Verderane v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.

• Decision Date: 30 September 1985
• Docket Number: No. 84-3777,84-3777
• Citation: 772 F.2d 775
• Parties: Edward J. VERDERANE, Claimant-Respondent, v. JACKSONVILLE SHIPYARDS, INC. AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY, Employer/Carrier-Petitioners, v. DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, United States Department of Labor, Party-In-Interest--Respondents.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 775

772 F.2d 775

1986 A.M.C. 1216

Edward J. VERDERANE, Claimant-Respondent, v. JACKSONVILLE SHIPYARDS, INC.

AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY, Employer/Carrier-Petitioners, v. DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, United

States Department of Labor, Party-In-Interest--Respondents.

No. 84-3777.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

Sept. 30, 1985.

John E. Houser, Jacksonville, Fla., for employer/carrier-petitioners.

Marianne Demetral Smith, Joshua T. Gillelan, II, Washington, D.C., for party-in-interest-respondents.

Petition for Review of an Order of the Benefits Review Board, U.S. Department of Labor.

Before FAY and JOHNSON, Circuit Judges, and HOFFMAN ^*, District Judge.

WALTER E. HOFFMAN, District Judge:

One truism of the law is that substantive and procedural rights may be lost if not asserted in a timely fashion. That truism is no less valid in administrative tribunals than elsewhere. This petition for review raises the issue whether a party can rely on section 8(f) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.A. Sec. 908(f) (West Supp.1985) ("the Act"), when the relief afforded by that section was not raised at the first available opportunity. We conclude that a party cannot rely on section 8(f) in these circumstances, and therefore affirm the order of the Benefits Review Board.

I. FACTS

Edward J. Verderane ("claimant"), began working as a ship's coordinator in March 1965, for Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. ("employer" or "Jacksonville"). Claimant held various jobs with employer until April 1974, when he was diagnosed as having vertigo, a disorder characterized by dizziness and typically caused or exacerbated by excessive noise. ¹ Although claimant spent most of the last four years of his employment working away from the noisy shipyard area, he had worked mostly within this area for the previous five years. Learning of the vertigo diagnosis, employer fired claimant.

Before his employment with Jacksonville, Verderane had worked intermittently between 1937 and 1962 for Bethlehem Steel Corporation in its Brooklyn, New York, and Hoboken, New Jersey, shipyards. He retired from Bethlehem in 1962. From 1962 through 1965, he received social security benefits for disability resulting from ear infections and vertigo. Claimant had suffered from ear infections since his teenage years.

After being fired by Jacksonville in 1974, Verderane filed a claim for permanent partial disability compensation against employer and Aetna Casualty Company ("carrier"). ² Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), Sherman P. Kimball, presided over a hearing in May 1975. On April 15, 1976, ALJ Kimball found that claimant, while working for employer, had sustained vertigo, which he found to be a permanent, totally disabling occupational disease. The ALJ ordered employer to make weekly payments to claimant. On April 30, 1976, ALJ Robert J. Feldman denied employer's motion for reconsideration, Kimball no longer then serving as an ALJ.

On appeal to the Benefits Review Board, the Board affirmed ALJ Kimball's decision that claimant had sustained a totally disabling occupational disease, but remanded for a more detailed analysis of claimant's status as an employee within section 2(3) of the Act. ³ ALJ Feldman presided over the hearing on remand. Subsequently, the Assistant Deputy Commissioner, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs ("OWCP"), referred to ALJ Feldman employer's request for a hearing on a newly asserted claim to limit its liability through section 8(f). ⁴ ALJ Feldman denied the request because the Board had remanded on the issue of section 2(3) coverage alone. He included the denial in his recommended decision on remand, along with his holding that he considered Verderane to have been covered within the meaning of section 2(3) because of his having worked in the shipyard area during the first five years of his employment.

Jacksonville appealed ALJ Feldman's recommended decision on remand. In a decision and order dated June 12, 1981, the Board affirmed ALJ Feldman's decision, remanding solely for a different computation of the award. Regarding employer's request for section 8(f) relief, the Board held that the issue could not be considered because it had not been raised in a timely fashion. Both employer and claimant then filed petitions for review, which were consolidated. This Court dismissed the petitions for review because they were not final. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Estate of Verderane, 729 F.2d 726 (11th Cir.1984). Based on an intervening United States Supreme Court opinion clarifying the scope of section 2(3), the Director, OWCP, then moved the Board to vacate its 1981 decision and to reinstate ALJ Kimball's 1976 decision awarding coverage. The Board granted the Director's motion, reinstating ALJ Kimball's decision in all respects. Employer petitioned this Court for review.

