Vicksburg, S. & P. R. Co. v. Tibbs

• Decision Date: 15 February 1904
• Docket Number: 14,865
• Citation: 112 La. 51,36 So. 223
• Parties: VICKSBURG, S. & P. R. CO. v. TIBBS et al
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

36 So. 223

112 La. 51

VICKSBURG, S. & P. R. CO. v. TIBBS et al

No. 14,865

Supreme Court of Louisiana

February 15, 1904

Rehearing denied March 28, 1904.

Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; John Thomas Watkins, Judge, vice Alfred Dillingham Land, Judge recused.

Action by the Vicksburg, Shreveport & Pacific Railroad Company against Albert Tibbs and others. The heirs of W. W. Smith and others were substituted as defendants. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Albert H. Leonard, William Pike Hall, and Edgar Williamson Sutherlin, for appellants.

Stubbs & Russell (William Henry Wise, of counsel), for appellee.

MONROE J. LAND, J. recused.

OPINION

MONROE J.

Statement.

This is a petitory action for the recovery of a tract of land in the parish of Caddo described as lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9, in S. 31, T. 18, R. 13, containing 179.80 acres, less 35.18 acres, not included in the demand. The original defendants disclaim title, and allege that they are in possession as tenants of A. H. Leonard, G. R. Wilson, and the heirs of W. W. Smith, who, assuming the defense, by way of exception plead res judicata and estoppel, and for answer set up title in themselves by patent to their author from the state of Louisiana, and by confirmation of title from the United States. After this suit was instituted the plaintiff company was put into the hands of a receiver, the land in controversy was adjudicated to C. C. Harvey, and the receiver and Harvey made themselves parties, and have set up a counterplea of res judicata. The plaintiff makes a claim for rents and revenues, and the defendants, in the event of their ejectment, for reimbursement of taxes paid but those claims have, by consent, been reserved for future adjustment.

The land in question has been known as "Silver Lake," and in 1839, when the township in which it is situated was surveyed, was covered with water. It was not, however, selected by and approved to the state as swamp or overflowed land, under the acts of Congress of 1849 and 1850 (9 Stat. 352, 519), but upon the passage by the General Assembly of Act No. 284, p. 257, of 1853, authorizing the Register of the Land Office to sell, subject to the conditions provided in the act, certain "shallow lakes," that officer, on May 14, 1853, sold it to W. W. Smith, to whom, in February, 1855, he issued a patent. In December, 1857, the state brought suit in the district court for the parish of Caddo to annul the sale so made, on the grounds that the act authorizing it had not then been promulgated, and the land had not been surveyed as thereby required, and from a judgment maintaining an exception filed by Smith and dismissing the suit the state appealed to this court, where said judgment was reversed, and the case remanded. The defendant, W. W. Smith, then died, and his administrator, J. W. Smith, set up the title upon which the defendants now before the court rely, and after trial upon the merits there was judgment in favor of the state, decreeing "that the certificate of entry of * * * Silver Lake * * * in favor of W. W. Smith be annulled, avoided, and delivered up, * * * and that the patent issued * * * for Silver Lake be annulled, and now taken up." From this judgment the defendant appealed to this court, and upon August 11, 1869, the appeal was dismissed by consent of counsel. In the meanwhile -- that is to say, by Act No. 228, p. 183, of 1853 -- the General Assembly had chartered a company to build a railroad from the Texas line, via Greenwood, Shreveport, and Monroe, to a point on the Mississippi river opposite Vicksburg, and upon June 3, 1856 (11 Stat. 18), the President of the United States had approved an act of Congress granting to the state of Louisiana, for the purpose of aiding in the construction of said road, every alternate section of land for six sections in width on each side of its proposed line, subject to the condition that the land so granted should be used for no other purpose, and should be disposed of only as the Governor of the state should certify to the progress and completion of the work. It is shown that the land here in question fell within the limits of the grant thus made; that immediately upon the passage of the act, and before it was signed, the Secretary of the Interior ordered that it should be withdrawn from the market; and that thereafter a number of applications for its purchase for homestead purposes or otherwise were refused on the ground that it was included in the grant to the railroad company. In the last of these rulings, made in March, 1881, the Secretary of the Interior concludes by saying: "The foregoing decisions touching the land in question, as abated, have all the force and effect of stare decisis. Consequently the adjustment of the grant in 1874 in ascertainment of the right of the state under act of July 14, 1870 (16 Stat. 277), declaring a partial forfeiture, and the reapproval of the lists containing these particular lands as a part of said grant earned by the company, must be considered as a final adjustment of the subject-matter which exhausted the power and jurisdiction of the department."

In 1885 R. N. Smith and others brought suit in the Circuit Court of the United States, alleging that they had inherited Silver Lake from W. W. Smith, and that about 40 acres of it was unlawfully withheld from them by George A. Turner, and praying judgment for the land so withheld. Turner disclaimed title, and the railroad company (present plaintiff) assumed the defense, and upon the trial offered to prove the value of the entire tract. The evidence offered for that purpose was, however, excluded upon the objection of the plaintiffs that there was nothing in controversy except the title to so much of the tract as was occupied by Turner and claimed by them, and there was judgment for plaintiffs for 35.18 acres of land, found to be occupied by Turner. The judgment so rendered was taken by writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States, where the plaintiffs (defendants in error) moved to dismiss on the ground that the court was without jurisdiction, for the reason that the value in dispute was that of the particular parcel of land occupied by Turner, and not that of the entire Silver Lake tract; and the court, adopting that view, dismissed the writ, saying:

"All that the plaintiffs, in their petition, claimed to recover, was the part of the land which was in the possession of Turner, alleged therein to contain 40 acres, or more. The answer alleged that the land sought to be recovered in the suit was worth at least $ 10,000, and prayed that the plaintiffs' demand be rejected, and for judgment decreeing the company 'to be the owner of the land.' This put in issue only the land in the possession of Turner. The judgment is limited to a piece of land described by metes and bounds, and containing 35.18 acres, as shown by a map and survey of the same on file and of record in the cause. The value of that parcel of land is shown clearly to be not over $ 2,000, and this is conclusive as to our jurisdiction. * * * Writ of error dismissed." V., S. & P.R.R. Co. v. Smith, 135 U.S. 195, 10 S.Ct. 728, 34 L.Ed. 95.

In 1888, the heirs of Smith brought another suit, alleging that they had obtained judgment against Turner for 35.18 acres of the Silver Lake tract; that Jack Ford and others, whom they named, were in possession of the remainder of the tract; and praying judgment against them therefor. The parties made defendant filed a general denial, setting up no title in themselves, and not disclosing the name of the owner; the railroad company made no appearance; and there was judgment for plaintiffs, under which they were put in possession of the property claimed.

Opinion.

Dealing with the pleas of res judicata and estoppel, as predicated by the defendants upon the judgment in the Turner Case, it will be observed that by an interlocutory ruling sustaining an objection urged by them, the judge of the Circuit Court held that the issue before the court in that case concerned only the title to the particular parcel of land occupied by Turner, and that the title to the remainder of Silver Lake tract was not...