Vermont Motor Co., Inc. v. Samuel L. Monk
| Decision Date | 03 October 1950 |
| Docket Number | 1005. |
| Citation | 75 A.2d 671,116 Vt. 309 |
| Parties | VERMONT MOTOR CO., INC. v. SAMUEL L. MONK ET AL |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
May 1950.
BILL IN CHANCERY to enjoin use of trade name. In Chancery, Rutland County, Cushing, Chancellor. Bill dismissed for want of equity.
Decree affirmed.
Vernon J. Loveland and Donald Hackel for the plaintiff.
Charles J. Marro for the defendants.
Present SHERBURNE, C. J., JEFFORDS, CLEARY, ADAMS and BLACKMER, JJ.
The plaintiff is a corporation organized in 1932 under the laws of this state. The defendants are partners who began doing business in January, 1948, under their registered firm name. Both parties have their places of business in the City of Rutland. This is a suit in equity seeking an injunction to restrain the defendants from using their registered partnership name. A. hearing was had and the chancellor made findings of facts and entered a decree dismissing the plaintiff's bill of complaint for want of equity. The case is here on an exception to this decree.
The following material facts relating to the plaintiff appear in the findings: The purpose for which the plaintiff was formed was to conduct a general garage business which included the sale of all kinds of motor vehicles and the servicing of the same. After its formation it held the state agency for White trucks. In 1939 this agency was terminated and the plaintiff became a local distributor for Mack trucks. It stopped selling these trucks during World War II. Since giving up its truck franchises, it has sold second-hand trucks and automobiles. During its active years it sold automobile and truck parts. It occupies a two story fire-proof building located on Strongs Avenue. The first floor of this building is, and has been, used for the most part by the Rutland Bus Co. The portion of the structure used by the plaintiff is now used almost exclusively for the warehouse housing of furniture. During the past few years it has done little, if any, business in connection with the selling, repairing and maintaining of motor vehicles. Its corporate existence has been continuous. It has advertised to a limited extent, its annual expenditure being about $ 81.00. It maintains a telephone listed in its name. It has done business continuously until the present time and it intends to deal in motor trucks in the future.
The material facts as found which pertain to the defendants are as follows: Their business purpose is also the buying selling and servicing of motor vehicles and the doing of all things incident to the operation of a garage. Since formation, the partnership has been actively engaged in the operation of a garage and a Studebaker Sales agency on route 4 within the city limits. There is a large sign on its building facing the highway with the words "Vermont Motor Sales." It advertises under this name extensively by newspaper, radio and miscellaneous agencies. It has the exclusive Studebaker franchise for the City of Rutland and does an annual business of approximately $300,000, disposing of around 100 new and 300 used cars annually.
The last finding reads as follows:
The exception to the decree raises the one question as to whether it is warranted by the pleadings and supported by the findings. Hall v. Hodgdon, 114 Vt. 63, 64, 39 A.2d 195. Anything said in Abel's Inc. v. Newton, 116 Vt. 272 at page 274, 74 A.2d 481, is not to be construed as holding to the contrary.
The plaintiff says it does not claim any exclusive property rights in its trade name. It does claim a preferential right to the words "Vermont Motor" and says that the defendants by adopting these words as a part of the partnership trade name are engaging in unfair competition with the plaintiff.
It seems to be the universal rule that whether there is unfair competition is a question of fact. For illustrative authorities see Transparent Ruler Co. v. C-Thru Ruler Co., 135 Conn. 181, 62 A.2d 668; Federal Securities Company v. Federal Securities Corporation, 129 Ore. 375, 276 P. 1100, 66 A.L.R. 934; Ann. 148 A.L.R. 26, note 73; 63 CJ 414. In the Federal Securities case it is stated: "When it has been found that there is a similarity of names, a court does not cease its inquiries and at once grant relief, but proceeds to ascertain whether the other facts are such that deception and injury are likely."
The test to be applied by the trier is well and concisely stated in Middletown Trust Co. v. Middletown National Bank, 110 Conn. 13, 20, 147 A. 22, 25, as follows ...
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