Verdun v. Doe
| Decision Date | 20 March 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 14-cv-0036-DHB |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
| Parties | JESSIE VERDUN, Plaintiff, v. FIDELITY CREDITOR SERVICE and DOES 1-10, Defendants. |
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Jessie Verdun's ("Plaintiff") motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 36.) In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges claims arising out of Defendant Fidelity Creditor Service's ("Defendant") demand for interest on Plaintiff's debt and summarization of California Civil Code section 1788.21 in a debt collection letter sent to Plaintiff. However, in his motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff only addresses the inclusion of section 1788.21 in the debt collection letter. Therefore, the Court construes Plaintiff's motion as a motion for partial summary judgment.
The parties consented to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (ECF Nos. 18, 19.) For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment is DENIED, and partial summary judgment is sua sponte granted in favor of Defendant.
Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant on January 6, 2014, arguing that Defendant violated the Federal Debt Collections Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 et seq., and its state equivalent, the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("Rosenthal Act"), California Civil Code §§ 1788 et seq., by including in its debt collection letter a summary of California Civil Code section 1788.21 ("section 1788.21"). (ECF No. 1.) On April 14, 2016, Plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment. (ECF No. 36.) Defendant failed to timely oppose Plaintiff's motion, and Plaintiff filed a reply in support of its motion for partial summary judgment on May 13, 2016. (ECF No. 37.) On May 17, 2016, Defendant filed an ex parte motion to shorten time and for acceptance of Defendant's untimely opposition to Plaintiff's partial summary judgment motion. (ECF No. 38.) Defendant attached its opposition brief as an exhibit to its motion. (ECF No. 38-2.) The Court then granted Defendant's ex parte motion, and Defendant's opposition was deemed filed as of May 17, 2016. (ECF No. 40.) Plaintiff filed a reply in support of his motion for partial summary judgment on June 1, 2016. (ECF No. 43.)
Plaintiff subsequently filed a notice of recent decision highlighting an Eleventh Circuit opinion on the issue of Article III standing in FDCPA cases following the Supreme Court's ruling in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016). (ECF No. 46.) Defendant filed a response to Plaintiff's notice of recent decision on July 13, 2016. (ECF No. 47.)
Summary judgment is appropriate under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when the moving party demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Where, as here, "the material facts are undisputed and resolution of a motion for summary judgment turns on a question of law . . . the court is left with the obligation to resolve the legal dispute between the parties as a matter of law." Gulf Ins. Co. v. First Bank, No. CIV S-08-209, 2009 WL 1953444, at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 7, 2009) (citing Asuncion v. Dist. Dir. of U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 427 F.2d 523, 524 (9th Cir. 1970)); see also Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Dist. 776 v. Texas Steel Co., 538 F.2d 1116, 1119 (5th Cir. 1976) (citing Asuncion, 427 F.2d at 524) ("It is axiomatic that where questions of law alone are involved in a case, summary judgment is appropriate.")
In Defendant's opposition to Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment, Defendant argues that Plaintiff did not establish Article III standing as required to invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of this Court because Plaintiff has not suffered a concrete injury. (ECF 38-2 at 6.)
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"Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Anyone seeking "to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts must satisfy the threshold requirement imposed by Article III of the Constitution by alleging an actual case or controversy." City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983). Standing is an "essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III." Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). To establish standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) an "injury in fact," (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Id. at 560-61.
It is well settled that an injury in fact is "an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized . . . and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical . . . ." Id. at 560. An injury is particularized if it affects the plaintiff in a personal and individual way. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016). An injury is concrete if it is "'de facto,' that is, it must actually exist." Id.
Defendant argues that under the recent Supreme Court decision, Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016), Plaintiff lacks Article III standing because he suffered no concrete injury as a result of receiving Defendant's debt collection letter. (ECF No. 38-2 at 6.) Defendant contends that Plaintiff suffered no injury because he did not rely on the letter or send his contact information to Defendant in response to the letter. Id. Rather, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff took no action after receiving the letter. Id. Even if the letter technically violated the FDCPA and Rosenthal Act, Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot establish standing because he suffered no harm and alleging a statutory violation that caused no harm is insufficient to establish standing.2
Plaintiff counters that he asserted a concrete injury because he "alleged more than a bare procedural violation." (ECF No. 43 at 10.) Plaintiff argues that he alleged receiving a false and misleading letter in violation of the FDCPA, which is an intangible harm as determined by Congress and thus a concrete injury. Id. at 8-10. Plaintiff further asserts that he suffered a concrete injury because he was confused by the letter and thus contacted and paid a lawyer to clarify his legal obligations regarding the debt. Id. at 11.
In Spokeo,3 the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff asserting a claim based on a statutory violation must still demonstrate a concrete injury to establish standing. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (). The Court noted that intangible injuries maybe concrete and explained that "[i]n determining whether an intangible harm constitutes injury in fact, both history and the judgment of Congress play important roles." Id.
The Court deemed Congress's judgment in identifying through statute intangible harms that meet Article Ill's standing requirements as "instructive and important." Id. However, the Court stated that a plaintiff does not automatically establish a concrete injury by citing a statute that grants a right and authorizes suit to vindicate that right. Id. A bare procedural violation that results in no harm does not satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III. Id. "This does not mean, however, that the risk of real harm cannot satisfy the requirement of concreteness." Id. Therefore, in some circumstances, alleging a harm identified by Congress through statute will be enough to establish an injury in fact. Id.
Since Spokeo, the Ninth Circuit has not yet considered whether a violation of the FDCPA establishes a concrete harm sufficient to confer Article III standing. However, the Eleventh Circuit and many district courts across the country have examined this issue.
In California, several district courts have considered whether plaintiffs who alleged statutory violations of the FDCPA suffered concrete injuries. In Munoz v. California Business Bureau, Inc., the plaintiff-individual incurred medical debt that was later assigned to the defendant-debt collector for collection. No. 15-cv-01345, 2016 WL 6517655, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2016). The defendant-debt collector sued the plaintiff in California state court to recover on the debt, and the plaintiff hired legal counsel. Id. at *1. Pursuant to a stipulated settlement agreement, the plaintiff agreed to pay the debt, and the defendant-debt collector subsequently sent the plaintiff two demand letters to collect the settlement amount. Id. at *2. The plaintiff then sued the defendant-debt collector for violating the FDCPA by sending demand letters to the...
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