Verdin v. Thomas
| Decision Date | 19 September 1966 |
| Docket Number | No. 6718,6718 |
| Citation | 191 So.2d 646 |
| Parties | Mayfield VERDIN et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Alma Authement THOMAS et al., Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
John A. Gordon, of Doyle, Smith & Doyle, New Orleans, for appellants.
Charles J. LeBlanc, of Guzzetta & LeBlanc, John F. Pugh, of Pugh, Lanier & Pugh, Francis Dugas, Thibodaux, for appellees.
Before LOTTINGER, LANDRY, REID, BAILES and LEAR, JJ.
This appeal arises out of a petitory action filed by fifty-nine named plaintiffs, and for all other heirs at law of Dominique Billiot, Alexandre Billiot and his wife, Marguerite Verdin, Mathilde Billiot and Neuville Billiot, as a class action, claiming title to certain lands located in Lafourche and Terrebonne Parish, Louisiana. The defendants are Alma Authement Thomas, Warren M. Simon, Walter Hunter, George Wray Gill, Joseph H. Baynard, Placid Oil Company, and Etienne Perrin, Jr. Attached to the petition is a partial list of heirs of the decedents showing the complexity of the Billiot family representation. It was alleged in the petition that the defendants acquired title to various interests in this subject property by conventional conveyances and through a tax sale.
After considerable delay, a joint petition was filed in which the plaintiffs and defendants sought the authority of the court to compromise the dispute between them, and all persons of the plaintiff class represented. This joint petition for compromise was filed on April 1, 1965, and it was proposed thereby that the property in dispute would be owned henceforth according to the following division of ownership, to-wit:
TRACT A: The SW/4 of the SW/4 of Section 36, Township 19
South, Range 20 East, of the Southeastern Land District of
Louisiana, west of the Mississippi River, situated in the Parishes
of Lafourche and Terrebonne.
On October 1, 1964, all of the named plaintiffs, acting through their agents and attorneys in fact, Guzzetta and LeBlanc, attorneys at law, who represent these persons in this litigation, granted an oil, gas and mineral lease on the subject property. On October 5, 1964, a petition was filed to appoint a provisional administrator in the Succession of Mathilde Billiot, and the next day, a petition was filed to appoint a provisional administrator in the Succession of Dominique Billiot. On the same date of the applications, provisional administrators were appointed by the court and letters of administration were duly issued. On October 7, 1964, in both successions, applications were made to the court for permission to grant oil, gas and mineral leases on the subject property. The applications were advertised, in accordance with law and on October 19, 1964, after hearing thereon, judgment was rendered granting authority to the provisional administrators to enter into the leases.
When the joint petition for authority to compromise the dispute over the title to the subject property was presented to the trial court, the court ordered the giving of public notice thereof. Of the several oppositions that were filed to the proposal of compromise only the opposition of a group of persons alleging themselves to be Billiot heirs and their mineral lessee, Diamond Four Corporation remains unsettled. This group, which for simplicity we will call the Diamond Four Group, is the appellant herein.
The basis for the standing of this Diamond Four Group in this litigation is the granting by these alleged specific Billiot heirs of an oil, gas and mineral lease on the subject property to the corporation called Diamond Four Corporation with an effective date of January 1, 1965, this, of course, being subsequent to the granting of the leases by the provisional administrators to another lessee.
On the same date the joint petition of compromise was filed in this action, like petitions were filed in the Succession of Billiot, La.App., 191 So.2d 652, and Succession of Billiot, La.App., 191 So.2d 653, wherein authority of the court was sought to enter into the same compromise agreement. All three actions were consolidated for trial in the district court, as well as in this court; however, separate judgments will be rendered by us in each case.
In addition to the opposition filed by appellants to the class action, oppositions were filed in each of the above mentioned succession proceedings contesting the validity of the oil, gas and mineral leases granted by the provisional administrators and opposing the authority sought by said administrators to execute the proposed compromise agreement in the class action.
The trial court decreed that the class action brought by the plaintiffs was the proper proceeding; approved the compromise agreement relating to the division of ownership of the property; approved and confirmed the leases granted by the provisional administrators, and ordered the operator of the leases to deposit all royalties due the Billiot heirs in the registry of the court until a final determination of the rights of the Billiot group was made. The question of heirship of the Billiot group, as well as the question of quantum of attorney fees to be awarded plaintiffs' attorneys, were reserved for further proceedings in the trial court.
Before this court, the appellants have devoted considerable portion of their brief to advance their argument that plaintiffs have no standing in court because by the allegations of their petition and by their act of granting the mineral lease, they have unconditionally accepted the successions and the concept of the succession as a separate entity no longer exists. This argument might be tenable were it not for the fact that this is a class action taken for the good of and to benefit the whole class. Further, the argument of the appellants addresses itself to the substantive rights of the parties and not the procedural aspect of the case. The substantive rights of the parties are proper things to compromise, and that was the purpose of the compromise agreement to settle the dispute involving the substantive rights of the parties thereto. We find the cited cases of Foster v. Spann (1930) 170 La. 1019, 129 So. 622, Lowry v. The Atlantic Refining Company (D .C., 1964) 231 F.Supp. 775; 5 Cir., 363 F.2d 876, and the cases cited therein, are inapposite to the instant case. The question of whether any of the plaintiffs, as heirs of the decedents, have accepted the various successions is not now a matter of concern because of the compromise agreement and the judgment heretofore entered between the plaintiffs and defendants in the district court. As between the parties to this compromise agreement, entered into and made the judgment of this case and not appealed from by the contracting parties, it is binding and effective.
We pass now to the points at issue, namely: The legality of the class action, the granting of the oil, gas and mineral lease by the provisional administrators of the successions of Dominique Billiot and Mathilde Billiot, and the approval of the compromise of the class action. We will discuss and determine the issues in that order.
Prior to the adoption of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, this state had no codified procedure for a class action. This case alone points up the great need for a procedure for class action. The Code of Civil Procedure spells out the requisites for such an action and provides the safeguards for the protection of the rights of the unnamed parties to the action.
LSA-C.C.P. Article 591 provides that 'A class action may be instituted when the persons constituting the class are so numerous as to make it impracticable for all of them to join or be joined as parties.' The purpose of this provision is to allow the courts to reach a determination of the rights of parties in cases where the number of persons involved is so great that it would...
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