Vetter v. Farmland Industries, Inc.

Citation901 F. Supp. 1446
Decision Date12 October 1995
Docket NumberNo. C 94-3008.,C 94-3008.
PartiesDean G. VETTER, Plaintiff, v. FARMLAND INDUSTRIES, INC., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

John S. Allen, Professor, and Johna Gaffke and Pressley Henningsen, Student Interns, of the Clinical Law Program of the University of Iowa College of Law, Iowa City, Iowa, for Plaintiff Dean Vetter.

Stanley E. Craven of Spencer Fane Britt & Browne, Kansas City, Missouri, for Defendant Farmland.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW OR FOR NEW TRIAL

BENNETT, District Judge.

                                            TABLE OF CONTENTS
                  I. BACKGROUND ..................................................... 1449
                 II. LEGAL ANALYSIS ................................................. 1450
                     A. Applicable Standards ........................................ 1450
                        1. Standards for judgment as a matter of law ................ 1452
                        2. Standards for a new trial ................................ 1453
                        3. Disposition of alternative motions under Rule 50(b) ...... 1454
                     B. Disposition Of Post-trial Motions ........................... 1455
                        1. The motion for judgment as a matter of law ............... 1455
                        2. The motion for new trial ................................. 1457
                     C. Relief ...................................................... 1458
                III. CONCLUSION ..................................................... 1460
                

Plaintiff, a member of the Jewish faith, was discharged from his employment after being told by a supervisor that "sometimes you have to choose between your religion and your job." The plaintiff chose his religion, the employer snatched his job, and a jury rebuffed the plaintiff's claims of religious discrimination. The plaintiff had brought claims against his former employer for disparate treatment on the basis of religion and failure reasonably to accommodate his religion. The matter now before the court is the plaintiff's renewal of his motion, first made at the conclusion of evidence in the trial, for judgment as a matter of law on his accommodation claim. The plaintiff has also moved, in the alternative, for a new trial on both of his claims. The defendant, an agricultural products company that had employed the plaintiff, albeit briefly, as a livestock production specialist (LPS), asserts that the jury properly concluded that the plaintiff was fired for insubordination, because he refused to live in his sales territory and because he initiated a move to an unacceptable location at company expense without prior company approval. The defendant also asserts that the jury properly found that the defendant had made reasonable efforts to accommodate the plaintiff's religion or found that its duty to make reasonable accommodation was never triggered in this case.

I. BACKGROUND

In this lawsuit, plaintiff Dean Vetter, a member of the Jewish faith, alleged that his employer, defendant Farmland Industries, Inc., subjected him to disparate treatment on the basis of his religion and failed to make reasonable accommodations for his religion. Vetter's complaint was in four counts. Counts I and III alleged disparate treatment on the basis of religion resulting in Vetter's discharge in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) and Iowa Code § 216.6(1)(a), respectively. Vetter's disparate treatment claims were founded on allegations that after he informed his supervisor that he was Jewish and wished to live in Ames, Iowa, because it had an active Jewish community, Farmland officials for the first time imposed a requirement that he live within the Webster City trade area, and ultimately terminated him for not accepting inadequate housing within that trade territory. Counts II and IV alleged failure to make reasonable accommodations to Vetter's religious beliefs, also in violation of the same provisions of federal and state law, respectively. Vetter's claims of refusal to make reasonable accommodation were based on his assertion that he was willing to maintain a residence for himself in Webster City, while his family lived in Ames, but that Farmland rejected this suggestion and failed to offer any other reasonable accommodation. Vetter sought damages for lost past and future income and benefits, emotional distress, suffering, inconvenience, and humiliation. Vetter also sought an award of his costs and attorneys fees, as well as such other relief as was just and proper.

On May 1, 1995, this court denied Farmland's motion for summary judgment on all of Vetter's claims. See Vetter v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 884 F.Supp. 1287 (N.D.Iowa 1995). The court found genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment against Vetter on either his disparate treatment or failure to accommodate claims. The court concluded that, as to disparate treatment, there were genuine issues of material fact involving whether similarly situated employees who were not members of Vetter's faith received more favorable treatment in being allowed to live outside of their trade territories, and whether Vetter's discharge was pretextual. As to Vetter's accommodation claims, the court found genuine issues of material fact involving whether or not Vetter was entitled to reasonable accommodation for his belief that he needed to live in an active religious community, and whether Farmland had offered any reasonable accommodation.

