VERRETT v. STEMPSON

• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Rogers
• Citation: VERRETT v. STEMPSON, 623 A.2d 120 (D.C. 1993)
• Decision Date: 06 April 1993
• Docket Number: No. 92-SP-186,92-SP-186
• Parties: Jerome J. VERRETT, Appellant, v. Douglas STEMPSON, Appellee.

623 A.2d 120

Jerome J. VERRETT, Appellant, v. Douglas STEMPSON, Appellee.

No. 92-SP-186.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Submitted January 5, 1993.

Decided April 6, 1993.

APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, BRUCE S. MENCHER, MOTIONS JUDGE.

Jerome J. Verrett, pro se.

Sidney R. Bixler, Asst. Corp. Counsel, with whom John Payton, Corp. Counsel, Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corp. Counsel, and Lutz Alexander Prager, Asst. Deputy Corp. Counsel, were on the brief, for appellee.

Before ROGERS, Chief Judge, and SCHWELB, Associate Judge, and MACK, Senior Judge.

ROGERS, Chief Judge:

Appellant Jerome J. Verrett appeals from the denial, without a hearing, of his pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus. D.C.Code § 16-1901 (Repl. 1989). We reverse.

I.

Appellant was convicted of assault with intent to kill while armed and assault with intent to commit robbery while armed, and sentenced to 12 to 36 years for each count, to run concurrently. The sentencing judge recommended that appellant be sent to a federal prison. Since then appellant has been incarcerated at a number of correctional institutions, all federal except for the Lorton Reformatory, where he had been incarcerated for two months at the time he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In his petition of January 3, 1992, appellant asserted that while at Lorton he has not received a classification study to determine his housing status and custody level in accordance with D.C. statutes and regulations, and that because he has met all the institutional requirements, he qualifies for minimum security. He further alleged that had he been given the benefit of statutory reductions to which he was entitled, he would be eligible for parole in January 1992 instead of September 23, 1992.

On appeal, appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying him a hearing on his petition in view of the violations of law by the Department of Corrections and the liberty interest and due process rights that he has pursuant to D.C.Code § 24-442, authorizing the Corrections Department to promulgate rules. He relies generally on Title 24, Chapter 4 of the D.C.Code on prisons and prisoners.¹ Specifically, he claims that since he has been returned to Lorton he has been in the maximum security facility and that, although he is eligible for less secure confinement, the authorities have not conducted a classification proceeding pursuant to its regulations and departmental orders,² as well as federal law.³Because of this lack of classification, he contends, he was bypassed in receiving parole credit for good conduct, D.C.Code § 24-428, educational good time, id. § 24-429, and Emergency Powers Act reductions, id. § 24-902. As a result, he maintains that his parole hearing date, September 23, 1992, is incorrect. He seeks to require the authorities to classify him so he can be in a less restrictive facility, maintaining that he has a statutory and liberty interest in the classification procedures and parole.

The government responds that there is no liberty interest in parole, and that violation of a departmental classification order does not create a liberty interest. By order of January 31, 1992, the motions judge denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus without a hearing and discharged the show cause order.

II.

The writ of habeas corpus "is not now and never has been a static, narrow, formalistic remedy; its scope has grown to achieve its grand purpose — the protection of individuals against erosion of their right to be free from wrongful restraints upon their liberty." Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243, 83 S.Ct. 373, 377, 9 L.Ed.2d 285 (1963). Under the District's habeas statute, D.C.Code § 16-1901, issuance of the writ is simply a means of bringing the petitioner before the Superior Court for a hearing on the petitioner's claim for relief. See Christian v. United States, 394 A.2d 1, 43 (D.C. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 944, 99 S.Ct. 2889, 61 L.Ed.2d 315 (1979); Lewis v. Stempson, 737 F. Supp. 667, 669 (D.D.C. 1990). After the hearing, if the court determines that the petitioner's detention is unlawful, the court must grant the relief requested in the petition, including release or conditional release, if appropriate. If the court determines that detention is lawful, the court must deny the relief requested. See Mizell v. Attorney General of New York, 586 F.2d 942, 947 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 967, 99 S.Ct. 1519, 59 L.Ed.2d 783 (1979). As the Supreme Court said over forty years ago:

The historic and great usage of the writ, regardless of its particular form, is to produce the body of a person before a court for whatever purpose might be essential to the proper disposition of a cause. The most important result of such usage has been to afford a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint upon personal liberty.

Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 283, 68 S.Ct. 1049, 1059, 92 L.Ed. 1356 (1948) (emphasis added); see Stewart v. Overholser, 87 U.S.App.D.C. 402, 405, 186 F.2d 339, 342 (1950) (en banc) (habeas corpus proceedings should be conducted with a liberal judicial attitude, given broadly remedial nature of the writ).

In order for a writ of habeas corpus to issue "the facts set forth in the petition [must] make a prima facie case." D.C.Code § 16-1901(a); United States v. Tuck, 194 U.S. 161, 170, 24 S.Ct. 621, 624, 48 L.Ed. 917 (1904). It is enough if an inmate "present[s] an allegation and supporting facts which, if borne out by proof, would entitle him [or her] to relief." Price, supra, 334 U.S. at 292, 68 S.Ct. at 1063. Furthermore, because inmates "are often unlearned in the law and unfamiliar with the complicated rules of pleading," and "[s]ince they act so often as their own counsel in habeas corpus proceedings, we cannot impose on them the same high standards of the legal art which we might place on the members of the legal profession." Id. Thus, the issue is whether appellant has made out a prima facie case to support his assertion that his due process rights had been violated and hence, that the motions judge erred in denying the petition and a hearing.

Appellant's classification contention is related to his claim that he is being denied a right to a corrected parole date. First, appellant contends that his liberty interest and due process rights were violated because the correctional authorities did not apply their classification procedures to him and place him in a less restrictive environment.⁴ Second, he maintains that the failure to classify him has resulted in an incorrect parole eligibility date as a result of denial of statutory entitlements.

A.

The place that a prisoner is confined and the procedure by which that is determined is an internal administrative procedure. The Supreme Court has held that "[t]he conviction has sufficiently extinguished the defendant's liberty interest to empower the State to confine him in any of its prisons." Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224-25, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 2538, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976). Further, the Court stated, the Due Process Clause does not "protect a duly convicted prisoner against transfer from one institution to another within the state prison system." Id. at 225, 96 S.Ct. at 2538. The Court also observed that "given a valid conviction, the criminal defendant has been constitutionally deprived of his liberty to the extent that the State may confine him and subject him to the rules of its prison system so long as the conditions of confinement do not otherwise violate the Constitution." Id. at 224, 96 S.Ct. at 2538. This court has specifically held that a prisoner "ha[s] no legally recognized interest in remaining at Lorton Reformatory." District of Columbia v. Cooper, 483 A.2d 317, 322 (D.C. 1984) (citing D.C.Code § 24-425 (1981), and Curry-Bey v. Jackson, 422 F. Supp. 926, 932 (D.D.C. 1976)).

In the instant case, no attempt is being made to do anything as drastic as to compel transfer of appellant to another correctional facility. If correctional authorities can transfer prisoners between institutions at will, it follows that it is within their discretion to determine the particular building within an institution in which to place prisoners without necessarily impinging on a prisoner's liberty interests. However, there may be circumstances that limit that discretion.

The Mayor is vested with jurisdiction under D.C.Code § 24-402 (Repl. 1989) over the placement of District of Columbia prisoners within the District's correctional system. The Corrections Department, in turn, is responsible for the "safekeeping, care, protection, instruction, and discipline of all persons committed to [D.C. correctional] institutions." D.C.Code § 24-442. The government advises that the procedure for assigning prisoners to housing appears in Department of Corrections Order 4090.3, which is the Department of Corrections Classification Operations Manual. This manual states that prisoners have a right to classification. Specifically, the Manual provides that:

"As part of the Intake process, an initial custody classification will be completed for new admissions to the Diagnostic Unit. A new admission is defined as a newly sentenced adult felon, YRA offender, misdemeanant on waiver, and parole violator. (Transfer cases will normally not be processed through the Diagnostic Unit, but should have a custody status review as part of the orientation process at the receiving institution)."

Chapter 3 at 39. The Manual also provides that a prisoner "should be classified in the least restrictive environment consistent with their supervision and safety requirements." Id. at 37. The Manual states, moreover, that "[s]everal landmark Courtdecisions, notably the twelve John Does Settlement Agreement, have affirmed the importance of reclassification as a basic inmate right and essential to a sound correctional system."⁵ Id. at 66. See also Inmates of Occoquan v. Barry, 717 F....