Victor Talking Mach. Co. v. George, 6932.

• Decision Date: 14 July 1939
• Docket Number: No. 6932.,6932.
• Citation: 105 F.2d 697
• Parties: VICTOR TALKING MACH. CO. v. GEORGE.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

105 F.2d 697 (1939)

VICTOR TALKING MACH. CO. v. GEORGE.

No. 6932.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

July 14, 1939.

Isaac D. Levy, of Philadelphia, Pa., Lawrence B. Morris and Floyd H. Bradley, both of Camden, N. J., David Mackay, of New York City, Louis Levinson, of Philadelphia, Pa., and Samuel H. Richards, and Louis B. LeDuc, both of Camden, N. J., for appellant.

James Mercer Davis, of Camden, N. J. (I. C. Davis, Jr., of Norfolk, Va., and Robert L. Nase, of Flushing, N. Y., of counsel), for appellee.

Before MARIS, BIDDLE, and BUFFINGTON, Circuit Judges.

MARIS, Circuit Judge.

In his bill filed in the District Court for the District of New Jersey seeking an injunction and accounting, David Graves George, the plaintiff, alleged that Victor Talking Machine Company, the defendant, had infringed his common law rights in the words of the song "The Wreck of the Old 97," which he claimed had been composed by him and reproduced by the defendant upon one of its phonograph records. The defendant denied that the plaintiff was the author of the song. The District Court found that he was its author, and by decree entered March 31, 1933, enjoined its further use by the defendant and directed an accounting for profits. Forty-eight days after that decree the defendant appealed to this court. The plaintiff argued that the appeal should be dismissed because it was from an interlocutory decree and was not taken within thirty days. This court overruled that contention, holding that the decree was final, and on the merits held that the District Court had erred in its finding that the plaintiff was the author of the song, and reversed its decree. 3 Cir., 69 F.2d 871. The Supreme Court allowed certiorari, 293 U.S. 544, 55 S.Ct. 82, 79 L.Ed. 649, solely upon the jurisdictional issue and ruled that the decree of the District Court was interlocutory, and that, since the appeal had been taken more than thirty days after its entry, this court was without jurisdiction. It, therefore, reversed our decree and remanded the cause with directions to dismiss the appeal. 293 U.S. 377, 55 S.Ct. 229, 79 L.Ed. 439. The case thereupon proceeded to an accounting in the District Court. The District Court in a final decree entered September 15, 1938, incorporated the rulings of the interlocutory decree of March 31, 1933, by reference, and awarded the plaintiff $65,295.56 with interest. The present appeal is from the final decree.

The defendant assigns as error the finding that the plaintiff is the author of the song as well as the determination of the amount due him upon the accounting. The plaintiff argues that so much of the appeal as relates to the adjudication of defendant's liability, the subject matter of the interlocutory decree, should be dismissed. He contends that since the defendant could have appealed from the trial court's finding on this subject as embodied in the interlocutory decree and did not do so within the thirty days allowed by statute for such an appeal it is precluded from raising those issues upon this appeal from the final decree. The question thus raised depends for its answer upon the construction to be placed upon Sec. 129 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 227, 28 U.S.C.A. § 227, which authorizes appeals from interlocutory decrees granting injunctions. The section provides: "Where, upon a hearing in a district court, or by a judge thereof in vacation, an injunction is granted, continued, modified, refused, or dissolved by an interlocutory order or decree, or an application to dissolve or modify an injunction is refused, or an interlocutory order or decree is made appointing a receiver, or refusing an order to wind up a pending receivership or to take the appropriate...