Victor Talking Mach. Co. v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co.
Decision Date | 07 May 1923 |
Docket Number | 458. |
Citation | 290 F. 565 |
Parties | VICTOR TALKING MACH. CO. v. BRUNSWICK-BALKE-COLLENDER CO. et al. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Delaware |
William Houston Kenyon, Frederick Bachmann, George W. Schurman, and George T. Bean, all of New York City, John D. Myers, of Camden, N.J., and Charles F. Curley, of Wilmington, Del., for plaintiff.
Melville Church, of Washington, D.C., George W. Case, Jr., of New York City, and William G. Mahaffy, of Wilmington, Del., for defendants.
The issue in an interference declared bye the Patent Office between claim 19 of patent No. 946,442, issued to Eldridge R Johnson, assignor to Victor Talking Machine Company, and claim No. 30 of application No. 411,454, filed by John Bailey Browning, was decided by the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia in favor of Browning. 50 App.D.C. 335, 271 F 1017. Thereafter patent No. 1,402,738, containing, as claim 1, the claim in interference, was issued to Browning assignor by mesne assignments of 51/100 to the Brunswick-Balke-Collender Company. Thereupon the Victor Company instituted against Browning and the Brunswick-Balke-Collender Company this interference suit in equity under R.S.U.S. Sec. 4918 (Comp. St. Sec. 9463), to have claim 1 of the Browning patent adjudged invalid and void. The answer of the defendants prays for like relief with respect to claim 19 of the Johnson patent. The case has been heard upon bill, answer, exhibits, depositions, and testimony on the part of the plaintiff taken in open court.
The defendants, relying upon the decision of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia (put in evidence by the plaintiff probably to show an exhaustion of Patent Office remedies, Smith v. Muller (C.C.) 75 F. 612; McKnight v. Metal Volatilization Co. (C.C.) 128 F. 51; Prindle v. Brown (C.C.) 136 F. 616), rested their case without offering any evidence. They contend that the decision of the Court of Appeals is a judgment with all the incidents and consequences of a judgment; that it is conclusive herein until set aside; that it may be set aside only on the grounds of fraud, accident, mistake, or other grounds sufficient to afford equitable relief against any other judgment; that this suit is, in legal effect, a suit in the nature of a suit to set aside a judgment, but that the plaintiff, misconceiving its nature, has adduced evidence, not of the character required to set aside a judgment, but only of the kind that would tend to uphold plaintiff's patent, had there been no prior adjudication with respect thereto. They further contend, as I understand it, that if the decision of the Court of Appeals is not technically a judgment, yet its decision is in the nature of a judgment, was rendered by a tribunal of great dignity in a proceeding of like character between the same parties, and should be controlling, unless overcome by evidence that carries thorough conviction or conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, and that upon this theory, also, the plaintiff has failed to make out a case for relief.
The position of the plaintiff is that the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a judgment; that in this suit the interference issue is tried de novo upon new evidence; that the decision of the Court of Appeals is without evidential or other value in this case, save that based upon comity (see Walker on Patents, Secs. 635, 634); and that, the evidence before the Court of Appeals not having been admitted as a whole in this case, new evidence having been here produced by the plaintiff, and no evidence having been produced by the defendants, a different state of evidence exists, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is here wholly without effect.
As the Patent Office interference proceeding is purely statutory, and as the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia in such proceedings is likewise statutory, the first step in the solution of these problems must consist of an examination of the statutes pertaining thereto, the more important of which are:
Section 780 of the R.S.U.S., relating to the District of Columbia:
'The Supreme Court, sitting in banc, shall have jurisdiction of and shall hear and determine all appeals from the decisions of the Commissioner of Patents, in accordance with the provisions of section forty-nine hundred and eleven to section forty-nine hundred and fifteen, inclusive, of chapter one, title LX, of the Revised Statutes, 'Patents, Trade-Marks, and Copyrights."
Section 9 of 'An act to...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
General Electric Co. v. Hygrade Sylvania Corporation
...2 Cir., 27 F.2d 823, 832; Jones v. Freed-Eisemann Radio Corporation, D.C., 48 F.2d 300, 309; Victor Talking Mach. Co. v. Brunswick-Balke Collender Co., D. C., 290 F. 565, at page 575, affirmed, 3 Cir., 8 F.2d 41. If "courts should regard with jealousy and disfavor any attempts to enlarge th......
-
Diamond International Corporation v. Walterhoefer
...a patent on grounds of a prior "public use". Exclusive reliance for these contentions is placed upon Victor Talking Machine Co. v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., D.Del. 1923, 290 F. 565, affd. 3 Cir. 1925, 8 F.2d 41 (per curiam) and General Electric Co. v. Hygrade Sylvania Corporation et al......
-
Harper v. Zimmermann
...action in which the questions in issue are tried de novo upon all competent evidence new and old. Victor Talk. M. Co. v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co. (D. C.) 290 F. 565, 569, 570. In the case at bar the record in the Patent Office proceeding was introduced in evidence not, however, to esta......
-
General Talking Pictures Corp. v. American T. Corp., 5714.
...de novo upon all competent evidence new and old." Harper v. Zimmermann, D.C., 41 F.2d 261, 264; Victor Talking Machine Co. v. Brunswicke-Balke-Collender Co., D.C., 290 F. 565, 569, 570; Hernandez v. Prizma, D.C., 39 F.2d 196. In such a suit, prior to the amendment here in issue, the evidenc......
-
VESTED RIGHTS, "FRANCHISES," AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS.
...to the precursor of this provision in the Patent Act of 1836). (537) See Victor Talking Mach. Co. v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 290 F. 565, 570 (D. Del. 1923) (observing that in suits under Rev. Stat. [section] 4918, as in suits under [section] 4915, "all questions in issue are tried de......