to Taylor, any right to receive support is a right which matures into Ryan when he reaches age twenty-one. The Court suggests at age twenty-one the parties follow the proper course of action when dealing with a disabled adult's estate.
(Emphasis added.) Accordingly, John was ordered to pay $1,500 a month in child support for Ryan's life, along with Ryan's health and dental insurance. John and Elisha were ordered to share all uncovered medical expenses and special-equipment expenses equally for Ryan's life. John filed a Motion for Reconsideration, Clarification, and/or Alternatively, for a New Trial. In his motion, John acknowledged "for the purposes of appeal" that he objected to thecourt's award of lifetime child support for Ryan. The chancery court submitted an Amended Final Judgment making minor changes to the initial judgment, but the court did not address John's argument regarding the legality of mandated lifetime child support. No further motions or appeals were taken, and the parties abided by the chancery court's judgment without modification for the next thirteen years.
¶3. On March 15, 2011, Elisha filed in chancery court a Petition for Appointment of Conservator. Elisha contended that Ryan, who was now twenty years old, was so incapable of managing his own person and estate that it was necessary to have a conservator appointed to have charge of his person and estate. Elisha claimed that she was willing and able to serve as Ryan's conservator, and that the appointment would be in Ryan's best interest. John responded by filing his own Petition for Appointment of Conservator, requesting the chancery court to appoint him as Ryan's conservator. Alternatively, John requested the court to appoint Elisha and himself as coconservators. John also contended that Ryan did not have a separate estate to manage at that time, but that upon reaching majority, he would require a conservator to manage his financial affairs.
¶4. On April 17, 2011, Ryan's twenty-first birthday, John ceased paying his child-support payments to Elisha and began depositing the funds in the registry of the Madison County Chancery Court. John then filed a motion for relief from the chancery court's 1998 judgment. John argued that the chancery court's award of lifetime child support to Ryan was void when rendered and that it was no longer equitable to enforce that provision, since Ryan had reached the age of majority. John claimed that all obligations specified in the court's 1998 judgment should terminate as a matter of law upon Ryan's twenty-first birthday. In response,Elisha argued that John's motion was untimely, as the 1998 judgment was not timely appealed. Elisha also argued that there had been no material change in circumstances, unanticipated at the time of the initial judgment, that would warrant modifying the judgment.
¶5. All pleadings and causes concerning the parties were consolidated by order of the Madison County Chancery Court into Cause No. 1996-350, the original divorce action. On February 22, 2012, the parties entered an Agreed Order stipulating the need for a conservator over Ryan's person. Chancellor Brewer then held a hearing on Elisha's and John's petitions to be appointed conservator, along with John's motion for relief from the 1998 judgment. John's motion for relief from the judgment was not fully addressed at the hearing, however. Instead, the parties presented witnesses to testify regarding each party's physical and financial ability to care for Ryan.
¶6. On April 18, 2012, the chancery court entered its Opinion and Final Judgment on the consolidated cases. Chancellor Brewer granted Elisha's petition to be appointed Ryan's conservator, denied John's petition to be appointed Ryan's conservator, and denied John's motion for relief from the divorce judgment. The chancellor held that John's motion for relief was an "untimely attemp[t] to re-litigate matters that were ripe for remedy under the procedural avenues thirteen years ago." The chancellor also found that Ryan's twenty-first birthday did not constitute a material change in circumstances warranting modification of the court's previous award of lifetime child support. Finally, viewing John's Petition for Appointment of Conservator as a request to modify custody of Ryan, Chancellor Brewer held that John had failed to prove a material change in circumstances warranting modification of the court's initial grant of custody to Elisha.
¶7. John filed a motion for reconsideration and clarification of the court's judgment on April 25, 2012.The chancellor denied this motion and ordered that any funds deposited in the court registry be released to Elisha. John now appeals to this Court, raising the following issues:
I. Whether the chancery court erred in requiring John to make support payments for the lifetime of his adult child.
II. Whether the chancery court applied the wrong legal standard when determining who would be appointed conservator of Ryan Ravenstein.
III. Whether the chancery court erred in not requiring Elisha to deposit all support paid by John for the benefit of Ryan to a Conservatorship Account and in not requiring Elisha to file an inventory and accounting of all support funds and to post a bond.
IV. Whether the chancery court erred when it awarded support to Elisha for the benefit of an adult who was not joined as a party to the action.
Following oral argument in this case, this Court requested supplemental briefing from the parties on the following issue:
V. Whether an interpretation that Mississippi Code Sections 93-5-23 and 93-11-65 do not allow the chancellor the discretion or authority to award child support for the support of an adult child who is mentally or physically incapable of self-support after the age of twenty-one years would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and the corresponding equal protection provision of the Mississippi Constitution. Specifically, whether such an interpretation violates an adult child's (in this case, Ryan's) right to equal protection under the law in light of the legislature's enactment of Mississippi Code Section 43-19-33, which provides that a putative father is not relieved of the duty of support in the case of an adult child who "is mentally or physically incapable of self-support."
¶8. "This Court has a limited standard of review in examining and considering the decisions of a chancellor." Ballard v. Commercial Bank of DeKalb, 991 So. 2d 1201, 1204-1205 (Miss. 2001) (citing McNeil v. Hester, 753 So. 2d 1057 (Miss. 2000)). This Court will not disturb the findings of the chancellor unless the chancellor was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or applied an erroneous legal standard. Tinnin v. First United Bank of Miss., 570 So. 2d 1193, 1194 (Miss. 1990). Where the chancellor's findings are supported by substantial evidence, this Court is without authority to disturb his or her conclusions, although this Court might have found otherwise as an original matter. Dew v. Langford, 666 So. 2d 739, 742 (Miss. 1995) (citing In re Estate of Harris, 539 So. 2d 1040 (Miss. 1989)). For questions of law, the standard of review is de novo. Vaughn v. Vaughn, 798 So. 2d 431, 434 (Miss. 2001).
¶9. John argues that Chancellor Lutz lacked the authority to extend John's child-support obligation beyond the date that Ryan reached the age of majority, which in Mississippi is twenty-one years old. See Nichols v. Tedder, 547 So. 2d 766, 770 (Miss. 1989) (...
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