Vickers v. Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 06 December 1895
• Citation: 71 F. 139
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
• Parties: VICKERS v. CHICAGO, B. & Q.R. CO.

71 F. 139

VICKERS v. CHICAGO, B. & Q.R. CO.

United States Circuit Court, N.D. Illinois.

December 6, 1895

S. K Daw, for plaintiff.

Chester M. Dawes, for defendant.

ALLEN District Judge (charging jury).

Yesterday afternoon a motion was made in this case in effect that the court instruct the jury to find for the defendant, upon the close of the plaintiff's rebuttal. Several questions have been argued in connection with the motion, and I conceive that it is of great importance, not only to the plaintiff but as a question of law in a general sense. The ground of the motion substantially is, as presented by counsel for defendant, that the plaintiff, who, before this accident occurred, became a member of the voluntary relief association or relief department of the defendant railroad company, made a contract, in substance, by which he agreed that if he should suffer from accident-- receive injury, in other words-- he should elect to take the benefits provided by the by-laws and regulations of this relief association, or have his action against the defendant. It is shown in this case that after his serious injury, resulting in the necessary amputation of his left arm (and it is contended-- and perhaps that contention is supported by evidence-- that he was seriously injured in his spine and the back portions of his body), he received from this fund,-- this relief fund,-- on account of such injuries and sickness consequent thereon, some $48. The facts in connection with it are, I believe, not disputed. It is shown that checks were drawn, indorsed by him, the money paid from the relief fund, and, as far as the evidence goes appropriated by the plaintiff. There is no denial of that. Now, the effect of this act of his is the important matter for consideration. It is said on the part of the plaintiff that this clause in the application, which is a part of the contract, is a misleading clause; that it is a device by the company with a view of relieving itself from the obligations-- the legal obligations-- which it incurred through its negligence; that at the time the plaintiff signed the application he was not aware of its import; that he was at a disadvantage with the defendant; that the entire relief fund department was a cunningly devised scheme to entrap persons, and shield the company from just responsibility; and much contention on that line, and very earnest contention, is made; and, indeed, one authority has been adduced, the decision being made in the Eighth circuit, in Colorado, in support of that view. Miller v. Railway Co., 65 F 305. I am unable to reach the same view in this matter that was held by the very able circuit judge in the Eighth circuit. So far as I have learned from the evidence (and I have watched it with a great deal of interest), no improper means or influences were brought to bear to induce the plaintiff to sign this application to become a member of this benefit association,-- relief association, I believe, technically, is the name of it. It was suggested to him that it was an association of the employes of the road entirely, as I understand it; limited to them; that it was a good arrangement; that it was for his benefit; it would prove to be for his advantage to become a member, and that he had better do so. The usual persuasive arguments, or, at any rate, the ordinary arguments, were adduced, and his judgment was addressed in the matter, and he finally signed the application. But such influences as those do not avoid the contract. It may be (he says himself) that he did not read it over, or, if at all, not carefully; that he did not fully know all there was in it. But there is no statement that he could not read, no denial of the fact that he could read, so that it would seem to be admitted that he could; that there was a paper laid before him, and that he signed it, as others did, and became a member, in the absence of any fact which would avoid the act of membership on account of fraud or undue influence. It has been too long settled in this country to admit now of doubt that when a man is making a contract, and can read it, the presumption is that he does so; and when he signs without reading a written or printed contract, as his voluntary act, in the absence of any fraud whatsoever, he will not be heard to say that he did not understand it legal import. That cannot be permitted, because some men--I am not saying that the plaintiff was-- some men are careless, and never look into anything. But contracts must be carried out according to their import, when they are fairly entered into. This relief association is supported, it seems, to some extent, by what may be called the 'assessments' or 'contributions' of the members, and where there is a deficiency the company makes it up, so as to keep it in a solvent condition,--...