Verdi v. Metropolitan Dade County, 95-3416

Citation684 So.2d 870
Decision Date18 December 1996
Docket NumberNo. 95-3416,95-3416
Parties22 Fla. L. Weekly D8 Emil P. VERDI, Jr., Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Appellant, v. METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, a Political Subdivision of the State of Florida, Appellee. Third District
CourtCourt of Appeal of Florida (US)

Gary B. Goldman, North Miami Beach, for appellant.

Robert A. Ginsberg, Dade County Attorney, and Jay W. Williams, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

Before NESBITT, GREEN and SHEVIN, JJ.

GREEN, Judge.

This is an appeal from a final order dismissing an amended class action complaint with prejudice on the grounds that this action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata and an order denying the motion for rehearing on the same. We affirm.

I

Emil P. Verdi, Jr. instituted the action below against Metropolitan Dade County on behalf of himself and purportedly "others" similarly situated who had been civilly fined by the County for violations of the Code of Metropolitan Dade County ("Code"), but who had not been given the opportunity to contest the same in the county court. Specifically, in 1990 Verdi had been charged and served with 51 civil violations of the Code. Pursuant to Chapter 8CC of the Code, he demanded and received an administrative hearing before a hearing officer in February 1991 to contest the charges. Verdi was found guilty as charged and the hearing officer imposed civil fines totalling $25,500.00 plus costs. Verdi did not take an appeal of any of the hearing officer's findings or assessment of the civil penalties to the appellate division of the circuit court as prescribed in Chapter 8CC. Rather, he paid the fines and costs as assessed.

In October 1994 or approximately 3 1/2 years later, Verdi filed the class action below 1 seeking a declaration that jurisdiction to entertain past code violations rested solely with the county court and not administrative hearing officers. Verdi, therefore, sought to have the findings of the hearing officer and the administrative assessment of fines deemed void and unconstitutional. Verdi further sought to recoup all fines and costs paid as a result of the findings made by the hearing officers in all such administrative proceedings. The County filed a general denial to the allegations and raised numerous affirmative defenses, chief among which was that this action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata where no direct appeal was taken of the hearing officer's findings to the appellate division of the circuit court.

Verdi thereafter moved to certify the class. During the hearing on this motion, however, the parties agreed to defer the issue of class certification to allow the trial court to address the initial issue of whether this action was barred by the principal of res judicata. The trial court found the county's use of hearing officers for its code enforcement proceedings to be statutorily authorized by section 162.03(2), Florida Statutes, therefore, the court concluded that the hearing officer's findings and assessment of fines were not void and subject to collateral attack in this proceeding. Thus, the trial court dismissed this action with prejudice on the grounds that it was barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

II

Verdi argues on this appeal that the trial court erred because the legislative intent of Part I of Chapter 162 (or the "Local Government Code Enforcement Boards Act") as evinced in sections 162.02 2 and 162.09(1) 3 was to authorize the creation of administrative proceedings to address only pending or repeat code violations and not past violations. Verdi further maintains that although Part II of Chapter 162 does confer authority upon the County to adopt a code enforcement system to punish past code violations, the county court is vested with exclusive jurisdiction to entertain such matters. Thus, Verdi concludes that the County in utilizing administrative hearing officers for proceedings involving past code violations has impermissibly combined the separate code enforcement provisions under Parts I and II of Chapter 162 into a single unconstitutional system. We disagree and find this argument to be belied by the expressed provisions of Chapter 162 for two reasons.

First of all, contrary to Verdi's argument, we find that the County's authority under Part I of Chapter 162 is not limited solely to compelling pending or repeat violators to comply with the Code. In section 162.06(4), the legislature clearly recognizes that certain code violations may be irreparable or uncorrectable and has thus conferred authority upon the County's enforcement mechanism to address these matters as well. That subsection states:

If the code inspector has reason to believe a violation or the condition causing the violation presents a serious threat to the public health, safety, and welfare or if the violation is irreparable or irreversible in nature, the code inspector shall make a reasonable effort to notify the violator and may immediately notify the enforcement board and request a hearing.

