Vertex, Inc. v. City of Waterbury
| Decision Date | 13 June 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 17550.,17550. |
| Citation | 278 Conn. 557,898 A.2d 178 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | VERTEX, INC. v. CITY OF WATERBURY. |
Matthew G. Conway, Hartford, with whom, on the brief, were Paul H.D. Stoughton and Christopher M. Bunge, New York City, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Elaine M. Skoronski, for the appellee (defendant).
BORDEN, NORCOTT, PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE and ZARELLA, Js.
The plaintiff, Vertex, Inc., appeals from the trial court's judgment in favor of the defendant, the city of Waterbury. The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly dismissed, sua sponte, two counts of its complaint just before the trial was to begin, and incorrectly instructed the jury with regard to the third count, which alleged unjust enrichment. We agree with the plaintiff, and, accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.
The record reveals the following factual and procedural history. In March, 1999, the plaintiff sent a proposal letter to the defendant offering to perform specific services to prepare the defendant's computer systems for the year 2000 problem.1 The defendant accepted the plaintiff's proposal and the parties entered into a written contract dated June 7, 1999, under which the plaintiff would install a certain software program on the defendant's computers and perform the tasks outlined in the plaintiff's March, 1999 proposal. Despite the fact that the written contract was not executed until June 7, 1999, the plaintiff commenced work in March, 1999. On July 1, 1999, the plaintiff submitted a proposal for additional work to remedy additional year 2000 problems that it had identified during its first three months of work for the defendant. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant accepted its July, 1999 proposal, that it performed this additional work, and that the defendant refused to pay for it. The defendant denies that it accepted the plaintiff's July, 1999 proposal, and contends that the additional work the plaintiff claims to have performed was within the scope of the earlier written contract. Thus, the defendant denies that it owes the plaintiff any additional money.
The plaintiff brought the present action against the defendant to recover for the services, outlined in the July, 1999 proposal, that it allegedly performed for the defendant. Specifically, the plaintiff, in its complaint, alleged the following causes of action: (1) breach of contract; (2) estoppel; and (3) unjust enrichment. On approximately February 20, 2004, after a jury had been selected, the trial court, in a chambers conference with counsel, ordered the parties to submit pretrial briefs by February 24, 2004, on the legal theories of the three causes of action alleged in the complaint. Both parties complied with the trial court's order and submitted briefs on February 24, 2004. On the following day, the trial court issued a memorandum of decision in which it dismissed, sua sponte, the first two counts of the plaintiff's complaint and allowed the plaintiff to proceed to trial only on the unjust enrichment count.
The case was tried to the jury and, at the close of the plaintiff's case, the defendant moved for a directed verdict. During oral argument on the defendant's motion, the trial court invited both parties to address the two counts that it previously had dismissed.2 The trial court thereafter granted the defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the first two counts, but denied the motion with respect to the plaintiff's unjust enrichment count.3 The unjust enrichment count was then submitted to the jury, but the trial court declared a mistrial when the jury was unable to reach a verdict. The case was retried before a jury in June, 2004, with the same judge presiding. Like the earlier trial, the case was limited to the plaintiff's unjust enrichment count because the trial court's earlier ruling dismissing the plaintiff's first two counts remained in effect. At the conclusion of the second trial, the jury returned a general verdict in favor of the defendant.4 Subsequently, the plaintiff made a motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial, claiming that the trial court improperly had dismissed the first two counts of its complaint and incorrectly had instructed the jury with regard to the third count. The trial court denied the plaintiff's motion and rendered judgment for the defendant. This appeal followed.5 Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the trial court improperly dismissed its breach of contract and estoppel counts because the defendant never filed any dispositive motion, such as a motion to strike or a motion for summary judgment, and neither party asked the court to determine the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's claims. In addition, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly instructed the jury that, in order to prevail on its unjust enrichment claim, the plaintiff needed to prove the existence of an implied in fact contract.6 In response, the defendant claims that the trial court properly dismissed the plaintiff's breach of contract and estoppel counts under its inherent trial management authority. Additionally, the defendant argues that the trial court's instruction on the unjust enrichment count was proper because this count is really a claim for quantum meruit, and in order to prevail on such a claim, the plaintiff must establish that there was an implied in fact contract. Alternatively, the defendant contends that the trial court's instruction was correct because the plaintiff had to establish that there was an express or implied in fact contract in order to prevail on its claim against a municipality.7 We agree with the plaintiff.
The first issue on appeal requires us to determine whether the trial court had the authority to determine dispositive questions of law that did not implicate the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction when neither party filed a motion or otherwise requested the court to make such a determination. We begin with the applicable standard of review. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Krevis v. Bridgeport, 262 Conn. 813, 818, 817 A.2d 628 (2003). "The case management authority is an inherent power necessarily vested in trial courts to manage their own affairs in order to achieve the expeditious disposition of cases." Id., at 819, 817 A.2d 628. A trial court abuses its discretion when it exercises its case management authority in a manner that is arbitrary, wilful, or without "regard to what is right and equitable under the circumstances and the law ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
We initially set forth two additional facts relevant to this issue. First, the trial court, in its memorandum of decision, concluded on the basis of the parties' pretrial briefs that the first and second counts of the plaintiff's complaint were without legal merit. Second, in its memorandum of decision, the trial court recognized that "[n]o motion to strike or motion for summary judgment has been filed ...." Thus, it is clear from the record that no motion was pending when the trial court dismissed the two counts of the complaint for legal insufficiency.
We note that due to the adversarial nature of our judicial system, "[t]he court's function is generally limited to adjudicating the issues raised by the parties on the proof they have presented and applying appropriate procedural sanctions on motion of a party." (Emphasis added.) F. James, G. Hazard & J. Leubsdorf, Civil Procedure (5th Ed. 2001) § 1.2, p. 4. The parties may, under our rules of practice, challenge the legal sufficiency of a claim at two points prior to the commencement of trial. First, a party may challenge the legal sufficiency of an adverse party's claim by filing a motion to strike. Practice Book § 10-39. Second, a party may move for summary judgment and request the trial court to render judgment in its favor if there is no genuine issue of fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Practice Book §§ 17-44, 17-49. In both instances, the rules of practice require a party to file a written motion to trigger the trial court's determination of a dispositive question of law. The rules of practice do not provide the trial court with authority to determine dispositive questions of law in the absence of such a motion.
In two recent decisions, we considered the boundaries of a trial court's discretion to determine dispositive questions of law on the eve of trial and in a manner inconsistent with the procedures established in the rules of practice. First, in Krevis v. Bridgeport, supra, 262 Conn. at 815, 817 A.2d 628, the trial court, on the day jury selection was to commence, heard oral arguments on the defendant's motion in limine to prohibit references to punitive damages and attorney's fees because of the defendant's governmental immunity as a municipality. During the course of the oral argument, the defendant argued that the plaintiff's claim was barred by the governmental immunity statute. Id., at 820, 817 A.2d 628. The trial court granted the defendant's motion in limine because it determined that the governmental immunity statute applied. Id. The court emphasized that it was not ruling on the legal validity of the plaintiff's claim, but noted that it would be willing to expand its ruling to consider this issue. Id. After a recess, the plaintiff asked the court to rule on the legal sufficiency of its claim. Id., at 821, 817 A.2d 628. The parties, at defense counsel's suggestion, agreed that the plaintiff's request should be treated as an oral motion for summary...
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