Via v. Taylor, Civ.A. 97-4-JJF.
| Decision Date | 11 September 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. Civ.A. 97-4-JJF.,Civ.A. 97-4-JJF. |
| Parties | Patricia T. VIA, f.k.a. Patricia T. Toomey, Plaintiff, v. Stan TAYLOR, Robert Watson, Alan Machtinger, and Rick Kearney, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Delaware |
David A. Boswell, Schmittinger & Rodriguez, P.A., Rehoboth Beach, Delaware, for plaintiff.
Michael F. Foster, Deputy Attorney General of the Department of Justice of the State of Delaware, Dover, Delaware, for defendants.
This action was brought by Plaintiff, Patricia T. Toomey1, a former employee of the Delaware Department of Correction, against Defendants, Stan Taylor, Robert Watson, Alan Machtinger and Rick Kearney, alleging that Defendants wrongfully fired her from her job at Sussex Correctional Institute Inc. ("SCI") as a result of her off-duty relationship with a paroled former inmate, Richard Via. The parties stipulated to a bench trial and agreed to sever the issues of liability and damages.
The Court conducted a three-day bench trial. Following the trial, the Court instructed the parties to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and to address evidentiary objections which were raised during the course of this litigation. This Memorandum Opinion constitutes the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on the claims and defenses presented.2
The Court takes its background of the facts in this case from both the stipulated pretrial order and the testimony and documents offered at trial. However, this factual background is not exhaustive, and the Court will make additional factual findings as needed in the context of the Court's analysis of the claims and defenses in this litigation.
Plaintiff was employed as a Correctional Corporal by the Department of Correction (the "Department") from 1978 until her discharge in 1995. (D.I. 98 at ¶ i.) The Department is an agency of the State of Delaware. (Id. at ¶ b.) The Department is divided into separate divisions, including the Bureau of Prisons and the Bureau of Community Corrections. (Id.) The Bureau of Prisons operates the prison facilities throughout the State of Delaware. (Id.) The Bureau of Community Corrections includes a statewide division known as Probation and Parole, and the Sussex Work Release Center located in Sussex County, Delaware. (Id.) The Sussex Work Release Center is a separate facility from SCI, and has its own warden.
At the time of Plaintiff's termination, Defendant Taylor was the Chief of the Bureau of Prisons. (Id. at ¶ c.) Currently Defendant Taylor is the Commissioner of the Department. Defendant Robert Watson is the former Commissioner of the Department. (Id. at ¶ d.) At all relevant times, Defendant Alan Machtinger has been the personnel director of the Department, and Defendant Rick Kearney has been the Warden of SCI. (Id. at ¶¶ e, f.)
As a Correctional Corporal at SCI, Plaintiff's duties included supervising inmates who worked in the SCI Commissary, maintaining inventory and security, and otherwise directing Commissary operations. (Id. at ¶ j.) One of the inmates under Plaintiff's supervision was Richard Via, who was serving a sentence imposed by the Delaware Superior Court. (Id. at ¶ k.)
In June 1994, Mr. Via was placed on work release through the Sussex Work Release Center of the Department. (Id. at ¶ 1.) Mr. Via was then paroled. When Mr. Via left SCI for Sussex Work Release Center, he was no longer under the supervision of Plaintiff or the Bureau of Prisons. Rather, Mr. Via was then under the supervision of the Bureau of Community Corrections. (Id. at ¶ m.)
On December 30, 1994, following his release from the Sussex Work Release Center, Mr. Via moved into Plaintiff's home as a boarder. While Plaintiff was a boarder with Plaintiff, Mr. Via was under the supervision of Probation and Parole and the Bureau of Community Corrections. (Id. at ¶ o.)
On January 3, 1995, her first day of work following December 30, 1994, Plaintiff reported the boarding arrangement to Defendant Kearney, the Warden of SCI. (Id. at ¶ p.) Plaintiff was required to report this arrangement pursuant to the Department's Code of Conduct. Defendant Kearney consulted by telephone with Defendant Taylor and Defendant Machtinger regarding Plaintiff's boarding arrangement with Mr. Via. After consultation, Defendant Kearney advised Plaintiff that the boarding arrangement with Mr. Via violated the Code of Conduct. (Id.)