Were we to accept Verdi's construction of Part I of Chapter 162, we would effectively render this section of Part I to be useless and of no effect. This we may not do. We are "compelled by well-established norms of statutory construction to choose that interpretation of statutes and rules which renders their provisions meaningful." Johnson v. Feder, 485 So.2d 409, 411 (Fla.1986); see also, e.g., Wilensky v. Fields, 267 So.2d 1 (Fla.1972). Under Johnson, we simply may not presume that section 162.06(4) employs useless language. Accordingly, we must find that the legislature did not intend to limit the county's administrative enforcement proceedings under Part I solely to compelling pending or repeat violators to comply. Second and more importantly, section 162.03(2) of Part I clearly and explicitly confers authority upon the County to adopt, by ordinance, a completely alternative code enforcement system to permit either a code enforcement board or an administrative hearing officer to conduct hearings and assess fines for code violations:

A charter county, a noncharter county, or a municipality may, by ordinance, adopt an alternate code enforcement system which gives code enforcement boards or special masters designated by the local governing body, or both, the authority to hold hearings and assess fines against violators of the respective county or municipal codes and ordinances.

The trial court correctly determined that in this section, the legislature did not limit the County's alternative system to the exact procedures set forth in Parts I or II of Chapter 162. Nor did the legislature preclude the County from combining any features of these parts. In the absence of any such limitations, we conclude as did the trial court that the County was authorized to enact Chapter 8CC of the Code of Metropolitan Dade County to provide administrative hearings before hearing officers for contested code violations. E.g., Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So.2d 106, 109 (Fla.1996) ("We agree ... that if the legislature had intended the amendment ... to be applied retroactively, it would have so stated...."); In re McCollam, 612 So.2d 572, 574 (Fla.1993) ("[H]ad the legislature intended to limit the exemption to particular annuity contracts, it would have included such restrictive language ...."); see also Romero v. Shadywood Villas Homeowners Ass'n, Inc., 657 So.2d 1193, 1196 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) ("Had the legislature intended to exempt homeowners' associations from ... Section 617.1605, it could easily have stated so...."); Skipper v. Skipper, 654 So.2d 1181, 1183 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) ("If the legislature had intended such a limitation [on overtime wages to be included as income for purposes of child support computation] it would have so stated.").

III

Verdi argues in the alternative that the hearing officer's findings and imposition of fines and costs against him are void and violative of the separation of powers provision contained in Article II, Section 3 of the Florida Constitution. 4 According to Verdi, the role of the hearing officer in the civil code enforcement proceedings is fundamentally judicial in nature. Therefore, reasons Verdi, the County's utilization of such administrative officers in fundamentally judicial proceedings is constitutionally prohibited by Article II, Section 3. We disagree because we conclude that code enforcement proceedings are quasi-judicial rather than judicial in nature and that the County's use of hearing officers in these proceedings is constitutionally authorized.

Article II, Section 3 of the Florida Constitution prohibits one branch of the government from exercising any powers appertaining to either of the other two branches unless expressly provided in the constitution. Article V, Section 1 provides that "[c]ommissions established by law, or administrative officers or bodies may be granted quasi-judicial power in matters connected...

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6 cases
  • Crapo v. Acad. for Five Element Acupuncture, Inc., 1D17-1895
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
    • July 8, 2019
    ...quasi-judicial power in matters connected with the functions of their offices."); see, e.g., 278 So.3d 131 Verdi v. Metro. Dade County , 684 So. 2d 870, 874 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (county code enforcement proceedings that involve hearing officer rulings appealable to the circuit court "fall squ......
  • Depart v. Macri, 1D04-1496.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
    • May 23, 2005
    ...or bodies" "quasi-judicial power in matters connected with the functions of their offices." See generally Verdi v. Metro. Dade County, 684 So.2d 870, 874 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (stating that, pursuant to article V, section 1, of the state constitution, Dade County, "as a legislative body[,] wou......
  • City of Miami v. Wellman, 3D01-3050.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
    • January 23, 2008
    ...approved a local government's use of an administrative proceeding to determine violations of local codes. See Verdi v. Metro. Dade County, 684 So.2d 870, 874 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (holding that "code enforcement proceedings are quasi-judicial rather than judicial in nature and that the County'......
  • Miami-Dade County v. Brown, 3D01-3105.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
    • April 24, 2002
    ...See § 2-319, Miami-Dade County Code. This Court previously upheld the constitutionality of Chapter 8CC in Verdi v. Metropolitan Dade County, 684 So.2d 870 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)(recognizing that the County was authorized to adopt an alternate method of enforcement of its ordinance than that cre......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • The appealing nature of local code enforcement board decisions.
    • United States
    • Florida Bar Journal Vol. 82 No. 5, May 2008
    • May 1, 2008
    ...potential quashing or remand of a reviewing court's order by a second-tier appellate court. (1) See Verdi v. Metropolitan Dade County, 684 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1996); Michael D. Jones, P.A. v. Seminole County, 670 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. (2) Emphasis added. (3) Emphasis added. (4) ......

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