Vicente v. Takayama
Decision Date | 04 October 2016 |
Docket Number | CV 16-00497 DKW-RLP |
Parties | DWIGHT J. VICENTE, Plaintiff, v. LINDA CHU TAKAYAMA, DIRECTOR OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Hawaii |
On October 3, 2016, Plaintiff Dwight J. Vicente, proceeding pro se, filed a First Amended Complaint against state employees of the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations Disability Compensation Division, a worker's compensation benefits insurer, a healthcare provider, the Governor of the State of Hawaii, and the United States Congress, alleging violations of federal law pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The First Amended Complaint suffers from the same deficiencies as Vicente's original Complaint, previously identified in the Court's September 12, 2016 Order granting his in forma pauperis ("IFP") Application and dismissing the Complaint with leave to Amend. Dkt. No. 6. Because Vicente again fails to state a claim for relief or establish any basis for this Court's subject matter jurisdiction, the Court DISMISSES the First Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and once more GRANTS Vicente leave to file an amended complaint by no later than October 31, 2016.
The Court subjects each civil action commenced pursuant to Section 1915(a) to mandatory screening and can order the dismissal of any claims it finds "frivolous, malicious, failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeking monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) ( ); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) ( ).
Because Vicente is appearing pro se, the Court liberally construes the First Amended Complaint. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); see also Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987) () (citing Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam)). The Court recognizes that "[u]nless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect . . . a pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the complaint's deficiencies and an opportunity to amend prior to dismissal of the action." Lucas v. Dep't of Corr, 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 977-78 (9th Cir. 2013).
Nevertheless, the Court may dismiss a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]" A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper when there is either a "'lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged.'" UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners, LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1014 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)). A plaintiff must allege "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Weber v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 521 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2008). This tenet -- that the court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in the complaint -- "is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Accordingly, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supportedby mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555); see also Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011) ().
"A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Factual allegations that only permit the Court to infer "the mere possibility of misconduct" do not show that the pleader is entitled to relief as required by Rule 8. Id. at 679.
The First Amended Complaint, like the original Complaint, attempts to assert a Section 1983 claim for violation of Vicente's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Vicente includes the following new allegations:
Vicente also re-alleges his prior claims:
Vicente also re-alleges his prior claim that the State's statutory workers' compensation scheme was "illegally implemented into the Kingdom of Hawaii," and that Hawaii Revised Statutes § 386-5 "denies Plaintiff's right to contract." First Amended Complaint ("FAC") ¶¶ 49-52. Among other relief requested, Vicente again seeks:
Many of the same shortcomings identified with respect to Vicente's original Complaint remain uncorrected in his First Amended Complaint. First, the Complaint fails to state a claim under Section 1983 based upon conduct that allegedly occurred in 1987, 1988, 1997 or 2000, and which formed the basis for complaints that Vicente previously filed with defendant State agencies. See FAC ¶¶ 9-20. These allegations are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. See, e.g., Faaita v. Liang, 2009 WL 89197, at *3 (D. Haw. Jan. 14, 2009) (...
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