On July 10, 1995, Plaintiff had a pre-decision meeting about her potential termination with Defendant Machtinger. (Id. at ¶ q.) At that time, Plaintiff advised Defendant Machtinger that she had developed an intimate relationship with Mr. Via. Defendant Machtinger advised Plaintiff that the Department was considering terminating her employment as a result of her relationship with Mr. Via. Defendant Machtinger also advised Plaintiff that if she terminated her relationship with Mr. Via, the Department would consider that to be a factor in her favor. Plaintiff refused to terminate her relationship with Mr. Via and was subsequently terminated from her employment for violating the Code of Conduct. (Id.) Plaintiff's work performance was not an issue, and played no part in the Department's decision to terminate her. (Id. at ¶¶ s, y.)
The Code of Conduct (the "Code") was established by the Department in 1988 while Defendant Taylor was Chief of the Bureau of Prisons. Defendant Watson, who was then the Commissioner of the Department, commissioned the Code in response to public outcry following a prison escape which resulted in a citizen's death. (Tr. A 35.) The Code is a policy document intended to enhance professionalism in the Department. The stated purpose of the Code is to:
set[ ] out high moral and ethical standards for correctional employees to assure unfailing honesty, respect for dignity and individuality of human beings and a commitment to professional and compassionate service.
(PXI at 1.)
The Code is given to the Department's employees in their training classes, and employees are required to sign for their receipt of the Code. (Tr. A-25-29; B-216-217.) The Code applies to "all staff unless otherwise specified." (PX1 at 1.) The portion of the Code at issue in this litigation is Article 16, which provides in relevant part:
Trafficking with incarcerated offenders is prohibited. No staff person shall have any personal contact with an offender, incarcerated or non-incarcerated, beyond that contact necessary for the proper supervision and treatment of the offender. Examples of types of contact not appropriate include, but are not limited to, living with an offender, offering an offender employment, carrying messages to or from an offender, social relationships of any type with an offender, and physical contact beyond that which is routinely required by specific job duties. Any sexual contact with offenders is strictly prohibited. Contact for other than professional reasons with the offenders outside of the work place shall be reported in writing to the employee[']s supervisor.
(D.I. 98 at t, PX1 at 5, 7, 8-9.) The term "offender" is defined in Article 29(k) of the Code as "[a]ny person committed by a court to the care, custody, or control of the Department." (D.I. 98 at ¶ t.) The prohibition described in Article 16 does not distinguish between types or degrees of officer/inmate relationships and on or off duty relationships. Article 16 also contains no disciplinary standards. Defendants make case-by-case determinations as to whether and what degree of discipline should be imposed as a result of a violation of the Code, including Article 16. (D.I. 98 at ¶¶ ab-ac.)
Plaintiff contends that Defendants violated her rights under the First and Fifth Amendments to freedom of association and privacy by terminating her as a result of her relationship with Mr. Via. Specifically, Plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of Article 16 of the Code, the provision upon which her termination was based. Plaintiff contends that her relationship with Mr. Via was a protected expressive association, a protected personal association, and a protected privacy interest such that the use of Article 16 to justify her termination as a result of her relationship with Mr. Via amounted to a violation of her rights.3
In discussing "freedom of association" under the First Amendment, the United States Supreme Court has created two lines of decisions. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984); Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity, Inc. v. University of Pittsburgh, 229 F.3d 435, 438 (3d Cir.2000). In one line of cases, the Court has recognized that the choice to enter into and maintain intimate human relationships is a fundamental element of personal liberty which must be secured against undue intrusion by the State. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618, 104 S.Ct. 3244. In another line of cases, the Court has recognized the right to associate for the purpose of engaging in activities protected by the First Amendment, such as speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion. Id. The nature and degree of constitutional protection afforded to the freedom of association varies depending on the nature of the association and the nature of the interest at stake. Id.
Insofar as personal associations are concerned, the Supreme Court has recognized that certain kinds of highly personal relationships are afforded a "substantial measure of sanctuary from unjustified interference by the State." Id...
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