Vicente Garcia Gavieres v. United States

• Citation: 220 U.S. 338,31 S.Ct. 421,55 L.Ed. 489
• Decision Date: 03 April 1911
• Docket Number: No. 102,102
• Parties: VICENTE GARCIA GAVIERES, Plff. in Err., v. UNITED STATES
• Court: United States Supreme Court

220 U.S. 338

31 S.Ct. 421

55 L.Ed. 489

VICENTE GARCIA GAVIERES, Plff. in Err.,

v UNITED STATES.

No. 102.

Submitted March 13, 1911.

Decided April 3, 1911.

Mr. Vicente Garcia Gavieres, in propria persona, for plaintiff in error.

[Argument of Counsel from page 339 intentionally omitted] Assistant Attorney General Harr for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice Day delivered the opinion of the court:

This case presents the single question whether the plaintiff in error, by reason of the proceedings herein- after stated, has been twice in jeopardy for the same offense.

Gavieres, plaintiff in error, was charged, convicted, and sentenced in the court of first instance of the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, of a violation of article 257 of the Penal Code of the Philippine Islands, which provides:

'The penalty of arresto mayor shall also be imposed on those who outrage, insult, or threaten, by deed or word, public officials or agents of the authorities, in their presence, or in a writing addressed to them.'

Gavieres was charged under this article with the crime of calumniating, outraging, and insulting a public official in the exercise of his office by word of mouth and in his presence. Upon conviction he was sentenced to four months of arresto mayor and to pay the cost of the prosecution. He had been previously convicted, because of the same words and conduct, under article 28, § 2 of the ordinance of the city of Manila, which provides:

'No person shall be drunk or intoxicated or behave in a drunken, boisterous, rude, or indecent manner in any public place open to public view; or be drunk or intoxicated or behave in a drunken, boisterous, rude, or indecent manner in any place or premises to the annoyance of another person.'

Section 5 of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902 (32 Stat. at L. 691, chap. 1369), provides: 'No person, for the same offense, shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment.'

This statute was before this court in the case of Kepner v. United States, 195 U. S. 100, 49 L. ed. 114, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 797, 1 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 655, and it was there held that the protection against double jeopardy therein provided had, by means of this statute, been carried to the Philippine Islands in the sense and in the meaning which it had obtained under the Constitution and laws of the United States.

It is to be observed that the protection intended and specifically given is against second jeopardy for the same offense and of which a conviction has been had in the municipal court and in the court of first instance, identical? An examination of the ordinance shows that the gist of the offense under it was behaving in an indecent manner in a public place, open to public view. It was not necessary to charge or prove under the municipal ordinance any outrage, insult, or threat to a public official or agent of the authorities. The charge contained in the record shows that under the municipal ordinance the plaintiff in error was charged with wilfully and unlawfully, in a public street car and in the presence of numerous persons, including ladies, conducting himself in a reckless, indecent, and discourteous manner.

It is true that the acts and words of the accused set forth in both charges are the same; but in the second case it was charged, as was essential to conviction, that the misbehavior in deed and words was addressed to a public official. In this view we are of opinion that while the transaction charged is the same in each case, the offenses are different. This was the view taken in Morey v. Com. 108 Mass. 433, in which the supreme court of Massachusetts, speaking by Judge Gray, held:

'A conviction or acquittal upon one indictment is no bar to a subsequent conviction and sentence upon another, unless the evidence required to support a conviction upon one of them would have been sufficient to warrant a conviction upon the other. The test is not whether the defendant has already been tried for the same act, but whether he has been put in jeopardy for the same offense. A single act may be an offense against two statutes; and if each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under either statute does not exempt the defendant from prosecution and punishment under the other.'

This case was cited with approval in Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U. S. 367, 395, 46 L. ed. 236, 251, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 181. In the Carter Case, speaking of the identity of offenses charged, this court said:

'The offenses charged under this article were not one and the same offense. This is apparent if the test of the identity of offenses, that the same evidence...