The case therefore went to trial before a jury on June 12, 1995. On June 15, 1995, the jury rendered a verdict against Vetter on both his disparate treatment and failure to accommodate claims. The court entered judgment pursuant to the jury's verdicts on June 22, 1995. However, at the close of evidence, Vetter had moved for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a) on his claim of failure reasonably to accommodate his religion, and the court had reserved ruling on that motion. On June 30, 1995, Vetter renewed his motion for judgment as a matter of law on the accommodation claim, and, alternatively, moved for a new trial pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a) on both his accommodation claims and his disparate treatment claims.

Both parties have filed briefs on Vetter's post-trial motions. Vetter's brief was filed on June 30, 1995, followed by Farmland's resistance on July 17, 1995. Vetter then filed a reply brief on July 21, 1995. The court heard oral arguments on Vetter's motions on August 10, 1995. At the oral arguments, Vetter was represented by Professor John S. Allen and student interns Johna Gaffke and Pressley Henningsen of the Clinical Law Program of the University of Iowa College of Law in Iowa City, Iowa. Farmland was represented by Stanley E. Craven of Spencer Fane Britt & Browne in Kansas City, Missouri. Local counsel — who participated in pre-trial and trial, but was excused from taking part in the post-trial arguments owing to other commitments — was Margaret Prahl of Heidman, Redmond, Fredregill, Patterson, Schatz & Plaza, L.L.P., in Sioux City, Iowa.

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Applicable Standards

Vetter has made post-trial motions pursuant to both Fed.R.Civ.P. 50 and Fed. R.Civ.P. 59. In resisting Vetter's post-trial motions, not only did Farmland fail to identify the appropriate standards for disposition of such motions, Farmland failed to cite a single case in support of its position on any issue. The court therefore deems it appropriate to examine the standards for disposition of Vetter's post-trial motions with some care. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 entitled "Judgment as a Matter of Law in Actions Tried by Jury; Alternative Motion for New Trial; Conditional Rulings" states in relevant part:

(a) JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
(1) If during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue, the court may determine the issue against that party and may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against that party with respect to a claim or defense that cannot under the controlling law be maintained or defeated without a favorable finding on that issue.
(2) Motions for judgment as a matter of law may be made at any time before submission of the case to the jury. Such a motion shall specify the judgment sought and the law and the facts on which the moving party is entitled to the judgment.
(b) RENEWAL OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AFTER TRIAL; ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL. Whenever a motion for a judgment as a matter of law made at the close of all the evidence is denied or for any reason is not granted, the court is deemed to have submitted the action to the jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the motion. Such a motion may be renewed by service and filing not later than 10 days after entry of judgment. A motion for a new trial under Rule 59 may be joined with a renewal of the motion for judgment as a matter of law, or a new trial may be requested in the alternative....

Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a) & (b).1

Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b), a litigant's post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law on any claim may not be entertained unless the movant previously moved for judgment as a matter of law on that claim at the close of all evidence pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a). Rockport Pharmacy, Inc. v. Digital Simplistics, Inc., 53 F.3d 195, 197 (8th Cir.1995) (post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law may not advance additional grounds not raised in pre-verdict motion); Smith v. Ferrel, 852 F.2d 1074, 1075 (8th Cir.1988) (record disclosed that no motion for "directed verdict" had been made at the close of all evidence, "appellant therefore cannot question the sufficiency of the evidence either before the district court through a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or on appeal."); Hubbard v. White, 755 F.2d 692, 695 (8th Cir.) (motion for "directed verdict"...

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    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • January 15, 2008
    ...communicated religious belief. This precise question was addressed by a district court in this circuit in Vetter v. Farmland Industries, Inc., 901 F.Supp. 1446, 1459 (N.D.Iowa 1995), rev'd on other grounds, 120 F.3d 749, 751-52 (8th What is important to the court's conclusion ... is that Fa......

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