II. AVAILABILITY OF SECTION 8(f) RELIEF

An extensive set of procedural rules governs claims under the Act. See 20 C.F.R. Secs. 702.11 to .394 (1985). Disputed claims, if not resolved at an informal hearing before the deputy commissioner, generally proceed to a formal proceeding before an ALJ. See id. Secs. 702.316, .331, .332. Prior to the hearing, each party must submit prehearing statements enumerating the issues that will be raised at the hearing. See id. Sec. 702.317; U.S. Dept. of Labor, OWCP, LS-18, "Prehearing Statement." Although the hearing progresses according to the issues in the prehearing statements, issues not included in the statements can be heard even though the hearing would have to be extended. See id. Sec. 702.336.

Employers, therefore, have the ability to request section 8(f) relief at the initial hearing before an ALJ. Because of this ability, posthearing requests for section 8(f) relief consistently have been held to be untimely. See American Bridge Division v. Director, 679 F.2d 81, 83 (5th Cir.1982); General Dynamics Corp. v. Director, 673 F.2d 23, 26 (1st Cir.1982) (per curiam); Avallone v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 13 BRBS 348, 350, BRB Nos. 79-647, 79-647A, petition for review denied, 672 F.2d 901 (2d Cir.1981); Dykes v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 13 BRBS 75, BRB No. 80-131 (1981); Wilson v. Old Dominion Stevedoring Corp., 10 BRBS 943, 944, BRB No. 78-636 (1979). ⁵ The rule serves the same policies of efficiency and fairness that fortify F.R.Civ.P. Rules 8 and 12, which require objections and defenses to be raised at the first available opportunity. American Bridge, 679 F.2d at 84; Wright, The Law of Federal Courts, Sec. 66, at 434-35 (4th ed. 1983).

Employer raises two contentions against application of the rule that section 8(f) relief is unavailable unless raised at the initial hearing. First, employer appears to argue that a request for section 8(f) relief at the 1975 hearing before ALJ Kimball would somehow have been inappropriate because the request would have contradicted employer's position that claimant was not disabled. ⁶ The argument lacks merit. Requesting section 8(f) relief and disputing a claimant's disability indeed are inconsistent. Inconsistent and alternative claims or defenses, however, are a well-accepted feature of modern practice. See Carroll v. American Bridge Division, 13 BRBS 759, 760-61, BRB No. 79-522 (1981), aff'd sub nom. American Bridge Division v. Director, 679 F.2d 81 (5th Cir.1982) (adopting F.R.Civ.P. Rule 8's position allowing claims or defenses to be asserted alternatively or hypothetically, regardless of consistency); see also 5 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure Secs. 1282, 1283 (1969 & Supp.1985) (pleading inconsistent claims and defenses promotes judicial efficiency by allowing thorough development of facts and legal theories at a single trial). Therefore, a request for section 8(f) relief could have been raised at the 1975 hearing before ALJ Kimball even though employer disputed claimant's disability. See American Bridge, 679 F.2d at 83-84.

Employer's second argument is no more convincing than its first. The Board's decision in Egger v. Williamette Iron & Steel Co., 9 BRBS 897, 899, BRB No. 78-322 (1979), so the argument goes, first adopted the rule that section 8(f) relief must be claimed at the initial formal hearing. Because Verderane filed his claim before Egger had been decided, employer concludes that the rule cannot apply to its request for section 8(f) relief. Employer emphasizes the court's statement that "hereafter the [section 8(f) ] issue must be raised at the first hearing of the case." Egger, 9 BRBS at 899.

Rather than support employer's analysis, the relevant authority contradicts its fundamental premise. Before Egger had been decided, a section 8(f) request apparently was raised in the same hearing at which a claimant's disability was determined. American Bridge, 679 F.2d at 84. Parsing the sentences in Egger only confuses the issue. Employer argues that by using "hereafter" in its decision, the Board in Egger adopted a new rule. Placed in context, the Board's statement that "hereafter" section 8(f) would have to be raised at the first hearing was admonitory. See American Bridge, 679 F.2d at 84. Egger, furthermore, concerned a situation in which the section 8(f) issue had been raised but withdrawn before the initial hearing. See Egger, 9 BRBS at 899. Thus, in this more limited sense, the Board's opinion disapproved the practice of withdrawing the section 8(f) request and then reasserting it once claimant's disability had been established. American Bridge, 679 F.2d at 84; see Egger, 13 BRBS at 899-900. Although the message of the "hereafter" language "extended to any case in which the application of Section 8(f) is an issue," this message was delivered in the course of an opinion attempting to clarify that withdrawn section 8(f) requests also would generally be held untimely if subsequently raised. Consequently, the "hereafter" language did not introduce a new rule, but rather clarifies...