Vicksburg Waterworks Company v. Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Vicksburg

• Decision Date: 07 April 1902
• Docket Number: No. 392,392
• Citation: 22 S.Ct. 585,46 L.Ed. 808,185 U.S. 65
• Parties: VICKSBURG WATERWORKS COMPANY, Appt. , v. MAYOR AND ALDERMEN OF THE CITY OF VICKSBURG
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

185 U.S. 65

22 S.Ct. 585

46 L.Ed. 808

VICKSBURG WATERWORKS COMPANY, Appt.,

v MAYOR AND ALDERMEN OF THE CITY OF VICKSBURG.

No. 392.

Submitted December 4, 1901.

Decided April 7, 1902.

The Vicksburg Waterworks Company, a corporation of the state of Mississippi, filed, in February, 1901, in the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of Mississippi, a bill of complaint against the mayor and aldermen of the city of Vicksburg, a municipal corporation of Mississippi.To this bill the city filed a demurrer and certain special pleas, and subsequently moved the court for leave to withdraw the demurrer and pleas, and for leave to file an answer alleging that said answer embodied all the matters of defense which were set forth in said pleas and demurrer, and also a motion to dissolve a temporary injunction which had been theretofore granted.

On July 1, 1901, the court entered the following order:

'Coming on to be heard the motion to dissolve the injunction herein, and the defendant now having moved the court for leave to file the answer herewith presented and marked by the clerk as filed June 21, 1901, and to withdraw the pleas and demurrers filed April 30, 1901, it is ordered that leave be granted to file said answer and withdraw said pleas and demurrers, but that the question of the jurisdiction of this court to hear the matter in controversy, raised by said answer, shall be first presented and argued.'

On July 3, 1901, the complainant moved the court to 'require defendant to elect on which plea it will stand, whether on demurrer to the whole bill or on the answer.'This motion was overruled, and on July 3, 1901, the court entered the following order and decree:

'This cause coming on to be heard upon the motion to dissolve the injunction heretofore issued in this cause, and the court now being advised in the premises, and it appearing that there is no Federal question involved in the controversy presented by the pleading, it is therefore ordered, adjudged, and decreed that said injunction be, and the same is hereby, dissolved, and that the bill of the complainant be, and the same is hereby, dismissed, and that execution issue therefor for the cost in the case.'

Thereupon the complainant moved the court to 'continue the restraining order in force as granted until the appeal in this cause is heard by the Supreme Court of the United States, or until the further order is granted by said court.'

The following order was then entered by the court:

'Upon the appeal being allowed herein it is ordered that the temporary restraining order herein be continued until the 1st day of January, 1902, or if before then, until the decision of the appeal herein by the supreme court, upon condition, however, that the complainant diligently prosecute its appeal and file a motion at or before the next term of the supreme court to advance the appeal in this cause upon the docket of the Supreme Court of the United States, and upon the further condition that the injunction bond heretofore given in this case shall stand and continue in force for any additional liability which may be incurred by reason of this order, the principal and sureties upon said bond, now in open court consenting thereto.Ordered, adjudged, and decreed this 3d July, 1901.'

On the same day an appeal was allowed to this court, and on July 4, 1901, the following certificate was signed by the trial judge and filed:

'The final decree having been entered herein on the 3d day of July, 1901, dismissing this suit and the bill, and amended and supplemental bill therein, now, therefore, this court, in pursuance of the 2d paragraph of the 5th section of the act of Congress, approved March 3, 1891, and entitled 'An Act to Establish Circuit Courts of Appeal, and to Define and Regulate in Certain Cases the Jurisdiction of the Courts of the United States, and for Other Purposes,' hereby certifies to the Supreme Court of the United States for decision the question of the jurisdiction alone of this court over this cause, whether this cause presents a controversy which involves a Federal question under the laws or Constitution of the United States.

'The only question which I considered and decided in dis- missing this suit and the bills of complaint is whether a Federal question was involved upon the pleadings.'

Messrs.James A. Carr, S. S. Hudson, and A. N. Edwards for appellant.

Mr.L. W. Magruder for appellees.

