Vessel v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 10 April 1913
• Parties: VESSEL et al. v. SEABOARD AIR LINE RY. CO.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

62 So. 180

182 Ala. 589

VESSEL et al. v. SEABOARD AIR LINE RY. CO.

Supreme Court of Alabama

April 10, 1913

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County; E.C. Crowe, Judge.

Action by Mary Alice Vessel and others, as administrators, against the Seaboard Air Line Railway Company. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

Plaintiffs' intestate was an assistant hostler on the Southern Railway engine, which was pulling a dead passenger train, and was killed in a collision between his engine and the Seaboard Air Line switch engine, at a crossing of the two roads near the terminal station of Birmingham. The case was submitted to the jury on the second and third counts. The second count charges that intestate's death was caused by the wanton, willful or intentional conduct of the defendants (the railway company and its engineer, Hankins), in that they wantonly, willfully or intentionally collided said engine with the knowledge that plaintiffs' intestate would probably be injured thereby and with reckless disregard of the consequences. The third is substantially like the second, except that it charges that intestate's death was due to the wanton, willful, or intentional conduct of the defendant's engineer, Hankins in that he wantonly, willfully, or intentionally caused said engine, of which he was in control, to collide with said engine, upon which plaintiffs' intestate was riding, with the knowledge, etc. The assignments of error are based upon the giving of the following charges in writing at defendant's request: "(1) The court charges the jury that wantonness is the moral equivalent of intention. (2) The court charges the jury that a wanton wrong is the moral and legal equivalent of an intentional wrong. (3) If the jury believe from the evidence in this case that Hankins, the engineer, did not wantonly, willfully, or intentionally take the life of Grover Collins, deceased, then you must find a verdict in favor of both defendants. (4) The court charges the jury that although they may believe from the evidence in this case that Hankins was guilty of negligence, or was careless, still you cannot render a verdict for the plaintiffs in this case, unless you further believe from the evidence that his conduct amounted to wantonness, or to an intentional or willful injury. (5) The court charges the jury that if they believe from the evidence in this case that the way was clear for the Seaboard Air Line Railway engine when the same was proceeding toward the crossing where the collision occurred and immediately before it reached the said crossing, then the engineer in charge of said engine, if he was otherwise free from negligence, had the right to reasonably indulge the presumption that no other train would approach said crossing without stopping."

Denson & Denson, of Birmingham, for appellants.

Tillman, Bradley & Morrow, of Birmingham, for appellee.

SOMERVILLE J.

The distinction between the mental attitudes which respectively characterize wanton negligence and willful injury has been often discussed and clearly stated in the reported decisions of this court, and repetition is unnecessary. L. & N.R.R Co. v. Calvert, 170 Ala. 565, 54 So. 184; Adler v. Martin, 59 So. 597; Southern Ry. Co. v. Benefield, 172 Ala. 588, 55 So. 252, 35 L.R.A. (N.S.) 420, wherein the cases are collected.

It is to be noted, however, that the terms "wanton" and "willful" relate primarily to the resulting injury, rather than to the mere act or omission which proximately produces that injury, for, considered without reference to known, probable or inevitable injury resulting, even the conscious or intentional omission of any precautionary duty is no more than simple negligence. L. & N.R.R Co. v. Anchors, 114 Ala. 492, 500, 22 So. 279, 62 Am.St.Rep. 116; M. & C.R.R Co. v. Martin, 117 Ala. 367, 382, 23 So. 237; B.R.L & P. Co. v. Brown, 150 Ala. 327, 43 So. 342; Neyman v. A.G.S.R.R Co., 172 Ala. 606, 55 So. 509.

The first and second charges complained of merely assert that a wanton wrong is the moral, or the moral and legal, equivalent of an intentional wrong. They do not assert that the essential ingredients of the two acts are the same, nor do they attempt to define them, and they fall very far short of declaring that in order to find defendants guilty of wanton wrong they must have intended to inflict the injury charged. They assert propositions of law so often repeated in the decisions of this court that they may be said to be mere truisms. B.R. & E. Co. v. Bowers, 110 Ala. 328, 331, 20 So. 345; B.R. & E. Co. v. Franscomb, 124 Ala. 621, 624, H. A. & B.R. Co. v. Robinson, 125 Ala. 483, 489, 490, 28 So. 28; Mobile, etc., R.R. Co. v. Smith, 146 Ala. 312, 40 So. 763.

In L. & N.R.R. Co. v. Orr, 121 Ala. 489,...