Vickers v. Stoneman

• Decision Date: 25 January 1889
• Citation: 73 Mich. 419,41 N.W. 495
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: VICKERS v. STONEMAN.

41 N.W. 495

73 Mich. 419

VICKERS v. STONEMAN.

Supreme Court of Michigan

January 25, 1889

Error to circuit court, Van Buren county, GEORGE M. BUCK, Judge.

Action by Robert Vickers against Edmund Stoneman for slander. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings error.

CHAMPLIN and LONG, JJ., dissenting.

O.N Hilton, (L. A. Tabor, of counsel,) for appellee.

CHAMPLIN J.

This is an action on the case to recover damages for verbal slander. The declaration contains no matters of inducement, and no averment of collateral circumstances, but proceeds in two counts to set out his cause of action, as follows: "On the 20th day of January, A. D. 1887, at Waverly, in the county of Van Buren aforesaid, in a certain discourse which the said defendant then and there had with the said plaintiff, in the presence and hearing of divers good and worthy persons, did speak, publish, and declare, to, of, and concerning the said plaintiff these false scandalous, and defamatory words, to-wit: 'He [meaning the said plaintiff] poisoned my cattle. They were poisoned with Paris green. They were poisoned from a pail that had bran and poison in it, and Vickers [meaning the said plaintiff] put it there;' thereby meaning and intending to charge that he, the said plaintiff, committed the crime of willfully and maliciously administering poison to the cattle of him, the said defendant, Edmund Stoneman, whereby said cattle were poisoned and killed. And whereas, also, the said defendant, with malice towards the said plaintiff aforesaid afterwards, to-wit, on the same day and year, and at the same place aforesaid, in a certain other discourse which the said defendant then and there had, in the presence and hearing of divers other good people, of and concerning the said plaintiff, did falsely and maliciously speak, publish, and declare, in the presence and hearing of those people, these other false, scandalous, malicious, and defamatory words, of and concerning the said plaintiff, to-wit: 'He [meaning the said plaintiff] poisoned my cattle. They were poisoned with Paris green. They were poisoned from a pail that had bran and poison in it, and Vickers [meaning the said plaintiff] put it there:' thereby meaning and intending to charge that he, said plaintiff, committed the crime of willfully and maliciously administering poison to the cattle of him, the said defendant, whereby the said cattle were poisoned and killed. By reason of the speaking, publishing and uttering of which said false, scandalous, malicious, and defamatory words the said plaintiff is greatly prejudiced in his good name, fame, and reputation." Then follows the claim for general damages. The plea was the general issue.

Upon the trial, the plaintiff having produced a witness by whom he proposed to prove the slanderous words, the defendant's counsel objected, for the reason that it was irrelevant and inadmissible under the pleadings; that the declaration set out no cause of action, because the words charged in the declaration do not amount to a charge of crime, and are not actionable per se, and no special damages are claimed. The circuit judge overruled the objection and admitted the testimony. This is one of the main grounds of error relied on.

The words laid in the declaration as slanderous are not actionable in themselves. They do not charge a crime, as the statute requires the poisoning to be done willfully and maliciously in order to punish it as a felony. But the pleader seeks to bring the words charged within the offense created by the statute by the use of an innuendo, the office of which is to explain doubtful words and phrases, and annex to them their proper meaning. It is, however, well settled that an innuendo cannot extend the sense of the words used beyond their natural meaning, unless something is put upon the record by way of introductory matter, with which they can be connected; in which case, words which are equivocal, or ambiguous, or fall short in their natural sense of stating a slanderous charge, may have fixed to them a meaning extending beyond their ordinary import, which renders them certain or defamatory by means of a proper innuendo. In this declaration there is nothing of an introductory character explaining the occasion, or stating circumstances which would connect the slanderous words with the relation of the parties, or the situation of the subject-matter, showing in what connection the slanderous words were used, and so by the use of the inuuendo make their meaning certain. Thus it is laid down in 1 Chit. Pl. p. 407, in speaking of the office of the innuendo: "It is only explanatory of some matter already expressed. It serves to point out, where there is precedent matter; but never for a new charge. It may apply what is already expressed, but cannot add to, or enlarge, or change the sense of the previous words." It is also laid down in Starkie on Slander, at page 421, that "the most important rule of law relating to this species of averment is that its office is merely to explain by pointing out...