Verney v. Planning and Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Greenwich

• Decision Date: 05 May 1964
• Citation: 200 A.2d 714,151 Conn. 578
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Nancy VERNEY et al. v. PLANNING AND ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF the TOWN OF GREENWICH et al. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 714

200 A.2d 714

151 Conn. 578

Nancy VERNEY et al. v. PLANNING AND ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF the TOWN OF GREENWICH et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

May 5, 1964.

William K. Cole, Hartford, with whom was Kenneth F. Clark, Greenwich, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

S. Floyd Nagle, Greenwich, for the appellee (defendant Arnold Bakers, Inc.).

Stewart H. Jones, Greenwich, with whom were Joseph A. Izzillo, Greenwich, and, on the brief, A. William Mottolese, Greenwich, for the appellee (named defendant).

Before KING, C. J., and MURPHY, ALCORN and COMLEY, JJ., and HOUSE, Acting Justice.

HOUSE, Acting Justice.

The plaintiffs have appealed from a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas dismissing their appeal from the action of the Greenwich planning and zoning board of appeals in granting a special exception to permit, subject to enumerated conditions, the use of a twenty-acre tract for a bakery and office building. The land is in a BA-5 zone. Under §§ 11.1a. (2)(a) and (d) of the Greenwich building zone regulations (1961), offices and business or industry light in nature as defined in § 28.b. (3)(f) are permitted in a BA-5 zone as a special exception when the board of appeals finds that the applicant satisfies certain conditions set forth in the regulations. The property is near the town incinerator and adjoins the main line of the New Haven Railroad, a large public housing development, the grounds of a public school and a residential area. The Connecticut Turnpike is just beyond the adjacent railroad tracks. The plaintiffs are owners of residential property in reasonably close proximity to the subject area. There has been no attack on the court's conclusion that they are aggrieved persons within the meaning of § 8-8 of the General Statutes.

Although the plaintiffs originally filed eight assignments of error, the only two which have been pressed on this appeal are the ones claiming that (a) the record before the defendant board did not permit it to conclude that the proposed use was business or industry light in nature and (b) the record before the board does not support its conclusion that the proposed use would not create a traffic hazard. Under §§ 28.b. (3)(a) and (f) of the regulations, these two affirmative findings are conditions precedent to the board's granting of the requested exception.

The appeal to the court from the decision of the board did not require nor permit the court by trial de novo to substitute its findings and conclusions for the decision of the board. Its functions were limited to a determination whether the board had, as alleged on the appeal, acted illegally, arbitrarily and in abuse of the discretion vested in it. 'We have frequently asserted, as a fundamental proposition, that the decisions of zoning authorities are to be overruled only when it is found that they have not acted fairly, with proper motives, and upon valid reasons. Where it appears that an honest judgment has been reasonably and fairly exercised after a full hearing, courts should be cautious about disturbing the decision of the local authority. The burden of overthrowing the decision of the board rested squarely upon the plaintiffs. Devaney v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 143 Conn. 322, 325, 326, 122 A.2d 303.' Wil-Nor Corporation v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 146 Conn. 27, 30, 147 A.2d 197, 199.

It will serve no useful purpose to recite or summarize here the substance of the testimony of the many witnesses who testified before the board, or the contents of the exhibits submitted for the board's...