Vest v. Giant Food Stores, Inc.
| Decision Date | 01 September 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 875,875 |
| Citation | 91 Md.App. 570,605 A.2d 627 |
| Parties | Woodrow W. VEST, v. GIANT FOOD STORES, INC., et al. , |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Luiz R.S. Simmons, Silver Spring, for appellant.
Christopher R. Costabile (Law Offices of Conrad A. Fontaine, on the brief), Fairfax, Va., for appellees.
Argued before BISHOP, ALPERT and HARRELL, JJ.
This case requires us to interpret the Maryland's Workers' Compensation Code provisions governing the limitations period for modifying compensation awards. The appellant was injured during the course of his employment and received temporary total disability payments. He later claimed permanent partial disability benefits but the Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission), relying upon time limitations, denied his claim, ultimately placing his case before us.
Woodrow Wilson Vest, the appellant, injured his lower back on 3 November 1980. On 30 December 1980, Vest filed with the Commission a completed form entitled "Employee's Claim," alleging that he was injured in the course of his employment with Giant Food Stores, Inc. (Giant). Giant did not contest or file issues with regard to Vest's claim. No hearing was requested by Vest, Giant, or Giant's insurer. Consequently, no hearing was conducted by the Commission.
On 30 January 1981, relying on the information set forth in the claim and any other documentation in its file, the Commission issued an "Award of Compensation" 1 finding that Vest "sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment on November 3, 1980--that the average weekly wage was $529.64, and that the claimant was temporarily totally disabled as a result of said injuries." The Commission ordered the employer/insurer to pay Vest $241.00 per week "during the continuance of the temporary total disability ... compensation to begin on the 8th day of November, 1980." The bottom of the Award of Compensation contains a sentence indicating that "[t]his Award is subject to further determination by this Commission as to whether the claimant has sustained any permanent disability."
Vest signed a "Statement of Compensation Paid" on 21 December 1980, and this was filed with the Commission. The form indicates that it is a The statement reflected payments from Giant to Vest in the amount of $1618.15 to compensate Vest for his temporary total disability.
We note here that Vest received temporary disability payments in addition to those reflected in the initial "Award of Compensation" and the "Statement of Compensation Paid," but the record is silent as to the procedures by which the payments resumed.
Vest received temporary total disability benefits from 5 November 1980 to 21 December 1980. These payments resumed on 28 December 1980, and continued until 3 January 1981. He received them again on 1, 2 and 5 February 1982. He also intermittently received temporary partial disability benefits from 20 December 1980 through 12 June 1981. The temporary partial disability payments resumed from 23 January 1982 through 6 March 1982. On 5 April 1982, Vest received the last temporary disability payment pursuant to his claim.
Vest subsequently required two disc surgeries, which he alleges were directly related to the injuries he suffered on 5 November 1980. Unfortunately for Vest, these surgeries were performed long after the limitations period purported to apply to his initial injury had expired. Vest's physician, Dr. John Bucur, determined that Vest had a forty-five percent partial disability of his lower back as the result of these operations. When Vest asked his insurance carrier adjuster whether he was entitled to permanent partial disability benefits, the adjuster told him that time limitations barred his claim.
On 5 April 1989, Vest formally requested additional benefits, and petitioned to reopen his claim, but the Commission on 28 August 1989 denied Vest's request on the ground that the request was barred by time limitations.
Vest appealed this decision to the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, which granted Giant's 2 motion for summary judgment on the basis of time limitations: Vest's claim for permanent partial disability benefits was made too late. Vest asked the court to amend its judgment, arguing that there had been no "award of compensation" within the meaning of the relevant statutory provision governing modifications. Vest also argued that the Commission made no findings and issued no order with respect to whether Vest sustained any permanent disability. On 15 May 1991, the Circuit Court denied Vest's motion to amend judgment.
Vest now appeals, asking us to consider:
I. Whether the 30 January 1981 administrative order of the Workmen's Compensation Commission is an award of compensation within the contemplation of Article 101 40(c)?
