Verrette v. Bragdon
| Decision Date | 21 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:20-cv-501 (KAD),3:20-cv-501 (KAD) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | STEVEN VERRETTE, Plaintiff, v. BRAGDON, et al., Defendants. |
Plaintiff, Steven Verrette ("Verrette"), currently confined as a pretrial detainee at Corrigan-Radgowski Correctional Center ("Corrigan") in Uncasville, Connecticut, filed this complaint pro se pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Verrette contends, inter alia, that the defendants, Unit Manager Lieutenant Bragdon and Counselor Blackman, were deliberately indifferent to his safety and failed to protect him from harm. Verrette seeks damages as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. The complaint was received on April 14, 2020. Verrette's motion to proceed in forma pauperis was granted on April 15, 2020.
Under section 1915A of title 28 of the United States Code, the Court must review prisoner civil complaints and dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. In reviewing a pro se complaint, the Court must assume the truth of the allegations, and interpret them liberally to "raise the strongest arguments [they] suggest[]." Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). see also Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 101-02 (2d Cir. 2010) (). Although detailed allegations are not required, the complaint must include sufficient facts to afford the defendants fair notice of the claims and the grounds upon which they are based and to demonstrate a right to relief. Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007). Conclusory allegations are not sufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
Verrette was a pretrial detainee confined at Corrigan-Radgowski Correctional Center ("Corrigan") on charges of sexual assault in the third degree. Doc. No. 1 ¶ 8. Verrette's cellmate, inmate Hernandez, learned of Verrette's charges and began threatening Verrette and requesting sexual favors or he would tell the other inmates about Verrette's charges. Id. ¶ 9.
On September 9, 2019, Verrette submitted an inmate request to Counselor Blackman requesting a cell change because he feared for his safety. Id. ¶ 10. When Verrette spoke to Counselor Blackman in detail about his fears later in the week, she asked if he had been sexually assaulted, said she did not believe him, and told him to speak to Lieutenant Bragdon. Id.
On September 12, 2019, Verrette told Lieutenant Bragdon everything that had happened. Id. ¶ 11. He requested a cell transfer because the situation was affecting his anxiety and depression disorders and inmate Hernandez was becoming bolder and more persistent in his threats and sexual requests. Id. Lieutenant Bragdon said Verrette would not receive special treatment and told Verrette to tell him or an officer on duty if anything actually happened. Id. On September 17, 2019, Verrette filed a grievance asking that he or inmate Hernandez be moved toanother cell. Id. ¶ 12.
On September 19, 2019, inmate Hernandez threatened Verrette's family, said he was going to reveal Verrette's charges the next day, and sexually assaulted Verrette. Id. ¶ 13. A correctional officer saw the sexual assault and wrote an incident report but did not intervene. Id.
On September 23, 2019, Verrette was called to Lieutenant Bragdon's officer as part of the investigation into the incident. Id. ¶ 14. Verrette confirmed that he had been sexually assaulted and said that he feared it would happen again. Id. ¶ 15. Lieutenant Bragdon said he was sorry that Verrette had been sexually assaulted but then said, "think of your victim, see how it feels." Id. Verrette was taken to the medical unit where he spoke to several people and then spoke to the state police. Id. When Verrette returned to his cell, inmate Hernandez was not there. Id. Shortly thereafter, Verrette was transferred to a different housing unit. Id.
As a result of the incident, Verrette suffers from insomnia, nightmares, generalized fear, heightened anxiety, and difficulty passing stool. Id. ¶ 18.
Verrette asserts five claims for relief: (1) failure to protect him from harm in violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights; (2) discrimination because of his criminal charges in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause; (3) cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment; (4) violation of rights under the Prison Rape Elimination Act; and (5) deliberate indifference to safety. He seeks monetary damages, declaratory relief and injunctive relief in the form of a single cell assignment and mental health treatment.
In his first claim, Verrette contends that the defendants failed to protect him from harm. In his fifth claim, Verrette alleges that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his safety. The standard for review of a claim for failure to protect is the same as that for deliberate indifference to safety. See Orr v. Marquis, No. 3:18-cv-1908(MPS), 2019 WL 161504, at *3 (D. Conn. Jan. 10, 2019) (). Thus, the Court considers the claims together.
In Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015), the Supreme Court held that a pretrial detainee asserting a claim for use of excessive force need only meet an objective standard. In Darnell v. Piniero, 849 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2017), the Second Circuit held that the reasoning from Kingsley should be applied to other pretrial detainee claims involving deliberate indifference including claims for deliberate indifference to safety or failure to protect from harm. Id. at 35-36 & 33 n.9; see Hodge v. City of New York, 2019 WL 1455170, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2019) ().
To state a claim for deliberate indifference to safety or failure to protect, Verrette must allege facts which demonstrate, that he was confined under conditions that posed a substantial risk of serious harm and that the defendants both knew that he faced a substantial risk of serious harm and failed to take reasonable efforts to abate that harm. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 837 (1994); Lewis v. Swicki, 629 F. App'x 77, 79 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing Hayes v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Corr., 84 F.3d 614, 620 (2d Cir. 1996)). Indeed, "a pretrial detainee must prove that the defendant-official acted intentionally to impose the alleged condition, or recklessly failed to act with reasonable care to mitigate the risk that the condition posed to the pretrial detaineeeven though the defendant-official knew, or should have known, that the condition imposed an excessive risk to health or safety." Darnell, 849 F.3d at 35. Negligent conduct will not suffice. Id. at 36 ().
Under Kingsley, objective reasonableness is determined "from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, including what the officer knew at the time, not with the 20/20 vision of hindsight." 135 S. Ct. at 2473. Verrette alleges that he reported the escalating threats and requests for sexual favors to both defendants in detail, but nothing was done until he was sexually assaulted. Verrette's allegations are sufficient at this stage of litigation to state a plausible failure to protect/deliberate indifference to safety claim.
The Equal Protection Clause protects individuals from invidious discrimination. It does not mandate identical treatment for each individual or group of individuals. Instead, it requires that similarly situated persons be treated the same. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1985). To state an equal protection claim, Verrette must allege facts showing: (1) he was treated differently from similarly situated individuals and (2) the difference in or discriminatory treatment was based on "'impermissible considerations such as race, religion, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious bad faith intent to injure a person.'" Diesel v. Town of Lewisboro, 232 F.3d 92, 103 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting LeClair v. Saunders, 627 F.2d 606, 609-10 (2d Cir. 1980)).
Verrette alleges that he is being treated differently based upon the nature of his pending charge, sexual assault, and he alleges that the defendants moved other incompatible inmates.Doc. No. 1 ¶ 16. Verrette alleges no facts suggesting discrimination based on his membership in a protected class. However, construing Verrette's allegations liberally, as the Court must on initial review, Verrette has stated a plausible claim that the defendants, acting with a malicious bad faith intent to punish him when they refused to take action on his claims until he had been assaulted. The Court will permit the equal protection claim to proceed for further development of the record.
Alternatively, Verrette may seek to advance an equal protection claim on the theory that he has been irrationally singled out as a "class of one." Enquist v. Oregon Dep't of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 601 (2008). To state a claim under the class of one theory, Verrette "must show 'an extremely high degree of similarity between [himself] and the persons to whom [he] compare[s himself].'" Ruston v. Town Bd. for Town of Shaneateles, 610 F.3d 55, 59 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Clubside, Inc. v. Valentin, 468 F.3d 144, 159 (2d Cir. 2006)). However, Verrette has not identified any inmates who were treated differently under the same or sufficiently similar...
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