Ventura v. Kyle
Decision Date | 26 November 2014 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. 12–472 RHK/JJK. |
Parties | Jesse VENTURA a/k/a James G. Janos, Plaintiff, v. Taya KYLE, as Executor of the Estate of Chris Kyle, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
David Bradley Olsen, Court J. Anderson, John N. Bisanz, Jr., Henson & Efron, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for Plaintiff.
John P. Borger, Leita Walker, Charles F. Webber, Amy M. Gernon, Holly A. Miller, Faegre Baker Daniels LLP, Minneapolis, MN, for Defendant.
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law or New Trial (Doc. No. 404). For the reasons that follow, the Motion will be denied.
Plaintiff is a well-known former wrestler, actor, and Governor of Minnesota, who served as a member of the Navy Special Forces Underwater Demolition/SEAL Teams during the Vietnam War. Chris Kyle was a Navy SEAL sniper and author of an autobiography entitled American Sniper, the Autobiography of the Most Lethal Sniper in U.S. Military History (hereafter, “American Sniper”). The book, which was released January 3, 2012, reached number one on the New York Times' Bestseller list by January 29, 2012, and in June 2012, Warner Brothers purchased the rights to a film adaptation.
In American Sniper, Kyle wrote a subchapter captioned “Punching Out Scruff Face” about an alleged altercation with Plaintiff. According to Kyle, the encounter took place at McP's, a bar in Coronado, California, on October 12, 2006, during a wake for Kyle's comrade, Mike Monsoor, who was killed in the line of duty. The subchapter reads as follows:
While not naming Plaintiff in print, Kyle confirmed in television, radio, and print interviews that “Scruff Face” was Plaintiff. In early January 2012, Kyle appeared on the Opie & Anthony Show, a talk-radio program, and the O'Reilly Factor, a talk show, retelling the above-quoted story about Plaintiff and repeating his alleged statement, “You deserve to lose a few guys.” The story also appeared on FOX News.
Plaintiff commenced the instant action against Kyle in February 2012, asserting claims of defamation, misappropriation, and unjust enrichment. Kyle moved for partial summary judgment in the fall of 2012, but his Motion was denied. In February 2013, Kyle was killed by a fellow veteran, against whom criminal charges are currently pending in Texas. His wife was appointed executrix of his estate and substituted as the Defendant in this action in July 2013. She, too, moved for summary judgment at the conclusion of discovery, but her Motion also was denied.
The case then proceeded to a jury trial in July 2014 on the three claims asserted in the Complaint. As the unjust-enrichment claim was an equitable one, the Court employed the jury in an advisory capacity only as to that claim. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 39(c)(1). The jury delivered a split verdict on the first two claims, finding for Plaintiff on the defamation claim (and awarding him $500,000 in damages) and for Defendant on the misappropriation claim. The jury also found in Plaintiff's favor on the unjust-enrichment claim and assessed $1,345,477.25 in damages. The Court later adopted the jury's verdict on the unjust-enrichment claim as its own. (See Doc. No. 391.)
Defendant now argues she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, or alternatively a new trial, on the defamation and unjust-enrichment claims. Her contentions are addressed in turn below.
When “a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue, the court may resolve the issue against the party.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1)(A). Defendant invoked this Rule and sought judgment as a matter of law at the close of Plaintiff's case (Doc. No. 347) but the Court denied the Motion, concluding that after “two weeks of trial,” and having “reviewed the testimony and evidence received,” there was “sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable jury could find in favor of Plaintiff.” (Doc. No. 359.) Defendant has now renewed her Motion, as is appropriate under Rule 50, but in the Court's view she has offered nothing that would lead it to alter its prior conclusion. See Gill v. Maciejewski, 546 F.3d 557, 562 (8th Cir.2008) ().
Defendant first argues that Plaintiff failed to prove the falsity of Kyle's statements. (Def. Mem. at 13–19.) But in order to grant judgment as a matter of law on this basis, “all the evidence must point one way and be susceptible of no reasonable inference
sustaining [Plaintiff's] position.” Dace v. ACF Indus., Inc., 722 F.2d 374, 375–76 (8th Cir.1983) (emphasis added); accord, e.g., Craig Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. Viacom Outdoor, Inc., 528 F.3d 1001, 1009 (8th Cir.2008) () (internal citations omitted). That would be an untenable conclusion here, because this case largely boiled down to a credibility contest, with several witnesses testifying that Plaintiff's version of events was true, while several other witnesses testified that Kyle's version of events was true. Credibility determinations are inherently within the province of a jury and simply cannot be used to undermine its verdict. See, e.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) () (internal citations omitted); GLB Enters., Inc. v. United States, 232 F.3d 965, 968 (8th Cir.2000) ( )(citation omitted).1
Defendant next argues Plaintiff failed to prove actual malice by clear-and-convincing evidence. (Def. Mem. at 19–22.) But Plaintiff was only required to show “that [Kyle] knew the statements [he published] were false” or that he acted “in ‘reckless disregard’ of whether they were true or false—that is, he ‘entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.’ ” (Doc. No. 269 at 10 (quoting Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 510, 111 S.Ct. 2419, 115 L.Ed.2d 447 (1991) ) (internal quotation omitted).) The simple fact that Kyle discussed an unambiguous event (“punching out” Plaintiff) was itself a sufficient basis upon which the jury could predicate a finding of actual malice. As the Court noted previously:
While it is possible Kyle could have misinterpreted Ventura's comments to him and innocently published a false account of them, this reasoning does not apply to Kyle's account of “punching out” Ventura. If Ventura proves that statement was false—that is, if a jury does not believe Kyle punched Ventura—it follows that Kyle fabricated it. See Robert D. Sack, Sack on Defamation, § 5.52, at 5–83–84 () (emphasis added). And if a jury concludes Kyle fabricated part of the story, it could reasonably conclude...
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...Haber, Copyrighted Crimes: The Copyrightability of Illegal Works, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 454, 470 (2014).54. See, e.g., Ventura v. Kyle, 63 F. Supp. 3d 1001, 1004-05 (D. Minn. 2014) (denying motion for judgment as matter of law or for new trial in defamation suit by Jesse Ventura over "Americ......