Viands v. Safeway Stores

• Decision Date: 28 July 1954
• Docket Number: No. 1505.,1505.
• Citation: 107 A.2d 118
• Parties: VIANDS et al. v. SAFEWAY STORES, Inc.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

107 A.2d 118

VIANDS et al. v. SAFEWAY STORES, Inc.

No. 1505.

Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.

Argued June 21, 1954.

Decided July 28, 1954.

Earl H. Davis, Washington, D. C., for appellants.

Thomas S. Walsh, with whom Mr. Cornelius Doherty, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellee.

Before CAYTON, Chief Judge, and HOOD and QUINN, Associate Judges.

CAYTON, Chief Judge.

Among the grocery stores operated by appellee Safeway is one at 1330 D Street, N. E. On each side of that store Safeway has a parking lot from which its customers must cross a paved public sidewalk which leads up to the front door of the store, which is the only entrance or exit for use of shoppers. One evening in October 1952 Mr. and Mrs. Viands followed this course in going to the store to do some shopping. Photographs in the record reveal that the store has a flat front consisting of masonry and glass, and the doorway is not flush with the rest of the building, but is set back or recessed somewhat from the front line of the building proper. It is fitted with double swinging doors. When they entered the store the entranceway was unobstructed, but Mrs. Viands did notice "about six" small coaster or delivery wagons on the sidewalk, close to the store window. A half hour later, having completed their shopping and each of them carrying two large bags of groceries, they started to leave the store, Mrs. Viands walking ahead of her husband. When she had taken one step out of the store and while one foot was still within the doorway, she tripped over a small metal delivery wagon which was standing on the sidewalk immediately in front of the door or doorway and which had not been visible to her as she opened the door to leave the store. She sued for her injuries and Mr. Viands sued for medical expenses and other damages personal to him.

There was testimony that Safeway had for a long time been having trouble with boys congregating within the store itself soliciting patrons for deliveries; that the store had had "several" complaints from customers about this; that some two months earlier Safeway had engaged the services of a special guard who worked on Fridays and Saturdays, and whose duty it was to keep the boys out of the store. The manager had at times counted as many as twenty boys on the inside of the store and as many as thirty on the outside. He said he had given instructions to the special guard to keep the boys out of the store but "couldn't do anything with them" on the sidewalk in front of the store; that "the guard has no jurisdiction beyond the store and its only means of getting rid of the boys is to call the Metropolitan Police."

The jury's verdict was in favor of defendant store and plaintiffs have brought this appeal, contending that the trial judge improperly instructed the jury. In his charge, after some general instructions and others as to the general duty of an invitor, the judge told the jury, "I want to tell you

there can be no duty imposed on the defendant in this or any other case of this type with respect to space over which the defendant has no control and no legal opportunity for control." He then also instructed them:

"No liability can be imposed upon the defendant simply because of the hazardous condition existing upon the public street outside of the store. The defendant had no dominion and no control over the public street and could not lawfully have exercised any dominion over the public street. Therefore no duty can be imposed upon the defendant Safeway Stores in this case with respect to the maintenance of the street or the conditions that exist upon the street.

"On the other hand the defendant store does have a duty to use reasonable care to maintain the entrances and exits to its store to the extent it has control over them, as I have indicated to you, to maintain those entrances and exits in a reasonably safe condition."¹

This language was also repeated to the jury when they asked for further instructions.

We must rule that these instructions did not accurately state the law applicable to this situation, especially as it referred to the matter of control. There is nothing novel or extraordinary surrounding the duty of an invitor to use care with reference to exits, entrances, and approaches to his premises. As long ago as 1881, the United States Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Harlan, stated the rule, "founded in justice and necessity and illustrated in many adjudged cases in the American courts" that an owner or occupant of land is liable to an invitee "for injuries occasioned by the unsafe condition of the land or its approaches, if such condition was known to him and not to them, and was negligently suffered to exist, without timely notice to the public or to those who were likely to act upon such invitation." Bennett v. Louisville and N. R. Co., 102 U.S. 577, 580, 26 L.Ed. 235. Later cases have laid down the same rule as to the duty to protect an invitee using approaches to the invitor's property. Blaine v. United States, D.C.E.D.Tenn., 102 F.Supp. 161; Rankin v. S. S. Kresge Co., D.C.N.D.W. Va., 59 F.Supp. 613, affirmed, 4 Cir., 149 F. 2d 934; Sexton v. Brooks, 39 Cal.2d 153, 245 P.2d 496; Flint River Cotton Mills v. Colley, 71 Ga.App. 288, 30 S.E.2d 426 (based on State statute); Perl v. Cohodas, Peterson, Paoli, Nast Co., 295 Mich. 325, 294 N.W. 697; Evans v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Mo.App., 104 S.W.2d 1035.² And it has been specifically held that the duty to properly maintain approaches to an invitor's property is not to be determined by the exact boundaries of the premises, and that such duty does not end at the door through which the invitee makes his exit. Cannon v. S. S. Kresge Co., 233 Mo.App. 173, 116 S.W.2d 559. In our search of the authorities we have found two recent cases, close to our factual situation. In Homer v. Penn Fruit Co., 1951, 169 Pa.Super. 473, 82 A.2d 313, 314, several boys with small express wagons had usually congregated on the sidewalk in front of a food market and one of them caused his wagon to collide with and injure a customer. Affirming a judgment for plaintiff and citing Restatement, Torts, § 318, the court held the storekeeper liable and said that he had made no persistent effort to control the activities of the boys in an orderly fashion and must be held to have permitted a condition to continue, "a condition which involved a reasonable probability that an accident was likely to occur and did occur." In Atterbury v. Temple Stephens Co., 1944, 353 Mo. 5, 181 S.W.2d 659, 663, the manager of a store unrolled some...