Victoriano v. City of Waterloo, 22-0293

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa
• Writing for the Court: MCDONALD, JUSTICE.
• Parties: MARCELINO ALVAREZ VICTORIANO, Appellant, v. CITY OF WATERLOO, IOWA, C.J. NICHOLS, in his/her Individual and Official Capacity, and WATERLOO POLICE DEPARTMENT, Appellees.
• Docket Number: 22-0293
• Decision Date: 06 January 2023

MARCELINO ALVAREZ VICTORIANO, Appellant,
v.
CITY OF WATERLOO, IOWA, C.J. NICHOLS, in his/her Individual and Official Capacity, and WATERLOO POLICE DEPARTMENT, Appellees.

No. 22-0293

Supreme Court of Iowa

January 6, 2023

Submitted November 17, 2022

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Joel A. Dalrymple, Judge.

The plaintiff appeals from an order dismissing with prejudice his petition asserting claims arising under the Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act.

Molly M. Hamilton (argued) of Hamilton Law Firm, P.C., Clive, for appellant.

Bradley M. Strouse (argued) and Bruce L. Gettman, Jr., of Redfern, Mason, Larsen &Moore, P.L.C., Cedar Falls, for appellees.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, Samuel P. Langholz, Assistant Solicitor General, and Tessa M. Register (argued), Assistant Attorney General, for amicus curiae State of Iowa.

McDonald, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices joined.

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MCDONALD, JUSTICE.

Marcelino Alvarez Victoriano filed suit against the City of Waterloo and Waterloo Police Department Officer C.J. Nichols, alleging Nichols shot him without justification. The defendants moved to dismiss the petition pursuant to Iowa Code section 670.4A (2022), which sets forth a qualified immunity defense to and heightened pleading requirements for claims arising under the Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act (IMTCA). The district court set the motion for hearing on January 13, 2022, but on January 12 Alvarez Victoriano dismissed his petition without prejudice. The defendants moved to set aside the dismissal without prejudice. They argued Alvarez Victoriano's alleged failure to meet the statutory pleading requirement mandated "dismissal with prejudice." Id. § 670.4A(3). The district court granted the defendants' motion and entered an order dismissing the case with prejudice. The question presented in this appeal is whether the district court erred in dismissing the case with prejudice after the plaintiff had already voluntarily dismissed his case without prejudice.

A plaintiff's right to dismiss a petition without prejudice to a future action has been the law since the founding of this state. The Iowa Code of 1851 provided that a party may dismiss a case "at any time before the jury return with their verdict." Iowa Code § 1803 (1851). The Iowa Code of 1860 provided an "action may be dismissed, and such dismissal shall be without prejudice to a future action . . . [b]y the plaintiff before the final submission of the case." Iowa Code § 3127.1 (1860). The statutory right of dismissal persisted until the adoption of the rules of civil procedure in 1943. See Iowa Code, Rule of Civil Procedure No. 1

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(1946) (discussing effective date of the rules); id. r. 215 (providing for voluntary dismissal). Rule 215, adopted in 1943, allowed a party to dismiss a petition as a matter of right "without order of court . . . at any time before the trial has begun." Id. r. 215. The rule did not limit a plaintiff's ability to dismiss the petition without prejudice as a matter of right, but it did require a plaintiff to file the dismissal before trial rather than at any time before final submission. See id.

The current rule of civil procedure, Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.943 (2022), is a continuation of the prior statutes and rule. It provides, "A party may, without order of court, dismiss that party's own petition, counterclaim, crossclaim, cross-petition or petition of intervention, at any time up until ten days before the trial is scheduled to begin." Id. The current rule of civil procedure does not limit a plaintiff's ability to dismiss the petition without prejudice as a matter of right, see id. ("A dismissal under this rule shall be without prejudice, unless otherwise stated ...."), but it does require a plaintiff to file the dismissal at least ten days before trial is scheduled to begin rather than at any time before trial.

We have interpreted the voluntary dismissal rule broadly. Generally, the rule "allows plaintiffs to dismiss their petitions without prejudice and start over- once" as a matter of right. ACC Holdings, LLC v. Rooney, 973 N.W.2d 851, 852 (Iowa 2022). We have stated the rule provides "the absolute right to dismiss" a petition "without court approval" at any time prior to ten days before trial is scheduled to begin. Valles v. Mueting, 956 N.W.2d 479, 484 (Iowa 2021). Under the rule, the "court retains no discretion to prevent such dismissal." Lawson v. Kurtzhals, 792 N.W.2d 251, 256 (Iowa 2010). This is because the dismissal is

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self-executing. See, e.g., Valles, 956 N.W.2d at 484. Even when a party dismisses an "action to escape the consequences" of an opposing party's motion, "it [does] not matter." Venard v. Winter, 524 N.W.2d 163, 168 (Iowa 1994). "The motive of the dismissing party plays no part in a voluntary dismissal under [the rule]." Id.

The district court here recognized "in nearly all circumstances the plaintiff is allowed to dismiss its own petition at any time up to 10 days before trial is scheduled to begin and such dismissal shall be without prejudice." The district court concluded, however, that section 670.4A conflicted with and superseded rule 1.943 and our precedents interpreting the same. In the district court's view, a party's voluntary dismissal of a petition, when made in response to a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 670.4A, must be construed as a dismissal with prejudice.

Section 670.4A was enacted into law on June 17, 2021. See 2021 Iowa Acts ch. 183, § 14 (codified at Iowa Code § 670.4A (2022)). The act, "being deemed of immediate importance, [took] effect upon enactment." Id. § 16. The law does two things relevant here. First, Iowa Code section 670.4A(1)(a) (2022) provides qualified immunity to employees or officers subject to claims arising under the IMTCA:

1. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an employee or officer subject to a claim brought under this chapter shall not be liable for monetary damages if any of the following apply

a. The right, privilege, or immunity secured by law was not clearly established at the time of the alleged deprivation, or at the time of the alleged deprivation the state of the law was not sufficiently clear that

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