II. Whether the period of limitations contained in Article 101 40(c) bars an employee's claim asserted more than five years after an administratively-granted award of the Commission which did not make or purport to make findings with respect to the issue of permanent partial disability?
We note at the outset that we must construe the state's Worker's Compensation Act as liberally as possible in the injured employee's favor, "in order to effectuate its benevolent purposes." Howard County Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Walls, 288 Md. 526, 530, 418 A.2d 1210 (1980). See also Md.Labor and Employment Code Ann. § 9-102 (Construction of title) (1991). Moreover, uncertainties should be resolved in the claimant's favor. See Lovellette v. Mayor of Baltimore, 297 Md. 271, 282, 465 A.2d 1141 (1983).
The statutory provision at issue here, in one incarnation or another, has been part of the Maryland Code for a long time. See Holy Cross Hosp. v. Nichols, 290 Md. 149, 154, 428 A.2d 447 (1981) (). Although the time limit for modifying earlier awards has sustained numerous assaults, 3 this particular challenge apparently poses heretofore unraised arguments. The subsection provides as follows:
(c) Modifications or changes.--The powers and jurisdiction of the Commission over each case shall be continuing, and it may, from time to time, make such modifications or changes with respect to former findings or orders with respect thereto as in its opinion may be justified; provided, however, that no modification or change of any award of compensation shall be made by the Commission unless application therefor shall be made to the Commission within five years next following the last payment of compensation.
Appellant calls on the Court to analyze the meaning of the document entitled "Award of Compensation" which was issued by the Commission on 30 January 1991 and signed by the Chairman of the Workers' Compensation Commission, Charles J. Krysiak. The document states at the outset that it is "an award of compensation". In the second paragraph of the award, it recites that "this Commission has concluded to pass an Order based on the evidence in the record". In the first paragraph the Order states that "after due consideration of the above entitled case, it is determined that the claimant sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment on November 3, 1980, that the average weekly wage was $529.64, and that the claimant was temporarily totally disabled as a result of said injuries". Finally, the employer and insurer are directed to "pay unto said claimant compensation at the rate of $241 per week payable weekly during the continuance of temporary total disability of the claimant, subject to the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Law; compensation to begin on the 8th day of November 1980".
The term "award" is not defined by the Act. "Compensation," however, is defined, in pertinent part, as "the money allowance payable to an employee ... as provided for in this article ..." 5 Temporary total disability constitutes a type of disability for which a money allowance may be ordered to be paid pursuant to the Act. 6 The procedures which the Commission follows in determining the disposition of a claim are set forth at § 40(a), art. 101:
(a) Hearing and award.--The Commission shall make or cause to be made such investigation of any claim as it deems necessary, and upon application of either party, shall order a hearing. Within thirty days after a claim for compensation is submitted under this section, or such hearing concluded the Commission shall make or deny an award, determining such claim for compensation, and file same in the office of the Commission.
As noted in § 40(a), no hearing is required to be held, absent a request by a party, before the Commission may "make or deny an award."
Appellant directs our attention to a distinction made, in a treatise on Maryland Workers' Compensation law 7, between an order entered administratively and one entered after a hearing. Judge Gilbert and Mr. Humphreys characterize the order issued without a hearing on the claim as "an Administrative Order" to pay benefits, rather than a decision regarding the validity of the claim. Gilbert at 275. While the authors do make a distinction between this type of administrative order and a decision made pursuant to a hearing, they do not make that distinction in the context for which appellant cites them. Subsequent to making their distinction, the authors note that either type of initial award of compensation is a final appealable order. Either...
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...on the grounds that it was time barred. Id. The Circuit court affirmed the Commission's order as did this court. Vest v. Giant Food, Inc., 91 Md.App. 570, 605 A.2d 627 (1992). The issue that the Court of Appeals was called upon to decide was whether the date of the last compensation payment......
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