Mr. Justice Shirasdelivered the opinion of the court:

The sole question for our consideration is whether the bill, as originally filed and as amended, presented a Federal question.As the partyplaintiff and the partydefendant were both corporations and citizens of the same state, the circuit court of the United States could not take jurisdiction of the controversy between them unless the complainant laid grounds for that jurisdiction by asserting rights arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, and such assertion must appear in the complainant's statement of its own claim.Metcalf v. Watertown, 128 U. S. 586, 32L. ed 543, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 173;Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U. S. 454, 38 L. ed. 511, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 654;Blackburn v. Portland Gold Min. Co.175 U. S. 571, 44 L. ed. 276, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 222.

It is true that the learned judge, in his certificate to this court, inquires 'whether a Federal question was involved upon the pleadings.'And it is also true that the counsel for the respective parties have gone, in their briefs, into a discussion of questions of fact and law, as if the case were here on appeal from a final decree on the merits.

But our function, in the case before us on this certificate, is restricted to the inquiry whether, upon the allegations of the bill of complaint, assuming them to be true in point of fact, a Federal question is disclosed so as to give the circuit court jurisdiction in a suit between citizens of the same state.If we conclude, after an inspection of the bill, that a Federal question is thereby presented, we must reverse the decree of the circuit court below dismissing the bill, and direct that court to proceed in the orderly exercise of its jurisdiction to determine the con- troversy; if we fail to find such a question, the decree of the circuit court must be affirmed.

Addressing ourselves, then, to a consideration of the contents of the bill, original and supplemental, we encounter a very long and somewhat confusing narrative of the facts of the case.We do not think it necessary to state those facts in full in this opinion, but shall confine our attention to the allegations in which questions arising under the laws or Constitution of the United States are claimed to arise.

By an act of the legislature of the state of Mississippi, approved on the 18th day of March, 1886, the city of Vicksburg was authorized 'to provide for the erection and maintenance of a system of waterworks to supply said city with water, and to that end to contract with a party or parties who shall build and operate waterworks.'

The city received competitive bids for the construction and maintenance of said waterworks, and on November 18, 1886, at a special meeting of the board of mayor and aldermen, a committee reported that the bid made by Samuel R. Bullock & Company, of New York, was the best bid, and submitted the draft of an ordinance, entitled 'An Ordinance to Provide for a Supply of Water to the City of Vicksburg, in Warren County, Mississippi, and to Its Inhabitants, Contracting with Samuel R. Bullock & Company, Their Associates, Successors, and Assigns, for a Supply of Water for Public Use, and Giving the City of Vicksburg an Option to Purchase Said Works.'This ordinance was then adopted, in terms as follows:

'Sec. 1.That in consideration of the public benefit to be derived therefrom the exclusive right and privilege is hereby granted for the period of thirty (30) years from the time that this ordinance takes effect, unto Samuel R. Bullock & Company, their associates, successors, and assigns, of erecting, maintaining, and operating a system of waterworks in accordance with the terms and provisions of this ordinance, and of using the streets, alleys, public squares, and all other public places within the corporate limits of the city of Vicksburg, Mississippi, as they now exist or may hereafter be extended, and within such other territory as may now or hereafter be extended, and within such other territory as may now or hereafter be under its jurisdiction, for the purpose of laying pipes, mains, and other conduits, and erecting hydrants and other apparatus for conducting and furnishing an adequate supply of good, wholesome water to the city of Vicksburg, Mississippi, and to its inhabitants for public and private use, and for making repairs and extensions to the said system from time to time during the period in which this ordinance shall be in force.

'The said Samuel R. Bullock & Company, their associates, successors, and assigns, shall exercise the greatest care and diligence in the use of the said streets, alleys, public squares, and other public places, and shall cause no unnecessary obstruction of, or interruption to, the public travel over or upon the same, or any injury to or interference with any pipes, mains, sewers, which may now be lawfully located beneath the surface thereof.

'The said Samuel R. Bullock & Company, their associates, successors, and assigns, shall take every precaution to provide against danger to property, life, and limb by reason of the exercise of the rights and privileges hereby granted, and shall cause all excavations and obstructions to be properly lighted and guarded at night, and after the completion of the purposes for which the said streets, alleys, public squares, and other public places may be used, they shall be restored to their former condition as near as may be without unnecessary delay, and they shall at their own cost and expense...