Vetter v. Farmland Industries, Inc.

• Decision Date: 16 July 1997
• Docket Number: No. 96-4286,96-4286
• Citation: 120 F.3d 749
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
• Parties: 74 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 550, 71 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,880 Dean G. VETTER, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. FARMLAND INDUSTRIES, INC., Defendant/Appellant.

Page 749

120 F.3d 749

74 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 550,

71 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,880

Dean G. VETTER, Plaintiff/Appellee, v.FARMLAND INDUSTRIES, INC., Defendant/Appellant.

No. 96-4286.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Submitted June 9, 1997.

Decided July 16, 1997.

Stanley E. Craven, Kansas City, KS, argued (Robert W. Schuller, on the brief), for defendant-appellant.

John Scot Allen, Iowa City, IA, argued (Joseph Jankunis, Dorothy March, Student Legal Interns, on the brief), for plaintiff-appellee.

Before MURPHY and HEANEY, Circuit Judges, and BOGUE, ¹District Judge.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge.

Dean Vetter sued his employer, Farmland Industries, Inc., under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq., for terminating him for refusing to move to his trade territory.Vetter contended that his religious beliefs required him to live in a city with an active Jewish community and synagogue and that Farmland had discriminated against him on the basis of his religion by enforcing its residence requirement and not reasonably accommodating his beliefs.A jury returned a verdict in Farmland's favor, but the district court granted Vetter's motion for judgment as a matter of law.Farmland appeals, and we reverse.

Farmland sells livestock feed to farm cooperatives through a program in which it hires and trains a livestock production specialist to work closely with a co-op to sell feed to local farmers.Farmland reached an agreement with United Co-op in Webster City, Iowa to participate in the program.Under the agreement the livestock production specialist working with United was to be an employee of Farmland, but United was to pay a significant portion of the person's salary.United wanted Farmland to assign someone to the job who was knowledgeable about the business, who could communicate effectively with customers, and who would live in the Webster City area so he or she would develop strong relationships with local farmers.

Farmland did not have a livestock production specialist to assign to United so it sought to hire one for the position.Farmland was impressed with Vetter's experience and scheduled an employment interview with him.According to the testimony of Farmland employees, Vetter was told during the interview that the job would require him to live in the Webster City area and Vetter expressed a willingness to move there.Vetter testified on the other hand that he was told that he had to relocate, but not that he had to move to any particular place.After the interview but before he began working for Farmland, Vetter asked his prospective supervisor, George Gleckler, whether he could live in Ames, which is about forty miles from Webster City.Gleckler discussed this proposal with United Co-op, but United reiterated its need to have the specialist live in the Webster City area.Glecker then told Vetter that Ames was too far from Webster City.

Farmland offered Vetter the job, and there was testimony at trial that just before the employment papers were completed, Farmland again told Vetter that he had to live in the Webster City area and that Vetter understood this requirement.Vetter testified that he knew that Farmland wanted him to move to the Webster City area but that he personally had not been told directly that this was company policy.²Vetter accepted the job and moved to a room in Webster City.His family remained in Muscatine which is over 200 miles from Webster City.During the first month of his employment, he searched for a home in the Webster City area but did not find rental housing satisfactory to him.Gleckler inquired about his house search, and Vetter said that his wife was working on it.

Shortly after this conversation Gleckler discovered from Farmland's relocation office that the Vetters had made arrangements to live in Ames.Farmland had indicated that it was prepared to reimburse his moving expenses from Muscatine to the Webster City area, but had said Ames was not acceptable.Gleckler discussed the matter with Vetter and then called Mrs. Vetter.Gleckler told her that he was upset that Vetter had not been forthright about his moving plans.Mrs. Vetter responded that it was important that the family live in an active Jewish community with a synagogue and that they wanted their children to participate in programs at the synagogue.Gleckler replied that "sometimes you have to choose between your religion and your job."

Gleckler discussed Vetter's plan to move to Ames with one of his supervisors and United's management.Farmland decided that Vetter should be dismissed because he had refused to live in the Webster City area and had begun to make arrangements to move to Ames at company expense in spite of its policy.Vetter was terminated, and he returned to Muscatine where he had lived for two years before his employment with Farmland and from which he commuted 45 miles to a synagogue in Rock Island.

Vetter sued Farmland, claiming that he had been discriminated against on the basis of his religion in violation of Title VII,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) & (j), in that Farmland did not reasonably accommodate his religious beliefs.³In order to prove this allegation Vetter had the burden to demonstrate that "(1)he has a bona fide belief that compliance with an employment requirement is contrary to his religious faith; (2)he has informed his employer about the conflict; and (3)he was discharged because of his refusal to comply with the employment requirement."Johnson v. Angelica Unif. Group, Inc., 762 F.2d 671, 673(8th Cir.1985)(quotingBrown v. General Motors Corp., 601 F.2d 956, 959(8th Cir.1979)).An employer need not accommodate a "purely personal preference," however.Brown, 601 F.2d at 960.

At trial both parties agreed to a jury instruction explaining that Vetter must prove that

[he] held a sincere belief that compliance with an employment requirement was in conflict with an observance or practice of his religion, [he] does not need to prove that his belief is a tenet of his religious nor that a particular religious observance or practice is required by the tenets of his religion.However, purely personal preferences do

not need to be accommodated ....[but that he] was discharged for failing to comply with the conflicting employment requirement.

The jury returned a general verdict in Farmland's favor.The district court then granted Vetter's motion for judgment as a matter of law.It recognized the jury's determination but concluded that "all of the evidence offered at trial points instead to the sincerity of Vetter's belief rather than to a purely personal preference."

Farmland argues the district court erred by overturning the jury verdict.It believes a desire to live near others of the same religion is not an observance or practice that must be accommodated under Title VII.Even if this were a requirement of his faith, however, it was necessary for Farmland to have the specialist live in the co-op trade area because of its agreement with United Co-op.It therefore could not reasonably accommodate his desire.Farmland also contends the jury...