Vickers v. State
Citation | 466 N.E.2d 3 |
Decision Date | 23 July 1984 |
Docket Number | No. 1282S465,1282S465 |
Parties | Christopher VICKERS and James Ballard, Appellants (Petitioners Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Respondent Below). |
Court | Supreme Court of Indiana |
Susan K. Carpenter, Public Defender, David R. Swinford, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, for appellants.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Kathleen Ransom Radford, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
Petitioners (Appellants) were convicted, following a trial by jury, of multiple offenses and sentenced. The judgments were affirmed by this Court in Ballard and Vickers v. State, (1979) 270 Ind. 337, 385 N.E.2d 1126. Their petitions for post-conviction relief, filed under P.C. Rule No. 1, were consolidated, heard and denied. This joint appeal is from that denial.
Post-conviction proceedings are civil in character. The petitioner has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to the relief sought. On appeal, our standard of review is the same as in other appeals from civil judgments. We do not reassess the credibility of witnesses, nor do we reweigh the evidence. Those responsibilities lie within the exclusive province of the trial judge.
A petitioner appealing from the denial of post-conviction relief is appealing from a negative judgment. The issue, on appeal, is whether or not that judgment was contrary to law. McKrill v. State, (1983) Ind., 452 N.E.2d 946, 948; Jackson v. State, (1975) 264 Ind. 54, 55-56, 339 N.E.2d 557, 559. It is only where the evidence is without conflict and leads to but one conclusion and the trial court has reached an opposite conclusion that the decision of the trial court can be disturbed as being contrary to law. McKrill v. State, 452 N.E.2d at 948; Cottingham v. State, (1978) 269 Ind. 261, 262, 379 N.E.2d 984, 985; Johnson v. State, (1974) 262 Ind. 183, 186, 313 N.E.2d 542, 544.
The issue before us, therefore, is whether or not the Petitioners sustained their burden of proof upon any issue presented to the post-conviction court which would, if proved, entitle them to relief, as a matter of law. Those issues, as framed by Petitioners' brief, were as follows:
"1. Whether the Appellants were denied due process of law under the Indiana and United States Constitutions when the trial court failed to admonish the jury to "2. Whether the Appellants were subjected to vindictive punishment in violation of the Indiana Constitution, Article I, Section 18, when they were sentenced under the Old Penal Code?
disregard an altercation occurring between one of Appellant's attorneys and the court bailiff in the presence of the jury which altercation prejudiced the Appellants?
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Appellants claim they were prejudiced by the trial court's failure to admonish the jury to disregard an altercation which had occurred between the court's bailiff and one of the Appellants' attorneys. The record, however, does not reflect that this altercation occurred within the view or earshot of the jury. Moreover, the argument did not involve anything relating to the merits of the case.
In their brief Appellants further argue that they were harmed when they were handcuffed outside the courtroom, but within the view of the jury. We have consistently held that, absent a showing of actual harm, the mere fact that members of the jury viewed the defendant in restraints outside the courtroom is not sufficient to impute prejudice, where the crime charged is of a serious nature. Hedrick v. State, (1982) Ind., 430 N.E.2d 1150, 1154; Johnson v. State, (1977) 267 Ind. 256, 258-59, 369 N.E.2d 623, 624-25, cert. denied 436 U.S. 948, 98 S.Ct. 2855, 56 L.Ed.2d 791; Jessup v. State, (1971) 256 Ind. 409, 412, 269 N.E.2d 374, 375. Appellants here were clearly charged with crimes of a serious nature; it is not unreasonable for the jury to expect to see them in police custody. Petitioners made no showing of entitlement upon this issue.
Appellants next argue that their sentences of life imprisonment for Kidnapping under the pre-1977 Indiana Penal Code violates their right to be free from "vindictive justice" under the Indiana Constitution, Article I, Section 18. Indiana Acts 1977, P.L. 340, Sec. 150(a), p. 1611, provides that proceedings begun before October 1, 1977, shall continue under the previous law. See also Ind.Acts 1977, P.L. 340, Sec. 150(b), p. 1611 ( ). Appellants acknowledge our holdings in Vicory v. State, (1980) 272 Ind. 683, 400 N.E.2d 1380 and six other cases to the effect that sentencing one under the statute in effect at the time his crime was committed, in accordance with the provisions of a subsequent statute which changed the penalty for such offense and which is presumptively constitutional, is not a violation of Art. 1, Sec. 18, of the Indiana Constitution proscribing vindictive punishment. They ask that we reconsider those holdings, but they have made no argument in support of a change. Petitioners made no showing of entitlement upon this claim.
Petitioners acknowledge that their claim that the alternate juror was
present during jury deliberations was drawn from a failure of the record to disclose an instruction that the alternate was not to participate in deliberations. No presumptions may be drawn from a silent record. Petitioners made no showing of entitlement upon this issue.
Upon Petitioners' claims that they were denied the effective assistance of counsel, we have reviewed the evidence, which consists solely of the testimony of the Petitioners and the record of the trial.
Petitioners had been convicted of rape, kidnapping and armed robbery upon the testimony of their victim. The sole issue appears to have been her credibility. Under such circumstances, it must be conceded that if a reasonable investigation would have brought forth evidence that would have refuted or impeached her testimony, a showing that no such investigation had been made would undermine the proper functioning of the adversarial process such that the trial could not be relied upon as having produced a just result; and it could not be said that there was no reasonable probability that the production of such evidence would not have created a...
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